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Abstract
This thesis comprises of a collection of essays that aim at enhancing our under-
standing of the underlying mechanics of leniency policies in antitrust.
In Chapter 1, we provide a systematic overview of the most inuential contribu-
tions to the literature on collusion and leniency policies, with a focus on antitrust
law. The survey elucidates the e¤ects of leniency programmes on cartel formation
and cartel implementation.
In Chapter 2, we provide a model to investigate the impact of a leniency pro-
gramme on collusive rmsincentives to keep or destroy hard incriminating evi-
dence. We show that rms may willfully keep the hard evidence to facilitate the
implementation of the cartel. Firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence
when a leniency programme is available. Finally, rms are more likely to destroy
the hard evidence when the collusive prots-ne ratio increases.
In Chapter 3, we study the strategic interaction between a cartel and an an-
titrust authority whose evidence against the cartel is private information. Within
the framework of a signalling game, we explore the antitrust authoritys incentives
to reveal the strength of its evidence, before committing to its prosecutorial e¤ort.
We show that, despite its potentially feeble evidence, the antitrust authority
can exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier
stage of the prosecutorial process. The more generous the leniency programme,
the easier it is to induce self-reporting by the cartel.
In Chapter 4, we provide a model to characterize the optimal leniency pro-
gramme when colluding rms can invest resources to avoid detection. We show
that the optimal ne discount rate depends positively on the severity of the ne
and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost of avoidance ac-
tivities. A leniency programme that ignores rmse¤orts to avoid detection may
result in under-deterrence.
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Chapter 1: Collusion in Industrial Economics and
Optimally Designed Leniency
1.1 Introduction
The rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics crystallizes that a system of
competitive equilibria is Pareto optimal. No redistribution of resources could make
anyone strictly better-o¤, without simultaneously making someone else worse-o¤.
Nonetheless, there are situations where free markets fail to e¢ ciently allocate
the scarce resources of an economy. One blatant example of market failure is
collusion among rms. In his famous book on the Wealth of Nations Adam
Smith1 acknowledged that the market system inherently provides a fertile ground
for the development of orchestrated behaviour by rms.2 The inimical e¤ects of
collusion to the welfare of consumers calls for government intervention; antitrust
policy is one such manifestation of this. Its goal is twofold; dissolve existing cartels
and deter new cartels to form in the future.
Because of the clandestine nature of cartels, Antitrust Authorities, which are
public agencies designated to enforce antitrust law, face two major challenges.3
The rst transpires because of the limited resources they have to combat cartels.
The stringency of an antitrust authoritys budget unequivocally restrains its inves-
tigative competency. The second is due to the asymmetry of information between
an antitrust authority and cartel members. Contrary to the antitrust authority, a
rm knows whether it participates or not in a cartel. Given the high standard of
evidentiary proofs required by courts, an antitrust authority cannot prosecute car-
tels unless it discovers incriminating evidence.4 Importantly, reliable and cogent
incriminating evidence is not costlessly obtainable.
A powerful policy tool that antitrust authorities have at their disposal in or-
der to overcome the informational disadvantages vis-a-vis cartels, is leniency pro-
1Adam Smith (1723-1790) was a Scottish moral philosopher. He is considered to be the
ideological father of the freedom of choice of individuals.
2Smith [1776] lucidly observed that people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
some contrivance to raise prices.
3As Hovenkamp and Leslie [2011] put it: Firms that engage in price xing may try to reduce
their probability of antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a price-xing
conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities from antitrust enforcers.
4Theoretically, the decision of a rm as to whether to participate or not in a cartel is endoge-
nous. In real life, however, things are more complex and less straightforward than in theory. An
illuminating study case is Graphite Electrodes. For a dicussion of the concerns that surfaced in
that particular case see Hviid and Stephan [2009]. Petrinent also is the discussion on whether
tacit collusion should be considered as illegal. For a discussion, see Turner [1962], Vaska [1985],
Feuerstein [2005], Odudu [2006] and Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a].
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grammes. Essentially, leniency programmes are information revelation mechanisms
aiming to incentivise colluding rms to come forward and denounce their unlawful
conduct. More formally, a leniency programme species a set of rules for granting
reduction of nes (or even o¤ering rewards or bounties), to rms or individuals,
for actively collaborating with the antitrust authority, either before or after the
commencement of an investigation procedure.5 Depending on whom the bene-
ciary is, leniency programmes are distinguished between those addressed to rms
and those addressed to individuals.
By incentivising the instability of cartels, such programs can trigger the collapse
of existing cartels (desistance e¤ect). More importantly, they may render cartels
less protable, and thus less likely to form (deterrence e¤ect). However, leniency
programmes do not unambiguously reinforce the e¢ cacy of antitrust law enforce-
ment; poorly designed leniency programmes may exacerbate cartel behaviour and
can potentially provoke cartel formation.6 A sound understanding of the function-
ing of cartels is essential to gain a thorough insight into leniency programmes and
their e¤ect on rmsincentives to collude. Prominently, the literature on leniency
programmes in antitrust draws insights from the economic literature on generic
law enforcement. An overview of this literature can provide useful background
knowledge such that the advancements in the literature on leniency programmes
in antitrust can be fully realized.
The economic theory of antitrust law enforcement builds on the pioneering work
of Becker [1968].7 Becker was the rst to explicitly use rational choice theory to
analyze the supply side of crimes. Since Becker [1968], the study of how criminals
respond to incentives has ourished. Importantly, Beckers seminal work led to
the development of a branch of economics known as the Economic Theory of
Public Enforcement of Law.8 The analysis of the e¤ects of self-reporting schemes
for individual crimes advanced, more than two decades after Beckers contribution,
with the ground-breaking research by Malik [1990] and Kaplow and Shavell [1994].
This literature has been the lodestar for a recently developed literature on the
optimal design of leniency programmes in antitrust law enforcement. Remarkably,
this literature forged 25 years after the implementation of the Corporate Leniency
5It is worth noting that the provision of lenient treatment (or amnesty) to wrongdoers is not
a novelty of antitrust law. Lenient treatment has a long history of use in various elds of law.
For instance, bounties against wanted criminals before capture but after detection, tax evasion,
unreturned library books, parking tickets, draft evasion and illegal immigration. See Marceau
and Mongrain [2000].
6For instance, see Ellis and Wislon [2003] and Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a].
7As Becker [1968, 1993] himself concedes, the discussion has its origins to the representatives
of the enlightenment era in the 18th century, and, in particular, to philosophers Beccaria [1986]
and Bentham [1931].
8For a comprehensive survey of the economic literature on the enforcement of law see Polinsky
and Shavell [2000] and Garoupa [1997].
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Policy in the US in 1978, with the highly inuential papers by Motta and Polo
[2003] and Spagnolo [2004].9
This paper surveys the literature on collusion and the optimal design of leniency
programmes. It also reviews the literature on the economics of law enforcement,
with a focus on self-reporting schemes, both for individuals and groups of individu-
als. The objective is to encapsulate the most inuential contributions, highlighting
their main ndings and limitations, in a systematic and useful and pedagogical way
for the reader. Moreover, the paper intends to pin down possible shortcomings and
areas that require further research.
In particular, the paper considers: 1) the economic literature on collusion (how
cartels form, what challenges they confront, their e¤ects on consumers, the em-
pirical estimation of overcharges, the challenges an antitrust authority encounters
in enforcing antitrust law, the policy tools available to combat illegal cartels), 2)
the literature on public enforcement of (generic) law, with a focus on the e¤ects
of self-reporting schemes, both for individual violators and groups of violators, 3)
the literature on antitrust law enforcement, 3) the literature on the optimal design
of leniency programmes, with an emphasis put on the impact of such programs on
rmsincentives to collude and, 4) the empirical literature on the e¤ectiveness of
leniency programmes.
The paper develops as follows: section 2.2 examines the economics of collusion
with a focus on cartel formation and cartel sustainability; section 2.3 provides a
systematic, yet non-exhaustive, review of the literature on optimal law enforce-
ment; section 2.4 reviews the economic literature on leniency programmes in the
realm of antitrust policy and nally; section 4.5 concludes.
1.2 Collusion in Industrial Economics
The overarching priority of antitrust authorities in various jurisdictions across the
globe is the detection of existing cartels, and, ultimately, the deterrence of cartel
formation in the future.10 Collusive agreements among rms constitute the most
9See also the earlier working papers by Motta and Polo [1999] and Spagnolo [2000].
10For instance, see OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the
1998 Recommendations, 2006; EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, Speech/00/295,
11/9/2000; Mario Monti, Fighting cartels: Why and How? Why should we be concerned with car-
tels and collusive behavior, 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, 11-12/9/2000;
Nelly Kroes, Speech/09/375, European Economic and Social Committee, Internal market sec-
tion, Brussels, 9/9/2009; Report on Competition Policy, 2009, Brussels 3/6/2010, COM(2010)
282; US DoJ Assistant Attorney General R.H. Pate, Speech at the Third annual conference on
international and comparative law, London, UK, 16/5/2003; Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust enforcement priorities and e¤orts towards international cooperation
at the US Department of Justice, 15/11/2004, Taipei, Taiwan.
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serious and egregious form of anticompetitive behaviour. Such agreements may
adversely a¤ect consumers and the economy as a whole. On account of their
pernicious e¤ects to consumers, collusive agreements have been aptly portrayed as
a major drain11 and carcinoma12 on the free market economy.13 Apart from the
tangible malign e¤ects to welfare, such agreements have also intangible and non-
measurable e¤ects, i.e., ethical issues. In the words of Smith [1776], almost 230
years ago, a collusive agreement constitutes a conspiracy14 against consumers.15
From an economic point of view, collusion describes a situation where prices
are higher than some competitive benchmark.16 The benchmark is usually consid-
ered to be the equilibrium of a strategic scenario where rms meet only once in
the marketplace (the stage game equilibrium) and at which collusion is infeasible.
Essentially, every subgame perfect equilibrium that is distinct from a Nash equi-
librium of the stage game is considered as collusive.17 The same holds for nitely
repeated supergames.18
11OECD Report, Hard Core Cartels, [2001], p. 7.
12Mario Monti, Fighting cartels: Why and How? Why should we be concerned with cartels
and collusive behavior, 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, 11-12/9/2000.
13Some authors argue that collusion, under some conditions, may be benecial for consumers
and/or society as a whole. For instance, see Fershtman and Pakes [2000], Deltas et al. [2009],
Doyle and Martijn [2005], Bos and Pot [2012].
14The word conspiracyis used in Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restrain of trade or commerce among the
several states, or within foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
15The statement by James Randall (then CEO of ADM - one of the rms participating in
the notorious Lysine cartel) is enlightening: We are gonna get manipulated by these God damn
buyers. [...]. They can be smarter than us if we let them be smarter [...] They are not your
friend. They are not my friend. And we gotta have em. Thank God we gotta have em, but they
are not my friends. You are my friends. I wanna be closer to your than I am to any customer
cause you can make us [...] money.
16The enduring temptation of rms to coordinate their conduct in the market is not new for
economists. Almost 230 years ago Smith [1776] observed that people of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
17For instance, in a homogeneous good market with price (quantity) competition, a collusive
outcome exists whenever prices are higher than the one-shot Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium.
Motta [2004] contends that in economics collusion coincides with an outcome (su¢ ciently high
prices) and not with the specic form whereby that outcome is attained. See Motta [2004], p.
138.
18Supergames are games for which the strategic form is endogenous (the strategic form or the
beliefs over the strategic form evolve), i.e. durable goods, inventories, switching costs etc. For
these type of games any equilibrium which is distinct from a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
is considered as collusive.
A MPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players use Markov strategies. Informally,
a Markov strategy depends only on payo¤-relevant past events. This type of strategies were
introduced by Maskin and Tirole [2001].
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A collusive agreement can manifest in various ways. For instance, xing prices,
restricting production, allocating (geographically or otherwise) market shares or
consumers, and rigging bids in auctions.
Collusive agreements are classied into two broad categories: explicit and tacit.
The former involves an explicit communication between rms and typically takes
place in the framework of an organized cartel, while the latter involves collusion in
a non-cooperative manner without any explicit communication between rms. For
instance, as Rotemberg and Saloner [1990] show, in an oligopoly rms may arrive
at a viable coordination without explicit cooperation or agreement by tuning their
prices to that of the largest rm in the market. Coordinating to a commonly
acceptable collusive equilibrium, when rms tacitly collude, normally postulates
costly experimentation in the market. On the contrary, explicitly colluding rms
evade this cost. Therefore, the core of the distinction between tacit and explicit
collusion is centred on the way whereby an equilibrium is reached.
Regardless of the type of collusion, tacit or explicit, its sustainability depends
on the existence of a compliance monitoring mechanism and a mechanism to punish
unilateral defections by colluding rms.19 Importantly, the explicit coordination
does not necessarily guarantee the sustainability of the collusion, since rms com-
munication might simply be cheap talk.20 It has to be remarked though that the
motive to deviate from the collusive equilibrium exists both with explicit and tacit
collusion. Hence, the underlying economics is the same for the two types of collu-
sion (tacit and explicit). The crucial point with either type of collusion however,
is that the collusive agreement must be self-enforcing in order to be sustainable.
The (tacitly or implicitly) coordinating rms will ideally aim to reproduce, in
an articial manner, the outcome of a monopoly. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the welfare implications of a cartel are identical to that of a monopoly.
Such a statement would erroneously imply that a cartel is equivalent to a merger
that results in a monopoly. Indeed, it is totally di¤erent to have one or more rms
with market power as a result of competition on the merits (i.e., successful product
or process innovation and/or exploitation of economies of scale), and rms with
market power gained as a result of a conspiracy to impair and contravene free
market competition. The subversion of the competitive process may result, among
others, in the survival of productively less e¢ cient rms in the market21 or the
19Stigler [1964] was the rst to argue that cartels are intrinsically unstable because of the
individual cartel members incentive to benet from defecting from the agreement by means of
secret price cuts. Therefore, apart from being protable, a cartel must also be feasible. The latter
requires a mechanism to monitor rmscompliance to the agreement and a credible punishment
mechanism for defecting rms.
20In Game Theory cheap talk is the communication between players which does not directly
inuence the payo¤ of the game. See Farrell and Rabin [1996] and Crawford and Sobel [1982].
21Competition, among others, can be described as a selection process whereby only the most
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existence of unexploited economies of scale. Moreover, it can result in less product
variety, and thus freedom of choice, both for rms and consumers.
Taking the above into consideration, a starting point to describe the welfare
implications of a cartel is the standard microeconomics textbook analysis of a
monopoly.22 To begin with, a cartel causes allocative ine¢ ciency. The consumers
that continue to purchase the cartel product see the margin between their maxi-
mumwillingness to pay and the price they actually pay squeezed. As a consequence
their welfare diminishes. Although transferred from consumers to cartel members,
it is claimed that these resources should be considered as a deadweight welfare
loss. The heart of the argument is that those resources are wasted by cartel mem-
bers in rent seeking activities, which do not generate, either directly or indirectly,
any value for society.23 On the other hand, there are also consumers who stop
purchasing the product because the collusive price is greater than their maximum
willingness to pay. These consumers divert to other products to which they at-
tribute a lower value. Thus, given that the prices cease to send the right signals
to economic agents (consumers and rms), the market fails to allocate resources
to their highest and best use (allocative ine¢ ciency).
Moreover, the lack of competitive pressure, as an outcome of the formation of
a cartel, ultimately results in organizational and/or managerial slack.24 Protected
from the competitive forces and having secured supra-normal prots, colluding
rms may fail to produce at the lowest possible cost (x-ine¢ ciency).25 Finally,
rms may experience less pressure to improve their competitive position in the
market by investing in new products and/or new and more advanced production
processes. As a result, the dynamic e¢ ciency may also be unfavorably a¤ected by
the existence of collusion.
e¢ cient rm(s) survive in the market against the less productive and e¢ cient rms (Darwinian
survival-of-the-ttest). For more on concepts of competition see Vickers [1995].
22For an elegant exposition of the welfare e¤ects of market power see the trade-o¤ model by
Williamson [1968].
23These resources can be used by cartel members to secure or even to increase their market
power. For instance, lobbying and bribing, detection avoidance activities, prosecution litigation,
and developing (and maintaining) mechanisms to administer and monitor the compliance of
cartel members to the collusive agreement.
24Adam Smith maintains that Monopoly ... is the greatest enemy of good management, which
can never be universally established but in consequence of the free and universal competition which
forces every body to have recourse to it [i.e. good management] for the sake of self-defence. See
Smith [1776], pp. 163-164.
25The term x-ine¢ ciencyhas its origin to Leibenstein [1966]. Hicks [1935] vividly declared
that the best of all monopoly prots is quiet life.
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1.2.1 Empirical estimation of cartels overcharges
The empirical assessment of the welfare e¤ects of cartels exclusively focuses on
the quantitative estimation of overcharges to consumers. It has to be emphasized
that this method may not always lead to an accurate estimation of the total harm
caused to society by cartels. If, for example, the demand is insensitive to price
changes, then an increase in the price may lead to a transfer from consumers to
cartel members, which from a social welfare point of view is not ine¢ cient. Another
remark is that the estimation of the overcharges is based on data from detected
cartels. Thus, if the most successful cartels are those who remain undetected, then
the empirical estimation may underrate the overcharges of the total population of
cartels.
The relevant literature comprises of two di¤erent methodologies:26 the rst es-
timates the overcharge of each individual cartel; the second uses a meta-analysis27
to estimate the average overcharge for various cartels in di¤erent time periods
and across a range of geographical areas. Regardless of their di¤erences, the ex-
isting studies conclude that many cartels were e¤ective in achieving signicant
overcharges.28 Clearly, some cartels were more successful than others at raising
prices.29
For instance, according to Connor [2001] US citizens would have paid $65-134
million less in the absence of the notorious Lysine cartel (1992-1995). Connor and
Lande [2008] also estimate the actual overcharge30 of the vitamins cartel (1990-
1999) to $11.5 billion globally and $3.6 billion for the US economy. For the graphite
26Although there are several studies that investigate and estimate the welfare loss of monopolies
(for instance, see Harberger [1954], Schwartzman [1960], Worcester [1973], Kamerschen [1966]
and Jenny and Weber [1983], Cowling and Mueller [1978]), the estimation of the corresponding
welfare loss due to the existence of cartels is not as straightforward. This is mainly ascribed to
the ignorance of the number of cartels that actually exist in markets. What could be potentially
estimated empirically is the deadweight welfare loss caused by the detected cartels. This typically
requires the estimation of the Hicksian demand functions.
27A meta-analysis is a statistical technique for combining the ndings from independent stud-
ies.
28The di¤erences of these papers are mainly the sample selection method, the approach that
is used to estimate the overcharge, and the specication of the econometric model employed.
29The empirical literature concentrates on the welfare e¤ects of detected cartels. Apparently,
there is a data selection bias, as we do not have information with regard to the non-detected
cartels. Therefore, measuring the welfare e¤ects of all existing cartels (detected and undetected)
is a rather complex, if not impractical, task. This is a semantic di¤erence between the empirical
literature on cartels and mergers. Unlike cartels, potentially merged rms are obliged to notify
to the antitrust authority their plans to merge, and, therefore, data for all proposed mergers
exists (approved and blocked). This allows a more thorough estimation of the welfare e¤ects of
mergers, compared to cartels.
30The actual overcharge takes also into consideration the overcharge of other rms that supply
the same product but do not participate in the cartel.
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electrode cartel (1992-1997), the overcharge is estimated to 50% in the EU and 65%
in the US.31 Moreover, the overcharge for the citric acid cartel is estimated to 30%,
both for US and globally, which corresponds to $1.5 billion.32
Other studies focus on the estimation of overcharges in bid rigging auctions
and other procurement contests. For instance, Porter and Zona [1999] estimate
the overcharge in the procurement of milk to southwest Ohio schools to be, on
average, 6.5%, however, in many areas the overcharges soar to 49%. Froeb et al.
[1993] estimate the average overcharge paid by the US Defence Department for the
procurement of frozen perch to be in the range of 23-30%. Kwoka [1999] estimates
the undercharge33 to the real estate auctions in Washington DC. to 32%. Similarly,
Howard and Kaserman [2004] estimate the overcharge for the public procurements
of sewer construction projects to be approximately 36%.
As has already been alluded to, the relevant literature encompasses numerous
meta-analysis surveys. In one of his several studies, Connor [2005] uses a com-
prehensive sample, which includes around 1000 cartels, to estimate an average
overcharge of 25%. The same study estimates the average overcharge for US to
19%, while for international cartels the average overcharge is signicantly higher
and amounts to 32%. Connor and Lande [2008] estimate the average overcharge
to 27.8%, which corresponds to $711 million, while the median34 overcharge is es-
timated to 27%, which corresponds to $63.5 million. On an individual cartel level,
the range of the overcharge is $0-14,256 million, while the overcharge as a percent-
age of the sales ranges from 0 to 79.5%. Similarly, Bolotova [2009] estimates the
average overcharge for all cartels in the period 1770-2006 (legal, illegal, US and
international) to 21.88%, while the median overcharge amounts to 20%. On an
individual cartel level, the range of the overcharge is -5.3-81.8%.35 By using a sub-
sample of 157 modern international cartels in the period 1991-2005, covering more
than 80 di¤erent markets, the same study estimates the overcharge to 27.81% and
the median overcharge to 28%. The range of the overcharge on individual cartel
31OECD, Report, Hard Core Cartels, 2000, OECD, Report - Fighting Hard Core Cartels:
Harm, E¤ective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes, 2002 and OECD, Hard Core Cartels 
Recent progress and challenges ahead, 2003.
32OECD, Report, Hard Core Cartels, 2000.
33This is because bidders collude to lower, rather than to increase, their bids.
34In general, the statistical average can severely inuenced by the existence of extreme values
(outliers) in the sample and the selection of a non-representative set of observations. When the
distribution exhibits asymmetry, it is more appropriate to use a measure which is based on the
median of the sample of observations. The median can estimate with greater accuracy the central
tendency of the distribution rather than the average.
For the empirical estimation of cartel overcharges, the statistical average can be sometimes
misleading, especially when there is a small number of cartels that were extremely successful in
raising prices. That is why, by convention, both, the average and median, are calculated.
35Evidently, some cartels were not successful at setting positive overcharges for their products.
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level is 0-90.9%.
More recently, Boyer and Kotchoni [2011] conduct a rened meta-analysis and
show that the overcharges are signicantly lower than previously estimated in
the literature. In particular, the authors estimate, after correcting biases in the
estimation method and the publication source of data, an average overcharge of
17.5%, with median overcharge of 14.1%.36
Functioning of cartels Before exploring the e¤ects of leniency programmes,
it may be worthwhile to analyze the microfoundations of cartels (i.e., compre-
hend how a cartel operates and what constraints, intrinsic or extrinsic, it copes
with). For this the focus initially is to delineate the underlying rationale for rms
participation to cartels. Subsequently, the spotlight is turned to the factors that
potentially facilitate or hamper cartelssustainability.
According to economic theory, the restrictions that a cartel encounters boil
down to two fundamental equations: the participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint. The former determines the incentives to form or to join a
cartel. A prot maximizing rm will join a cartel if the (expected) benets exceed
the (expected) costs associated with its participation to the cartel. The benet is
the additional (supra-competitive) prots due to the coordinated behavior, while
the expected cost is the ne that a rm has to pay in case of detection and
conviction by an antitrust authority.37 Noticeably, the level of the expected cost
of the cartel, contrary to the expected benet, is inuenced by the level of the ne
and the probability of detection; two policy instruments. Nonetheless, a cartels
sustainability in the long-run is precarious because of the innate temptation of
its members to defect from the illegal agreement. This will be the case if the
deviation prots exceed the loss entailed from the ensuing retaliatory measures
by other cartel members and the concomitant deprivation of future supra-normal
prots. The relationship between the compliance and non-compliance prots is
encapsulated by the incentive compatibility constraint.
Correspondingly, the economic literature on collusion consists of two strands.
The rst deals with the procedures of cartel formation and examines cartel stabil-
ity. It uses the static game theory approach, and thus by its very nature leaves
unexplained why some cartels are more successful than others (i.e., last for a longer
period of time). In other words, it concerns explicit rather than tacit collusion. No-
36For other empirical studies estimating cartels overcharges see, Werdem and Simon [1987],
Gri¢ n [1989], Cohen and Sche¤man [1989], Gallo et al. [2000], Connor [2001], Posner [2001],
Connor [2003], Werden [2003], Connor and Bolotova [2006], Levenstein and Suslow [2006], Connor
and Lande [2008], Bolotova et al. [2007] and Miller and Connor [2010].
37Realistically, the cost of a cartel also takes into account the potential 1) private damages
actions, 2) individual sanctions (e.g. risk of criminal proceedings, disqualication of directors,
personal damages) and 3) reputational damages because of adverse publicity.
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tably, this branch of the literature is closely related to the one on non-cooperative
games of coalition formation with payo¤ externalities.38 The second focuses on
the enforcement of the collusive behavior. In particular, it uses the supergame-
theoretic approach to explore the factors that reinforce or hinder the sustainability
of cartels. Furthermore, it investigates the factors that facilitate the adoption of
a commonly acceptable collusive equilibrium. Clearly, this literature concentrates
on rmsincentive compatibility constraints, leaving unexplained the participation
constraints.
1.2.2 Cartel Formation
As mentioned above, the heart of the literature on cartel formation is based around
the stability of cartels.39 A cartel is said to be stable if it is individually rational for
every rm participating in the cartel to remain in the cartel (internal stability) and
for every rm not participating in the cartel to remain outside the cartel (external
stability).40
A central remark of this literature is that a cartel is basically a public good.
A rm that decides to stay an outsider cannot be excluded from the positive
externality that is generated by the coordinated conduct of cartel members.41 The
public good properties of a cartel give rise to a free-riding problem. Invariably,
the opportunistic behaviour undermines a cartels fragile stability. However, this
line of argument disregards the e¤ect on the equilibrium price, and consequently
the impact on rms prots, after a change in rms membership of the cartel.
The process of cartel formation was originally analyzed by Selten [1973]. The
main conclusion of the study is that under Cournot competition, the process of
forming a cartel in a market that comprises of more than ve rms is quite di¢ cult
and most probably will be futile. With more than ve rivals, it becomes more
advantageous to stay out of the cartel formed by others. This is because the
position of an outsider becomes more attractive as the number of competitors
38See Bloch [1996, 2005] and Yi [1997].
39A crucial assumption of this literature is that cartels are sustained with binding agreements
or enforceable contracts. This implicitly entails that collusive rmsconduct does not change
when a defection occurs in the market.
40The concepts of internal and external stability were originally introduced by dAspremont
et al. [1983].
41The intrinsic di¢ culty in convincing rms to form a cartel was originally pointed out by
Stigler [1950, 1983] in a discussion of horizontal mergers. Stigler [1950] maintained that If there
are relatively few rms in the industry, the major di¢ culty in forming a merger is that it is
more protable to be outside a merger that to be a participant. The outsider sells at the same
price but at much larger output at which marginal cost equals price.Stigler [1950] p. 25. It is
noteworthy to remark the resemblance between rmsincentives to merge and form a cartel. In
both scenarios rms have similar incentives to free ride. Thus, in principle, the two literatures,
on cartel formation and mergers, are alike.
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increases.42 More precisely, the numerical analysis by Selten [1973] demonstrates
that if there are four or less rivals, then a cartel forms with certainty. If there are
ve, the probability that all ve collude is 0.22. If there are more than ve rivals,
this probability drops to approximately 0.01.43
Contrary to Selten [1973], who considers the cartel as another rm in a Cournot-
competition game, dAspremont et al. [1983] focus on the formation of a dominant
cartel. A dominant cartel acts as a price leader, whereas all rms outside the
cartel remain price-takers. In a model of collusive price leadership with increasing
marginal cost, dAspremont et al. [1983] show that there is always a stable cartel,
provided that a nite number of rms exists. Moreover, the authors show that the
fraction of the rms that participate in a stable cartel diminishes with the number
of rms that are active in the market.44 This is because, the smaller the size of the
cartel (in relation to market), the poorer the e¤ect of the marginal collusive rm
on the equilibrium price. Similar conclusions apply when the strategic decision of
rms is at the level of production (and not the price), as Donsimoni et al. [1986]
show.
In another study, Donsimoni [1985] examines the e¤ects of the existence of
asymmetry in costs, assuming increasing marginal costs. The main result of the
study is that heterogeneous stable cartels, i.e., cartels with di¤erent types of rms,
are feasible. Stable cartels comprise of the most e¢ cient rms, while the less
e¢ cient rms remain independent outsiders.
Sha¤er [1995] demonstrates that when the strategic variable is the level of
production, and when there is a Cournot fringe, the stable cartel comprises of 50%
of the rms, regardless of the total number of rms in the market.45 However,
Escrihuela-Villar [2004] shows that when rms simultaneously make their strategic
decisions, then 80% of them participate in the stable cartel.46 The intuition is that
42This does not imply that it is more di¢ cult to enforce the collusive agreement if there are
more rivals in the market. Indeed, in Seltens [1973] model there is no room for cheating since
cartels appear as non-cooperative Nash equilibria with perfect and complete information.
43For a simplied exposition of Seltens [1973] model, see Phlips [1995], pp. 23-28.
44The size of the market is determined by the number of active rms. Technically, this is due
to the assumption that the demand function is homogeneous of degree one with respect to the
number of rms in the market. This implies that i) the equilibrium price depends on the number
of rms in the market and ii) the prots per rm, when the price is chosen optimally, depend on
the fraction of rms in the dominant cartel. As dAspremont et al. [1983] admits it remains an
open question whether this conclusion holds with more general demand and cost functions.
45This conrms previous ndings by Selten [1973], dAspremont et al. [1983] and Donsimoni
et al. [1986]. Moreover, it resembles to Kamien and Zang [1990] who show that by prohibiting
mergers that result in rms acquiring more than 50% of the the rms in the market partial,
monopolization is completely eliminated.
46Note the similarity of this nding with the merger paradox result by Salant et al. [1983].
The authors show that a merger (that entails no e¢ ciency gains) between two or more rms in
a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous good is not protable unless it accounts for more that
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a cartel member appropriates a higher share of collusive prots when only a small
number of rms participate in the cartel. At the same time, joining the cartel is
more appealing since outside cartel competition is erce. Conversely, if the number
of cartel participants is large, cartel prots are distributed among many rms, and,
therefore, abandoning the cartel becomes more tempting. The prots of the rms
that remain outside the cartel are relatively high compared to cartel prots.
The role of private information on rmsincentives to form a cartel is examined
by Hviid [1992]. The author assumes that the cartel operates as a quantity leader
and focuses the analysis on an involuntary information transmission from the cartel
to any outside rms. The information pertains to a common random parameter
in the demand function. The main nding of the paper is that private information
dampens rms incentives to form a cartel. Apart from the existing free-riding
e¤ect, Hviid [1992] shows that outsiders also benet from the correct inference of
the cartels output choice.
A signicant contribution to the literature focusing more generally on coali-
tion formation procedures is made by Bloch [1996, 2002]. The author illustrates
the di¤erence between simultaneous and sequential games of coalition formation,
and games of open and exclusive memberships. In simultaneous procedures, the
formation of a cartel is not feasible because rms have an incentive to free-ride
on a cartel that is formed by other rms. Contrarily, in sequential move games
the formation of a (partial) cartel is feasible because of the ability of the rms,
and, in particular, those rms that move rst, to credibly commit to stay out of
the cartel.47 Moreover, Bloch [2002] investigates the prospect of signing bilateral
market sharing agreements between rms, whereby rms commit not to enter each
others market territory.48
1.2.3 Cartel Sustainability
In spite of the absence of an explicit agreement, rms can circumvent the com-
petitive pressures that squeeze their prots by recognizing the interdependence of
their strategic choices. This idea originates form Chamberlin [1929, 1933] and it
has been formally developed by Friedman [1971]. Friedman [1971] shows that col-
lusion can be sustained if rms condition their conduct in the market on the history
of their strategic interaction.49 In particular, the author demonstrates that rms
are able to maintain a collusive equilibrium by adopting grim trigger strategies.
80% of the total number of rms in the market.
47The sequence of moves has a commitment value.
48For a selective survey on the major contributions of the literature on cartel formation see
Bloch [2005].
49Essentially, the collusive outcome can be supported in equilibrium if rms are su¢ ciently
patient (i.e., if the discount factor is su¢ ciently high).
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This type of strategy calls for an eternal reversion to the stage game equilibrium in
case of deviation from the collusive equilibrium.50 A weakness of these strategies is
that they preclude the possibility to adapt the level of punishment, if a deviation
from the collusive equilibrium occurs.51 Abreu [1986, 1988] remarks that if the
payo¤ at the punishment phase is positive, then the severity of the punishment
can be strengthened.52 This would decrease the stream of post deviation prots,
and, hence, facilitate the sustainability of the collusive equilibrium. Specically,
Abreu [1988] denes the concept of optimal penal codesas a particular trigger
strategy that entails a punishment, which may lead rms to make losses for a num-
ber of periods (the stick) in case of defection from the collusive equilibrium. The
optimal penal code prescribes that rms will return to the collusive equilibrium
(the carrot) provided that all of them participate in the punishment phase for
a given number of time periods; otherwise, rms will remain in the punishment
phase.
The above suggests that an essential condition for the success of tacit collusion
is repeated interaction of rms in a market. Without repeated interaction, rms
will be confronted with a PrisonersDilemma situation; although all of them can
make higher prots by coordinating their actions, each of them can expropriate
more by unilaterally diverging from the collusive equilibrium. On the contrary,
with repeated interaction, the rm that is tempted to renege from the collusive
equilibrium, by imposing, for instance, a lower than the agreed price, acknowledges
that its benet from the deviation will be ephemeral if the other collusive rms
are competent enough to trace and reciprocate such a behavior. Thus, another
essential condition for the sustainability of collusion is the existence of su¢ cient
transparency to enable or facilitate the detection of such deviations. Indeed, Stigler
[1964] argues that the greatest challenge to the sustainability of a cartel is secret
price cuts. The weakness or inability to monitor the compliance to the agreement
may trigger or precipitate the occurrence of price wars among cartel members.
According to Stigler [1964], price wars signal the collapse of the cartel.
However, Green and Porter [1984] argue that price wars do not always con-
rm Stiglers conclusion. In particular, Green and Porter [1984] maintain that
occasional price wars are a property of the collusive equilibrium, even if no ac-
50This is because trigger strategies set an upper bound, which is dened by the Nash Equilib-
rium of the stage game, to the severity of the punishment when a defection is detected. Another
weakness of grim trigger strategies is that they are not renegotiation-proof. That is, it is in the
interests of rms to negotiate again in order to restart collusion, depriving the grim trigger of
credibility, and thus e¤ectiveness. For more on renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated games
see Farrell and Maskin [1989] and van Damme [1989].
51For other signicant studies characterizing the optimal penal codes see Lambson [1987, 1994,
1995] and Häckner [1996].
52As we will see in section 2.4 the punishment strategies adopted by colluding rms signicantly
impact on the magnitude of the deterrence e¤ects of leniency programmes.
13
tual deviation occurs. E¤ectively, price wars are a mechanism that incentivises
colluding rms to abstain from opportunistic behavior.
As already mentioned, a di¢ culty that rms face with tacit collusion is the
coordination to a commonly acceptable equilibrium, given that there is a plethora
of potential candidates.53 The feasible set of equilibria consists of a set that ranges
from the competitive to the monopoly equilibrium. With repeated interaction
rms can enforce any of these equilibria, provided that they su¢ ciently discount
future prots. Many theorems have been developed in the literature, commonly
known as Folk theorems, that allow for the justication of the selection of specic
collusive equilibria in innitely repeated games.54 In e¤ect, Folk theorems provide
an appropriate tool for the analysis of the sustainability mechanism of collusion.
The second strand of the economic literature on collusion focuses on the iden-
tication of factors that enables rms to coordinate and sustain their cooperation
without necessarily resorting to an explicit agreement. Although the assumptions
of the papers in the relevant literature di¤er, the underlying mechanism that drives
their results is the same. The mechanism operates through i) the e¤ect on rms
ability to coordinate to a commonly acceptable collusive equilibrium and ii) the
costs and benets that emanate from cartel defection. Among the factors that are
considered to facilitate the sustainability of collusion are the following: small num-
ber of rms55; high market concentration rate56; high frequency of interaction57;
multi-market interaction58; market transparency59; and information exchange60.
On the other hand, factors that facilitate surpassing the problems of a cartels
sustainability include: barriers to entry61; cost asymmetries62; buyer power63 and;
asymmetric information64. The e¤ects of restrictions in productive capacity of
53Tirole called this the embarrassment of riches. See Tirole [1988], p. 244.
54For instance, see Friedman [1971], Aumann and Shapley [1976], Rubinstein [1979] and Fu-
denberg and Maskin [1986].
55Shapiro [1989].
56Bain [1956].
57Snyder [1996].
58Bernheim and Whinston [1990], Spagnolo [1999] and Scott [2008].
59Porter [1983], Green and Porter [1984] and Abreu [1986].
60Porter [1983], Farrell [1987], Kandori and Matsushima [1998], Compte [1998], Athey and
Bagwell [2001] and Kühn [2001].
61Bain [1956], Modigliani [1958], Labini [1969], Tirole [1988], Neven [1989] and Wilson [1992] 
for empirical research see Levenstein [1995], Clay and Troesken [2002] and Levenstein and Suslow
[2006].
62Bain [1948], Rothschild [1999] and Miklós-Thal [2009].
63Stigler [1964] and Snyder [1996].
64Roberts [1985], Cramton and Palfrey [1990], Kihlstrom and Vives [1992], Athey and Bagwell
[2001], Athey et al. [2004], Compte [1998], Kandori and Matsushima [1998] and Verboven [1998].
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rms65, asymmetries in the size and distribution of productive capacity of rms66,
product di¤erentiation67 and business cycles68, are less clear-cut.
1.2.4 Asymmetry of information between antitrust authorities and col-
luding rms
The possibility of rms engagement in illegal collusive activities brings to the
surface an acute information problem. This emanates from the existence of asym-
metric information between an antitrust authority and the rms that participate
in a cartel. Rational rms, fully conscious of the illegality of collusive agreements,
adopt a code of silenceto conceal their unlawful conduct, and remain undetected
by antitrust authorities. Consequently, the greatest challenge for an antitrust
authority is to gather or elicit incriminating evidence to expose and eventually
convict illegal cartels and their members. The hunt for evidence may not always
be fruitful as collusive rms may manipulate or even destroy the evidence. Ad-
ditionally, market investigations and appeal processes are costly for an antitrust
authority, as they require the commitment of resources. More importantly, even
though an antitrust authority detects such evidence it will nevertheless be hard to
convict the cartel because of the high standard of evidentiary proof required by
courts.
Enforcement policy instruments The portfolio of standard policy instru-
ments an antitrust authority has to combat illegal cartels comprise of i) market
investigations and ii) nes for convicted cartels. These two instruments signif-
icantly impact on cartel deterrence, as they jointly determine the expected ne
for a cartel. An increase, either in the magnitude of the ne or the probability of
detection, su¢ ces to alter the relationship between the expected costs and benets
emanating from the participation to a collusive agreement, as is reected by the
participation constraint. Moreover, by changing the balance of the relationship be-
tween deviation and compliance prots, as reected by the incentive compatibility
constraints, such changes may instigate the collapse of existing cartels.
The e¢ cacy of such an enforcement policy hinges on the size of the maximum
feasible ne69 and the resources available to the antitrust authority. The latter
65Brock and Scheinkman [1985] and Davidson and Deneckere [1990].
66Compte et al. [2002].
67Deneckere [1983], Chang [1991], Ross [1992], Raith [1996] and Symeonidis [2002].
68Rotemberg and Saloner [1986], Haltiwanger and Harrington [1991], Staiger and Wolak [1992]
and Bagwell and Staiger [1997].
69Becker was the rst to explicitly argue that nes are bounded by the o¤enders wealth. See
Becker [1968], pp. 183-185 and pp. 191-193. In a similar vein, antitrust nes are also argued
to be bounded. The argument is twofold. Firstly, high nes may jeopardize a rms nancial
vigor, and even its market survival, contrary to the ultimate objectives of antitrust policy. Thus,
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constrains the number of market investigations and, hence, the probability of de-
tection. Ideally, the probability of detection would be equal to 1, assuming that all
cartels retard competition and produce malign welfare e¤ects.70 However, given
the scarce resources an antitrust authority has at its disposal, the actual proba-
bility of detection is signicantly less than this level.71 Therefore, the cap on the
ne and the limited resources of the antitrust authority condition the e¢ ciency of
the enforcement policy.
The boundaries to the e¤ectiveness of the enforcement policy may be relaxed
with the advent of an information revelation mechanism, such as a leniency pro-
gramme. Essentially, leniency programmes are mechanisms that incentivise collu-
sive rms and/or individuals to come forward and denounce the cartel. A properly
designed leniency programme can break the walls of secrecy that surround the car-
tel and its members from inside. The concession may range from a reduction in
the ne to the grant of a positive reward/bounty to the whistle-blower(s).
A leniency programme has many constituent elements. Specically, it stip-
ulates, among other things, the number of possible beneciaries of leniency, the
stage of the investigation procedure at which leniency is o¤ered (before or after the
investigation), whether a ringleader or a repeated o¤ender is qualied to apply for
leniency, the size of the ne reduction and the impact of the quantity and quality
of information, and the sequence with which such information is provided. The
transparency and condentiality are two other inuential elements for the e¤ec-
tiveness of leniency programmes. All these elements are crucial for the design of
leniency programmes achieving the optimal level of cartel deterrence.72
antitrust nes are bounded to avoid bankruptcy. Secondly, the principle of proportionality
applies. According to this principle the severity of the ne must be correlated to the magnitude
of the harm caused by the o¤ender. In other words, the punishment should t the crime. Taking
also into account the possibility of legal errors, which implies that nes are not socially costless,
the application of this principle also restricts the level of the ne. For a recent discussion on the
optimal antitrust nes, see Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2007] and Houba et al. [2011].
70We deliberately neglect the possibility of welfare enhancing e¤ects as this is not the focus of
this survey paper.
71Bryant and Eckard [1991] estimate the probability of detection to be at most in the range of
13-17% for the US using data from 1961-1988. A similar study by Combe et al. [2008] estimate
the probability of detection at EU level to be in the range of 12.9-13.3% using data from 1969-
2007. A more recent study by Ormosi [2011] estimates that cartel detection rate in the EU has
stayed below 20% for most of the analyzed period (1985-2005), and it frequently dropped under
10%.
72Hammond distinguishes three essential cornerstones of an e¤ective Leniency Program: 1) se-
vere sanctions for those rms participating in cartels, 2) increased fear of detection by antitrust
authorities for non-reporting rms and, 3) transparent leniency programme so that rms can
predict with a high degree of certainty how they will be treated if they apply for leniency, and
what the consequences will be if they do not. See, Scott Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforce-
ment, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, ICN Workshop on Leniency Programmes,
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A leniency programme can have both deterrence and desistance e¤ects. It may
enable, respectively, the deterrence of cartels that would otherwise have formed,
and the detection of existing cartels that would otherwise have gone undetected.
As a result of the introduction of a leniency programme, the e¢ cacy of antitrust
enforcement may improve. To fully comprehend the underlying working mecha-
nisms of such programs, we rst need to identify the costs and benets emanating
from a leniency application. The determinative benet for a cartel member that
applies for leniency is its privileged treatment with regard to the level of the ne
it will pay in case of conviction by the antitrust authority. This benet is a func-
tion of the avoided ne, the probability of successful prosecution of the cartel,
once detected, and the probability with which the whistle-blower actually receives
leniency. On the other hand, the cost for a rm that actively collaborates with
an antitrust authority, on the basis of a leniency programme, is represented by
the collusive supra-normal prots that the rm forgoes due to the collapse of the
cartel, and the likely retaliation measures by its ex partners.
The next subsection briey cites the main e¤ects of leniency programmes, both
on cartel stability and cartel sustainability. A more systematic exposition of these
issues is reserved for Section 2.4.
1.2.5 Deterrence e¤ects of leniency programmes
To begin with, a leniency programme may have direct deterrence e¤ects.73 Theo-
retically, it is possible that a leniency programme achieves the rst best of complete
deterrence of cartels without the antitrust authority incurring any cost for active
investigations.74 Spagnolo [2004] proves that if only the rst self-reporting rm
is eligible for leniency, and if this rm is rewarded with the nes imposed on all
other cartel members, then the e¢ cacy of the enforcement policy would reach its
maximum at zero cost.75 A similar nding is uncovered by Buccirossi and Spag-
nolo [2006a]. Moreover, Motchenkova [2004] demonstrates that when nes are
proportional to the accumulated collusive prots and the application procedure
for obtaining leniency is condential (rms cannot instantaneously react to the
22-23/11/2004, Sydney, Australia.
73The deterrence e¤ects of Leniency Programs are explored in more details in
Section 2.4.
74Notably, this theoretical result contradicts the results of a recent experimental study by
Bigoni et al. [2012]. These authors show that deterrence is enhanced when positive rewards are
not available to self-reporting (experimental) subjects.
75Houba et al. [2011] conrm this result in a more general setting without imposing any
restrictions on functional forms and the mode of competition between rms. The main novelty
of this paper is that it relaxes the assumption regarding the protection of a deviator form the
punishment by other cartel members.
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actions of their rivals), then complete deterrence is feasible, provided that the ne
is su¢ ciently high.76
The deterrence power of the enforcement policy may also amplied by a le-
niency programme that o¤ers bounties to individual self-reporters. As shown by
Aubert et al. [2006], when such a leniency programme is available, rms must
pay higher compensations to their employees in order to preserve their silence.
Markedly, the higher the compensation, the higher the cost of collusion. There-
fore, cartel deterrence may be fostered by the introduction of a leniency programme
that is available to individuals.
A leniency programme may also impact on cartel deterrence indirectly. The
collapse of cartelssecrecy walls from inside and the ensuing desistance of cartels
may relieve prosecution costs and accelerate the judicial procedures. As demon-
strated by Motta and Polo [2003], the released resources of the antitrust authority
could be used to enhance cartel detection rates, and thereby leniency programmes
can indirectly increase cartel deterrence.
1.2.6 Desistance e¤ects of leniency programmes
A leniency programme may also trigger the collapse of existing cartels by under-
mining their (internal) stability.77 In particular, as shown by Spagnolo [2004] and
Harrington [2008], a leniency programme may increase the payo¤of cheating in the
market by protecting the defector from antitrust nes. This will be the case if a
rm simultaneously defects in the market and applies for leniency. This impacts on
rmsincentive compatibility constraints, and, thus, cartelssustainability. Even
if a rm is unwilling to blow the whistle, there is a genuine danger that some
other rm will. This potential undermines the fragile trust among cartel mem-
bers. E¤ectively, a leniency programme thrusts rms into a Prisonersdilemma
through a race to the courtwhich ultimately squeezes the expected prots from
collusion. Thus, by undermining the already feeble trust among rms, a leniency
programme may increase the riskiness of collusion. However, this e¤ect transpires
only when the whistle-blowers are o¤ered advantageously discriminate treatment
with regard to the rate of ne reduction.78 A similar result exists for programs
o¤ering leniency to individuals. In e¤ect, with the introduction of such programs,
rms are not only in a race with their rivals but also in a race with their culpable
employees.
76However, contrary to Spagnolo [2004], the optimal rate of law enforcement is positive. In
other words, to achieve the complete deterrence of cartels, the antitrust authority must credibly
commit some of its resources to market investigations.
77The desistance e¤ects of leniency programmes are thoroughly explored in Section 2.4.
78An extreme example is when only the rst self-reporting rm is eligible to receive lenient
treatment.
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Leniency programmes may also vitiate the punishment mechanisms that rms
use to curb opportunism and secure the conformity to the agreement. As shown by
Spagnolo [2004], a leniency programme may increase the future nes and reduce
the expected prots from continuing the participation to the cartel.79
Despite their benets, the economic literature highlights that only properly and
carefully designed leniency programmes can fruitfully induce self-reporting. In-
deed, the relevant literature underscores that poorly designed leniency programmes
may result in counterproductive side e¤ects. For instance, wrongly designed le-
niency programmes may exacerbate collusive behaviour or provoke cartel forma-
tion. As Motta and Polo [2003] argue, leniency programmes essentially decrease
the expected cost of cartels, and thereby can, contrary to their principal objection,
cultivate cartel formation. Moreover, Ellis and Wislon [2003] and Motchenkova
and Leliefeld [2010] maintain that leniency programmes may provide collusive
rms with a disciplining device to thwart defections from the illegal agreement.
Similarly, Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a] demonstrate that leniency programmes
may alleviate the inherent hold-up problems of some types of previously infeasible
collusive arrangements. Aubert et al. [2006] also show that leniency programmes
may prevent benign cooperation between rms (i.e., legitimate joint ventures) or
detrimentally a¤ect the internal structure of colluding rms.
The next section presents a systematic review of the literature on the optimal
enforcement of (generic) law.
1.3 The Economics of the Optimal Enforcement of Law
The economic literature on the optimal law enforcement begins with the seminal
paper by Becker [1968].80 Beckers pioneering ideas have been the locomotive for
the development of rigorous economic analysis of crime and punishment. The in-
vestigation of criminal behavior was, until then, dominated by sociologists and
psychologists who argued that crime reects social environment problems (e.g.,
problematic families, social inequality, class warfare, subculture and social oppres-
sion), and that criminals were helpless victims. Crime was also linked to bio-
logical characteristics (e.g. natural-born criminals, heredity, organic disorders) or
to psychopathological characteristics (e.g., mental illness, distress, dysfunction).
However, none of these theories managed to adequately interpret the causes of
79This will be the case if i) the collusive agreement is sustained by two phase stick and carrot
punishment strategies à la Abreu [1986, 1988] and ii) a recidivist is severely punished.
80For a systematic and meticulous survey of this literature see Polinsky and Shavell [2000] and
Garoupa [1997].
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criminal behavior, nor had any such theory focused upon the premise that all
individuals are potential criminals.
Beckers work is built on the assumption that individuals are rational expected
utility maximizers. As such, their decision to engage in criminal activities is based
on the comparison between the expected net returns from committing a crime,
and the benet derived from legitimate activities (the opportunity cost of crime).
A public agency which implements and enforces law (enforcement agency) aims to
minimize the social cost caused by crimes. The social cost of crimes involves both
the harm caused to society by the illegal act and the enforcement costs. The latter
includes all expenditures the agency makes for police and the courts. Prominently,
these expenditures determine the probability of detection and conviction.81 The
law enforcement agency can choose the type of punishment (e.g. imprisonment or
nes) as well as the severity of punishments.
In this framework, the optimal level of enforcement is attained when only those
illegal acts for which the net gain that accrues to a violator is lower than the harm
caused to society are prevented (ine¢ cient crime).82 Those criminal activities for
which the individual benet to the violator exceeds the loss caused to society
should not be deterred (e¢ cient crime). Thus, according to Beckers analysis only
the socially ine¢ cient crime must be deterred.83
Becker concludes that the least costly policy to enforce the law is to set the
ne at its maximum feasible level84 and to use the probability of apprehension
as a complement to the ne. The idea is that the expected ne must be at a
level that optimally deters crime.85 This conclusion is crucially grounded on two
assumptions. The rst is that an increase either in the ne or in the probability
of apprehension increases the expected cost of criminal behavior. The second
is that nes are costless transfers. Although the former assumption seems to
be realistic, the latter is controversial because of the non-binding nature of the
enforcement agencys decisions and the costs associated with administrative control
(e.g. possibility of erroneous decisions).
In particular, Beckers assumption that nes are simple transfers from criminals
to taxpayers (and thus the cost of collecting a ne is unrelated to its size) does
not hold when violators: i) engage in socially costly detection avoidance activities
81As we will see in Section 2.4, Motta and Polo [2003] discriminate the probability of detection
from the probability of conviction. The rationale is that detection does not always guarantee
conviction.
82This rule resembles to the contemplations of Beccaria [1986]. According to Beccaria, the
main objective of law enforcement is to reduce the frequency of ine¢ cient outlawed courses of
action.
83This result is known in the literature as the Beckers rule.
84The maximum feasible ne is restricted by individualswealth so as to prevent bankruptcy.
85In Beckers model the probability of detection serves as a priceincentive that induces the
quantity of o¤ences suppliedby individuals.
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(Malik [1990]), ii) have an aversion to risk (Polinsky and Shavell [1979]) and, iii)
can commit crimes of di¤erent gradation of seriousness (Stigler [1970]). In those
instances, the optimal ne may not be the maximum feasible ne.
Finally, Becker argues that nes are preferred to other types of punishment,
such as imprisonment. Unlike nes, imprisonment is socially costly, since a prisoner
su¤ers a utility loss. In addition, with imprisonment the government ultimately
ends up spending86, rather than gathering resources, in order to maintain correc-
tional institutions and facilities. Besides, Becker argues that prisoners are unable
to productively work during their time in prison; hence the diminished labor force
represents an additional cost to society. Nevertheless, he maintains that if nes
are not feasible, then the enforcement agency ought to resort to imprisonment to
achieve the optimal level of crime deterrence.
Malik [1990] contests, and indeed invalidates, Beckers main thesis, namely,
that the optimal ne must be set at its maximum feasible level. He argues that if
individuals can potentially engage in activities that reduce the probability of de-
tection (avoidance activities), then it will not be optimal to impose the maximum
feasible ne. The underlying rationale is that a higher ne induces individuals
to invest more resources into socially unproductive avoidance activities.87 This
implies that nes are not costless transfers, as assumed by Becker [1968]. In the
light of this, the design of the optimal law enforcement policy, should serve, in con-
trast to Becker [1968], two conicting goals; optimizing deterrence and minimizing
avoidance activities.
In this context, Malik shows that the optimal ne is such that the marginal
benet of a higher ne in reducing the enforcement cost of deterrence is equal
to the marginal cost of raising wasteful avoidance e¤orts. The optimal level of
the ne is, in principle, below the maximum feasible ne. He also argues that
86Resources used for establishing and maintaining jails and other correctional facilities.
87A limitation in Maliks analysis is that it disregards the possibility of cross-e¤ects between
crime and avoidance. This is basically due to the assumption that individuals make a binary
decision, namely, to commit an illegal act of a specic degree or not. Any changes in the
magnitude of the punishment (ne or probability of detection) may a¤ect an individuals decision
to commit a crime but not the severity of the crime. Thus, a change in the level of the punishment
gives rise to two direct e¤ects: the deterrence e¤ect and the avoidance e¤ect. The deterrence
e¤ect emerges because an increase in the punishment increases the marginal cost of crime, and,
thus, reduces crime. The avoidance e¤ect emerges because an increase in the punishment implies
a higher benet from avoidance, and, thus, increases investment in avoidance. However, there is
another indirect e¤ect between crime and avoidance. A greater investment in avoidance reduces
the marginal expected punishment, thereby inducing more crime. Similarly, a lower level of
crime reduces the expected punishment, thereby decreasing the marginal benet of avoidance.
The complementarity between crime and avoidance is explored by Nussim and Tabbach [2009].
The authors show that increasing the punishment may result in more crime, contrary to Malik
[1990].
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the social costs associated with avoidance activities provide a rationale to screen
individuals and impose nes that are type dependent (i.e., nes that depend on
the private benets accrued to individuals by their criminal activity). In e¤ect,
screening allows the enforcement agency to eliminate the avoidance activities of
those individuals whose private gain exceed the harm caused to society by their
illegal act, without deterring them from engaging in the illegal activity. On the
contrary, without screening, the optimal enforcement policy may deter the occur-
rence of socially e¢ cient criminal activities for which the private benet to the
violator exceeds the cost caused to society. Hence, the possibility of screening a
violators private benet may enable the law enforcement agency to reduce the
avoidance costs without sacricing e¢ cient deterrence.
Polinsky and Shavell [1979] discuss the importance of individuals attitudes
towards risk. The authors argue that when individuals are risk averse, the optimal
ne may be well below the maximal ne.88 This is because when an individual
is risk averse, a higher ne imposes substantial risk-bearing costs which are not
translated into extra revenue for the enforcement agency (or the state). Since
violators dislike risk, the expected ne falls by an amount reecting the risk pre-
mium (the disutility caused by imposing greater risk on risk-averse individuals).
Importantly, the real social cost of nes increases for risk-averse criminals as the
ne increases.
Beckers remark that a higher ne implies a lower expected net utility to a
potential o¤ender is valid for single-act framework where each individual makes a
binary decision, namely, whether to commit an illegal act or not. In a more realis-
tic multi-act framework, where illegal activities can take on di¤erent graduations,
higher nes may induce wrongdoers to switch to more harmful acts. The argument
is that if the ne is unrelated to the severity of the crime, the marginal deterrence
for more serious crimes could be very small or even negative. Therefore, a violator
who is threatened with a uniform ne, regardless of the severity of the violation he
commits, would have more incentives to substitute that crime for a more serious
one, from which he obtains a higher benet.89 The marginal deterrence of less
serious crimes is also distorted from higher nes. For instance, over-enforcement
could emerge with the risk of judicial errors (e.g. prosecution of innocent individ-
uals).90 Taking into consideration the distortion to marginal deterrence, Stigler
88In the extreme case where the cost of investigation is su¢ ciently small, the optimal proba-
bility of detection converges to one. This is because the decrease in utility due to the risk of a
ne is higher than the potential benet from a lower probability of detection. In this case, the
optimal level of the ne is equal to the benet of wrongdoers from the law violation.
89For instance, if robbery is punished as severely as murder, the robber might as well kill his
victim to eliminate a witness.
90The costs of defense of innocent individuals, whether borne by themselves or the government,
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[1970] shows it is optimal to impose only moderate nes on less serious violations to
maintain su¢ cient marginal incentives to deter more serious o¤enses. The condi-
tion for optimal marginal deterrence advocated by Stigler states that the marginal
benet of an illegal activity should be equal to the marginal expected ne to deter
such an activity.
1.4 Enforcement of Antitrust Law
Building on the insights of Becker [1968] and Stigler [1970] that penalties should
be su¢ cient to induce o¤enders to internalize the full social cost of their illegal
actions, Landes [1983] lays the foundations for the economic analysis of antitrust
enforcement. In particular, Landes develops the economic theory of the optimal
antitrust penalties.
In a simple setting where detection of violations and enforcement of the law
are perfect and costless, the optimally deterring penalty equals the net harm to
persons other than the violator. In more realistic settings wherein the probabilities
of detection and conviction are less than perfect, and enforcement costs are non-
trivial, the optimal penalty equals the net harm (which includes the enforcement
costs per case) multiplied by the inverse of the probability of a ne being e¤ectively
imposed (i.e., the product between the probability of detection and the probability
of conviction).
Notably, this rule allows for possible benets that accrue form the o¤enses to
third parties. More precisely, the net harm rule makes the o¤ender internalize all
costs and benets of the violation. Accordingly, this rule implies that the o¤ender
commits only the e¢ cient violations, i.e., violations whose total benets exceed
the total costs.
Applied to the case of cartels, the benets consist of the additional collusive
prots, plus any cost saving and quality advancement as a result of the coordinated
practice, net of any cost of enforcement. On the other hand, the harm consists of
the consumer surplus transferred to rms in the form of overcharges plus the utility
of the foregone consumption due to the higher price and the induced misallocation
of scarce social resources, i.e., the deadweight loss.91
The theory of optimal penalties developed by Landes [1983] does not explore the
e¤ects of antitrust enforcement on rmsbehavior (e.g. pricing decisions). The rst
systematic e¤ort to study the impact of antitrust enforcement on cartelspricing
are part of the social costs of enforcement.
91The net harm rule ts the Chicago School view that the primary goal of antitrust laws is
to maximize the total economic welfare, i.e., the sum of the economic welfare of both consumers
and producers. Clearly, this rule gives equal weight to the welfare of antitrust violators and that
of their victims.
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decisions is by Block et al. [1981]. The authors consider a static model of collusion
where the antitrust policy instruments are endogenous. In particular, a higher
price cost-margin raises more suspicions by customers or antitrust authorities,
thus implying a higher probability of detection and conviction.92 In addition, the
penalty (ne plus damages) is also inuenced by rmspricing decisions since it
is a multiple of collusive prots.93 In this context, rms want to increase prices in
order to achieve higher prots but avoid detection and conviction by an antitrust
authority.
The analysis of the paper shows that the optimal cartel price is below the
monopoly price and is decreasing in the penalty multiple and the intensity of
antitrust enforcement.
The authors conduct an empirical test of the implications of the model in
the market of white pan bread. The empirical results reveal that raising the
Department of Justices (DOJ) enforcement capacity or indicting a DOJ price-
xing complaint had the deterrent e¤ect of contracting markups in the industry.
An implicit assumption made by Block et al. [1981] is that rmsprice-cost
margins are publicly known. This requires that the antitrust authority (or, in gen-
eral, the enforcement agency) observes the collusive rmscost functions. Besanko
and Spulber [1989] relax this assumption and explore the optimal monitoring pol-
icy of an antitrust authority when rmsproduction costs are private information.
In particular, the authors assume that cartels can be of two types: high marginal
cost and low marginal cost.94
In this context, neither the antitrust authority nor the buyers (who lodge com-
plaints to the antitrust authority) observe the cartel. Instead, they draw inferences
from the observed price (and expected price-cost margins) and decide whether or
not to pursue a case. What makes the problem interesting is that with incomplete
information it is di¢ cult to distinguish situations with high price due to high
marginal costs from situations with high price due to collusion.
A crucial assumption of the paper is that the antitrust authority credibly com-
mits to a set of instruments, i.e., nes and probability of investigation, that make
the expected ne contingent on some observed signal, as for instance the market
output. Given that the litigation procedure is costly, the antitrust authority may
not wish to carry out its threat to prosecute cartels. Anticipating that they are
not going to be prosecuted, rms would not change their behavior. Thus, the an-
92The authors nd empirical support of this evidence in their study of the bread industry.
93This mainly reects the US legal system wherein a price xing conspiracy is subject to both
criminal and civil sanctions. Civil sanctions such as treble damages are a multiple of markups.
94Pénard and Souam [1996] generalize this approach to the case of where the cost of production
take a continuum of values. The results of the analysis are qualitatively consistent with the
original paper.
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titrust policy would not have any deterrence e¤ects unless the antitrust authority
credibly commits to prosecute cartels.
Besanko and Spulber [1989] show that, under full information, the fully compet-
itive equilibrium can be costlessly achieved. Similar to Beckers logic, the optimal
ne is the maximum feasible and the probability of detection is such that the
expected ne equals the supra-normal prots accrued to a cartel. However, with
asymmetric information the antitrust authority will always tolerate some collusion
by low-cost rms (i.e., adopt a laissez-faire policy for slightly harmful price agree-
ments) to economize on the costs of enforcement. Since the enforcement costs are
decreasing in rmsproduction levels, the authority can allow littlecollusion to
go unpunished. This would enable the antitrust authority to deter more serious
cartels at a lower expected enforcement cost. Prominently, this result holds regard-
less of the level of enforcement costs. Finally, the authors show that the cartels
equilibrium price is decreasing in the nes, a result which is consistent with Block
et al. [1981].
A common characteristic of the papers by Block et al. [1981] and Besanko and
Spulber [1989] is that they explore the impact of antitrust enforcement on rms
pricing decisions in static settings. Several papers consider dynamic settings where
the parameter time inuences rmspricing behaviour. The rst attempt to inte-
grate the probability of detection and nes into a repeated game of collusion is put
forward by Cyrenne [1999]. The author considers an antitrust enforcement policy
which focuses on signicant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism
for the allocation of resources devoted to monitoring collusion. In particular, the
enforcement agency monitors the market price, and if it signicantly falls for a
number of periods and then reverts back to a higher price, it intervenes and in-
vestigates all rms for price xing. To determine the e¤ect of this enforcement
strategy, the author considers the Green and Porter [1984] model where rms use a
(nite reversion) trigger strategy as a punishment mechanism to sustain collusion.
According to this strategy, rms initiate a price war if the price is below an agreed
threshold the trigger price - for a nite number of periods and then revert to the
initially agreed price.95
In this context, prices can change even if antitrust enforcement is not included
in the analysis, contrary to Block et al. [1981] where prices adjust only in responds
to changes in the enforcement policy parameters (ne and probability of detection).
The author considers two versions of the Green and Porter [1984] model, i)
quantity competition with homogeneous goods and ii) price competition with dif-
ferentiated goods.
95However, in Cyrenne [1999] rms observe the market price and can monitor rivals sales.
Unlike Green and Porter [1984], the market price is determined by industry output and an
additive stochastic component.
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While the enforcement policy typically reduces the expected gains from col-
lusion, it has no e¤ect on the frequency of collusion unless nes are su¢ ciently
large.96 Importantly, undesirable e¤ects may emerge if rms anticipate that the
nes will not be su¢ ciently high.
In the rst scenario, where rms produce homogeneous goods and compete in
quantities, the enforcement policy may have a negative impact on the length of the
punishment period. A defection from the agreement (increase in output) increases
the probability of a price war, and, thus detection is more likely. This implies a
higher punishment for a defection from the collusive agreement, since rms pay a
ne in the case of detection, which allows rms to reduce the costs of their own
punishment mechanism by limiting the length of the reversion period.
In the second scenario, where rms produce di¤erentiated goods and compete
in prices, the analysis shows that, for given trigger quantity and length of the
reversion period, the enforcement policy allows rms to charge a higher collusive
price than would be sustainable otherwise.
Another crucial assumption of the paper by Block et al. [1981] is that the
probability of detection and the penalty depend on the price levels. In a dynamic
setting, this assumption leads to a counterfactual result, namely, that there is a
radical price increase when the cartel forms and then the price declines. Intuitively,
a higher price in the current period increases current prots, but lowers the future
payo¤ by both increasing the probability of detection and the penalty. Since the
probability of detection and the penalty are both increasing in price, colluding
rms steadily lower their prices over time to make detection less likely.
The impact of antitrust enforcement on a cartels pricing dynamics is explored
by Harrington [2005]. The author assumes that the probability of detection de-
pends on price changes, rather than on price levels. In particular, large price
movements raise more concerns to buyers and antitrust authorities about collu-
sion, implying a higher probability of detection.
In this context, the cartel gradually raises its price to the steady-state level
which is less than the monopoly price. The steady-state price is set to equate the
incremental prot with the expected present value of the marginal rise in damages
due to a higher price.97 Notably, the steady-state price is decreasing in the damage
multiple and the probability of detection while it is independent of the level of xed
96When nes are not su¢ ciently high, the choice of collusive output or price is una¤ected since
the antitrust policy does not inuence the probability that an unexpected price fall is realized.
97Harrington [2005] assumes that the punishment in case of detection comprises of a (xed)
ne and a multiple of the damages instigated by the cartel (historical and current). The latter
depend on the cartels price path contrary to Block et al. [1981] where damages depend only on
the price level. This di¤erence is due to the static nature of the model by Block et al. [1981]. A
similar assumption is made by Harrington [2004].
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nes. The latter implies that if nes are the only penalty, so that the penalty is
independent of the price path, the steady-state price equals the monopoly price.
In this case, antitrust enforcement does not inuence rmspricing decisions.98
Finally, the author shows that when the damage multiple increases, the steady
state price is reduced. This is because an increase in the damage multiple increases
the cost of detection for the cartel, and, thus, rms lower their prices to decrease
the probability of detection.
An implicit assumption in Harrington [2005] is that rmsincentive compati-
bility constraints are not binding. In another paper, Harrington [2004] investigates
the role of antitrust policy in destabilizing the internal stability of cartels. The
analysis shows that two qualitatively di¤erent cartel price paths may develop de-
pending on the parameter values. One is qualitatively the same as in Harrington
[2005] - the cartel gradually increases its price converging in the long-run to a
steady-state level. The second type of price path has the cartel gradually increase
its price, but then the price declines down to the steady-state. Even though reduc-
ing the collusive price shrink prots, and cannot make detection less likely (since
the probability of detection depends on price changes), a price decline is essen-
tial to discourage defections from the collusive agreement. Moreover, the author
shows that the risk of detection and penalties may deter a rm from defecting,
anticipating that a price war may spark suspicions about collusion. Thus, an-
titrust enforcement can loosen rmsincentive compatibility constraints and have
preserve e¤ects on cartelspricing.
Motchenkova and Kort [2006] explore the deterrence power of two distinct
penalty structures for antitrust law violations: xed and proportional. The latter
penalty scheme takes into account all accumulated illegal gains to the violating
rm(s). An implicit assumption of the study is that the antitrust authority can
perfectly observe the accumulated rents from the antitrust law violation. The
authors focus their attention to illegal price-xing agreements. Using a dynamic
optimal control model wherein a cartel maximizes its discounted expected payo¤
in the presence of antitrust enforcement, the paper shows that the proportional
penalty scheme is more e¤ective in achieving complete deterrence. Although com-
plete deterrence is feasible with xed nes, the level of the xed penalty that
attains complete deterrence is too high and leads to bankruptcy of the nes par-
ticipating in the cartel. The proportional penalty scheme is more appropriate than
the xed penalty since it ensures complete deterrence of cartels in the long-run,
even when the penalty is moderate. Moreover, the analysis reveals that cartel
98This result is known in the literature as the neutralityof antitrust enforcement. A similar
result has been shown by Block et al. [1981] when the probability of detection is insensitive to
price.
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deterrence is achieved sooner with a combination of high probability of detection
and more severe penalty. Finally, when the penalty is already high, then a further
increase in the severity of the punishment is less e¢ cient than the policy that
increases the probability of detection.
1.5 Self-Reporting Schemes
The literature on self-reporting schemes for generic crimes is divided into two
ramications. One studies the e¤ects of self-reporting schemes o¤ered to single
individuals who commit a single illegal act. The other one, studies the e¤ects of
self-reporting schemes o¤ered to a group of individuals who jointly commit a crime
(organized crime). We survey the two subdivisions of the literature below.
1.5.1 Crimes committed by individuals
Kaplow and Shavell [1994] and Malik [1993] are the rst to investigate the e¤ects
of self-reporting schemes on the optimal design of law enforcement.
Kaplow and Shavell [1994] show that if self-reporting individuals pay lower
nes, then the social costs of law enforcement diminish. . The crux of their
argument is that if the ne for those who self-report is innitesimally smaller
than the expected ne without self-reporting, while the ne for those detected is
the maximum feasible, then all (risk-neutral) violators will self-report. Although
deterrence is una¤ected, given that the ne for self-reporting is slightly lower
than the one without self-reporting, the enforcement costs are lower. This is
because only those individuals who have not reported must be monitored. The
authors maintain that the optimum enforcement policy is such that all individuals
who commit an illegal act self-report. Nevertheless, the rst best (complete and
costless deterrence of illegal acts) is infeasible as the enforcement agency has to
credibly commit itself to costly monitoring. Otherwise, no individual will have any
incentives to self-report.99
Kaplow and Shavell [1994] develop various extensions to their basic model.
Specically, they show that if there is an administrative cost associated with nes,
then self-reporting is benecial only if that cost is su¢ ciently higher than the mon-
itoring cost. The reason is that in a self-reporting regime administrative costs are
borne with certainty, while in a regime without self-reporting these costs are borne
only with the probability of apprehension. Furthermore, the authors show that if
99Spagnolo [2004] is the rst to show that the rst best, that is complete and costless deterrence,
is feasible. However, the framework of his study is di¤erent from that of Kaplow and Shavell
[1994]. The latter authors examine individual violations, while Spagnolo [2004] studies violations
by a group of individuals.
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the monitoring technology is imperfect, that is, if there is a positive probability of
Type I or Type II errors100 transpiring, then the cost savings from self-reporting
are greater than those estimated in the basic model. The underlying reasoning is
that in the presence of imperfect monitoring technology, the frequency of viola-
tions is, ceteris paribus, higher (as with some probability complying with the law
is pointless).101
Another benecial e¤ect that derives from a self-reporting scheme is the provi-
sion of insurance to risk-averse individuals. Thus, in a self-reporting regime, risk
cost is reduced since (risk-averse) individuals who self-report pay a certain amount
rather than uncertain (expected) nes.
In another extension to their basic model, Kaplow and Shavell [1994] investigate
the e¤ects of imprisonment as a punishment for those individuals who do not self-
report. Although imprisonment is costly (as suggested by Becker [1968]), Kaplow
and Shavell [1994] show that the benets stemming from a self-reporting regime
are extensive. This is because all violators self-report at the equilibrium, and thus
the imposition of imprisonment obviates. However, this result holds as long as
the enforcement agency credibly commits to put in jail those violators who do
not self-report. This conclusion is relevant whenever imprisonment is an optimal
punishment when a self-reporting scheme is not available. Nevertheless, as Becker
[1968] argues, even if imprisonment is not an optimal punishment, the threat of
imprisonment, as an ex-post sanction for those who fail to self-report their illegal
acts, always augments the advantages of self-reporting schemes. The intuition is
that a given level of deterrence (i.e., a given level of ex-ante sanction) can be
attained at a lower cost with a lower probability of detection. Only the violators
that falsely report face a greater ex-post sanction. Importantly, since the ex-post
sanctions are never actually imposed, the social costs of imprisonment are evaded.
In a similar vein, Malik [1993] explores the e¤ects of self-reporting when nes
are subject to administrative control. This implies that nes, contrary to Becker
[1968], are not costless transfers.102 In particular, the author analyzes the e¤ects of
100Type I errors occur when the enforcement agency fails to punish/convict a guilty party (also
known as false positives). Type II errors occur when the enforcement agency punish/convicts
an innocent party (also known as false negatives).
101For a discussion of the e¤ects of Type I and Type II errors on the enforcement of competition
law see Schinkel and Tuinstra [2006]. The authors conclude that an increase in the enforcement
errors exacerbate antitrust law violations. The reasoning is twofold. Firstly, the probability
of detection drops, leading to lower expected nes for rms. Secondly, the risk of being ned
increases (because of the probability of an unjust punishment), inducing rms to collude as a
precautionarymeasure.
102The analogy between environmental pollution and cartels is limited and vague, if it exists at
all. Nevetheless, Maliks [1993] assumption that nes are not costless seems to be more realistic
for the analysis of antitrust policy. This is because antitrust authoritiesdecisions are also subject
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self-reporting in a context of regulation of stochastic environmental pollution where
the privately known e¤ort level of a rm a¤ects the probability of an environmental
standard violation. Within this context, the goal of the regulatory authority is to
design a policy that elicits a truthful self-reporting of rmspollution levels. The
portfolio of policy tools of the regulatory authority comprises of: i) random audits
in order to verify each rms report, ii) penalties for generating pollution and iii)
nes for submitting dishonest reports.
The main result of the study is that self-reporting does not necessarily reduce
regulatory costs. Therefore, a policy that does not require rms to self-report
may be preferred to one that does. This is because with a self-reporting scheme
available, rms need to be audited less often and punished more often than without
self-reporting. Whether self-reporting reduces or not the regulatory and social
costs depends on the relative magnitude of the costs pertinent to auditing and
ning. Malik concludes that self-reporting is more likely to reduce (increase) the
regulatory and social costs when a) the audit costs are high (low), b) the maximum
feasible ne is low (high), c) the accuracy of the monitoring technology is low (high)
and, d) the desired e¤ort level by the rm is high (low). Finally, he argues that an
improvement in the accuracy of the regulators monitoring technology is socially
less valuable when a self-reporting scheme is available to polluting rms.
Innes [1999] identies additional benets that emanate from self-reporting
schemes, namely, introducing and allowing the possibility of the early preven-
tion of damages. Motivated by environmental law, the author develops a model
wherein rms engage in activities that may cause socially costly accidents. In this
context, each rm exerts some accident prevention e¤ort to reduce the accident
rate. Accidents do not cause xed and immutable harm, but rather harm that can
be reduced ex-post if rms engage in costly post-accident remediation activities.
Innes assumes that a rm is eligible for leniency provided that it engages in reme-
diation activities that (partially) remedy the damage caused by the accident.103
The author shows that by increasing the frequency of remediation rate, a
self-reporting scheme enhances the ex-post benets of remediation. While non-
reporting rms engage in costly remediation activities only when they are caught
by the enforcement agency, self-reporting rms always engage in e¢ cient remedi-
ation (before or after the accident occurs). Another result of the paper is that
to costly judicial review.
103It is worth noting that there is no such a requirement for obtaining leniency for antitrust
law violations. A colluding rm is eligible for obtaining leniency as long as it terminates its
participation to the cartel, at the latest at the time it lodges a leniency application, and actively
cooperates with the antitrust authority. Moreover, leniency programmes in antitrust do not
require ex-post remediation actions by self-reporting rms. However, rms can be held liable to
private damage claims.
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a self-reporting scheme allows the enforcement agency to costlessly impose sti¤er
nes to non-reporters. Thus, a lower e¤ort is required by the enforcement agency
to achieve a target level of deterrence. Innesanalysis shows that in a regime with-
out self-reporting the optimal ne for an accident may be set below the maximum
feasible level, contrary to Beckers argument. If remediation is possible, then an
increase in the probability of detection not only increases the frequency of accident
detection, but it also mitigates the harm caused by the accident through a socially
valuable remediation. This implies that the probability of detection and the ne
are no longer substitute policy instruments.
By comparing the two regimes, with and without self-reporting, Innes [1999]
infers that the optimal ne in the setting where self-reporting is feasible is lower
than the one without self-reporting. The rationale is that self-reporting rms
must be incentivise to undertake precautionary measures (e¤ort) to prevent the
accident.
One common prediction of the papers discussed above is that at the equilib-
rium all violators self-report. Nonetheless, this theoretical result is inconsistent
with empirical observations. The discrepancy between theory predictions and
empirical facts is the primary motivation for a new study by Innes [2000]. By
segregating all other advantages of self-reporting schemes (as indicated by Kaplow
and Shavell [1994], Malik [1993] and Innes [1999]), Innes [2000] suggests that one
possible explanation for the fact that law enforcement agencies sometimes detect
non-reporters is the existence of heterogeneity in violatorslikelihood of apprehen-
sion. The study shows that at the optimum enforcement policy only those viola-
tors with high probability of apprehension, who would be over-penalized under a
regime without self-reporting, self-report. Those individuals pay a ne equal to the
harm they cause by their illegal acts. However, Innes shows that those violators
who do not self-report continue to be under-penalized. Thus, he concludes that
self-reporting can provide a screening mechanism that enables the enforcement
agency to tailor the nes based on individualsheterogeneity. The introduction of
a self-reporting scheme may thus foster the e¢ cacy of the enforcement policy.
Building on Malik [1993], Innes [2001] explores the impact of self-reporting
schemes on detection avoidance activities. In this study, Innes identies two ad-
vantages of self-reporting, those being the savings achieved both in avoidance and,
enforcement costs. The main result of the analysis is that with self-reporting there
is no need to engage in socially ine¢ cient investments in avoidance activities. By
setting the ne for self-reporting equal to the average ne that the violators would
otherwise face, including the optimal avoidance cost, the enforcement agency can
induce self-reporting without dampening individualsincentives to avoid engaging
in illegal acts. The additional benet from self-reporting is that those individu-
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als who self-report do not engage in avoidance activities and, therefore, the costs
related to these activities are economized. Moreover, by deterring avoidance, self-
reporting allows the enforcement agency to thwart violations with a lower enforce-
ment e¤ort. This is achieved by raising the non-reporting nes to the maximum
feasible level. Therefore, Innes [2001] concludes that at the optimal policy, the
same benets identied by Becker [1968] without the additional costs identied by
Malik [1990] could be attained.
The introduction of ex-ante asymmetric information, as studied by Innes [2001],
was criticized by Feess and Heesen [2002]. These authors suggest that, although
ex-ante asymmetric information allows explaining partial self-reporting, it does
not account for the main drawback of self-reporting schemes, which is that they,
ceteris paribus, sharpen the incentives to violate the law.
The authors consider a scenario wherein each violator receives a private sig-
nal about the individual probability of apprehension, after the violation is com-
mitted. Technically, this implies that the decisions related to the violation and
self-reporting are made on di¤erent information sets, contrary to Innes [2001] who
assumes that individualsprobabilities of apprehension are ex-ante heterogeneous.
The distinguishing feature of ex-post asymmetric information is that it creates
an option value for individuals which bolsters their incentives to violate the law.
Nevertheless, Feess and Heesen [2002] show that the advantages of self-reporting
dominate this undesirable e¤ect.
More specically, the authors show that when there is ex-post asymmetric infor-
mation, the opportunity to self-report may provide those individuals that receive
an unfavorable signal (i.e., those with high probability of detection) with an option
value. If the enforcement agencys e¤ort remains the same, as in the setting with-
out self-reporting, then the option to self-report tends to increase the frequency
of law violations. However, self-reporting violators need not be investigated, and,
therefore, the enforcement agency may achieve a target level of deterrence at a
lower cost. Thus, by taking into consideration this feature of self-reporting, the
enforcement agency may coin a second best optimal enforcement policy. As a re-
sult, social welfare increases, even with the restriction that the violation rate must
not exceed the one without a self-reporting scheme.104
1.5.2 Crimes committed by groups of individuals
The observation by Feess and Heesen [2002] that the introduction of self-reporting
schemes sharpens, ceteris paribus, the ex-ante incentives of individuals to vio-
104This second best solution entails 1) a higher monitoring e¤ort because of value of the option
to self-report and 2) a ne for self-reporting that is slightly below the expected ne for the
violator with the highest detection probability.
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late the law has stimulated the research on self-reporting schemes for groups of
violators. A distinguishing feature of this stream of the literature is that the en-
forcement agency can exploit the strategic interdependence between violators in
order to increase the expected ne for each violator. This is despite of the fact that
the probability of apprehension diminishes. This contrasts to the single violator
scenario where the expected ne with self-reporting cannot exceed the expected
ne without self-reporting, since otherwise no individual would self-report.
One paper that investigates the deterrence e¤ects of self-reporting schemes to
groups of individuals that jointly act to commit an illegal act is by Feess and
Walzl [2004]. Their analysis suggests that the adoption of self-reporting schemes
improves the e¢ cacy of the enforcement policy, in spite of the fact that violators
behave cooperatively at the self-reporting stage. In particular, the authors show
that if violators behave non-cooperatively at the self-reporting stage, the enforce-
ment agency may induce them into a PrisonersDilemma situation. The agency
can achieve this by setting the maximum feasible ne if all violators self-report
and by granting full amnesty (i.e., the reduced ne is equal to zero) only to a
single self-reporter. Although all group members can be better-o¤ if they credibly
commit that none of them will self-report, each of them has an incentive to uni-
laterally run to the court rst and benet from amnesty.105 While not all crime is
deterred, all violators self-report with the least enforcement cost given that the op-
timal probability of apprehension is (almost) zero. If, on the other hand, violators
behave cooperatively at the self-reporting stage to minimize their joint expected
nes106, then, as in Kaplow and Shavell [1994], the optimal ne for each violator
is equal to the expected ne that individuals are liable to pay in the setting with-
out self-reporting. In this case, even if all violators self-report, the probability of
apprehension is weakly higher than the one with non-cooperative behavior. This
implies that the enforcement cost is higher with cooperative behavior.
In addition, Feess and Walzl [2004] explore the optimal enforcement policy
when the enforcement agency has imperfect information about violatorsactions
at the self-reporting stage, i.e., it is ignorant whether violators act cooperatively or
non-cooperatively. The authors show that if individualscooperation probability
is exogenous, the optimal self-reporting scheme is independent of the cooperative
behavior rate. The optimal policy calls for a ne against a single self-reporter
equal to the expected ne without self-reporting. Moreover, if all violators self-
report, then the optimal policy calls for the maximal feasible ne, so that to
induce violators into a PrisonersDilemma situation. The threat of being driven
to a Prisonersdilemma situation may, however, motivate accomplices to search for
credible commitment devices to provoke cooperation. Thus, when the probability
105This e¤ect of self-reporting schemes is known in the literature as race to the courthouse.
106This is also the case in the paper by Motta and Polo [2003] discussed in the next section.
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of cooperation is endogenously determined, the optimal policy o¤ers ne reduc-
tions to all violators that non-cooperatively self-report. Given that the expected
ne is increasing in the probability of conviction, and that higher nes induce a
higher degree of cooperation, a non-cooperative self-reporter may pay a ne which
is below the maximum feasible level. The rationale is to limit the cooperation
rate of individuals at the self-reporting stage. Therefore, an endogenous rate of
cooperation, as maintained by the authors, may explain the partial reduction to
nes for all violators in case of simultaneous self-reporting.
A supplementary explanation of why all members of the group should be o¤ered
a ne discount is the existence of imperfect self-reporting technology. For instance,
if self-reporting by a single violator does not necessarily imply the conviction of
other group members. Thus, if violators retain evidence of di¤erent quality ex-
post, i.e., after they commit the illegal act, then it will be optimal to induce full
self-reporting by all group members and impose the maximum nes. This would
force violators into a Prisonersdilemma situation. The optimal ne in this case
is lower than the maximum feasible ne. Furthermore, the ne is higher for the
violator who has been more often convicted on the basis of his accomplices self-
reporting. Finally, the authors show that the ne for each violator depends on how
informative the evidence submitted by other group members is to the enforcement
agency.
1.6 Leniency programmes in Antitrust
The literature reviewed in the previous section addresses the optimal level of en-
forcement in generic law. In this section, we survey the literature that explores
the implications of self-reporting in antitrust law enforcement, where the centre
of interest is rms rather than individuals. This ramication of the literature has
proliferated over the last decade, after the pioneering papers of Motta and Polo
[2003], and Spagnolo [2004]. It has to be emphasized, at the outset, that at the
heart of this literature is the exploration of the impact of leniency programmes on
cartel desistance and cartel deterrence.
Motta and Polo [2003] are the rst to study the impact of leniency programmes
in antitrust policy.107 The main research question of their paper is whether rms
already under investigation should be eligible for leniency. Their study shows that
a leniency programme has two e¤ects on law enforcement. On the one hand, it may
lower proceedings costs and lead to a temporary cessation of cartels (anti-collusive
e¤ect). On the other hand, it may exacerbate cartel activity as the expected
107For an exellent survey of the literature (theoretical, empirical and experimental) on leniency
and whistleblowers in antitrust, see Spagnolo [2008].
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cost of collusion decreases (ex-ante pro-collusive e¤ect). The latter e¤ect was also
identied by Feess and Heesen [2002].
The main assumptions of the paper by Motta and Polo [2003] are the following:
i) the antitrust authority has an exogenous xed budget constraint that can be
used either to detect or to convict cartel members; ii) the same lenient treatment
is o¤ered to all self-reporting rms regardless of the reporting order108; iii) a de-
viating rm can neither be convicted for taking part in a cartel nor can report
its former partners; and iv) rms sustain collusive agreements by adopting grim
trigger strategies. Assumptions ii and iii are less intuitive and are in odds with
the leniency programmes implemented in various jurisdictions. In fact, antitrust
authorities discriminate self-reporters depending on the self-reporting sequence,
as well as on the quality of information that self-reporting rms reveal to the
antitrust authority. Theoretically, the assumption of no ne di¤erentialamong
self-reporting rms relaxes rmsincentive compatibility constraints, and thus en-
hances cartel sustainability. In addition, an antitrust authority can in practice
convict a deviating rm for taking part in a collapsed cartel. More importantly,
a deviating rm has strong incentives to self-report its illegal conduct to the an-
titrust authority so as to pay a lower ne. Essentially, assumptions ii-iv of the
paper, drain rmsincentives to spontaneously and non-cooperatively run to the
antitrust authority to self-report. As we will see later, this is the main motivation
of the paper by Spagnolo [2004].
The two major results of the paper are the following: i) leniency programmes
are not unambiguously optimal and ii) it may be optimal to grant leniency to rms
already under investigation if the antitrust authority has not yet obtained action-
able evidence. With respect to the rst result, the authors show that, in principle,
it may not be optimal to introduce a leniency programme if the antitrust author-
itys budget is su¢ ciently high, so that cartels could be deterred with a su¢ ciently
high probability of detection without leniency. If, however, the antitrust authority
has limited resources, a leniency programme may be an optimal ancillary policy
instrument from a second best perspective. In this case, the introduction of a le-
niency programme may generate a Prisonersdilemma situation at the conviction
stage, which induces rms to (collectively) self-report. Taking into consideration
the collective application for leniency and the fact that a leniency programme re-
duces the expected costs of the cartel, the authors demonstrate that the optimal
enforcement policy should provide full amnesty (as in Feess and Walzl [2004]) to
all self-reporting rms so as to increase the probability of conviction. The second
result of the paper is rationalized on the basis that the probability of conviction
radically increases once the antitrust authority prosecutes the cartel. Thus, the
108For a convenient way to model asymmetric treatments to self-reporting rms, which depends
on the sequence of self-reporting, see Houba et al. [2011].
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prospect of reduced nes becomes more appealing for a rm under investigation.
Therefore, leniency programmes that are open to rms after the commencement
of an investigation by the antitrust authority might play a pivotal role in the
prosecution of cartels.
It is worth noting that the paper by Motta and Polo [2003] is a close mir-
ror of Kaplow and Shavell [1994]. Both papers highlight two benets of leniency
programmes (or self-reporting schemes). On the one hand, help economize enforce-
ment resources and, on the other hand, provide insurance to risk-averse individuals
or rms (a leniency programme essentially provides a riskless alternative to a prob-
abilistic conviction).
The paper by Spagnolo [2004] can be viewed as a complement to Motta and
Polo [2003]. However, the two approaches crucially di¤er in their focus and re-
sults. The study by Spagnolo [2004] focuses on whether a leniency programme
can induce spontaneous self-reporting by rms, contrary to Motta and Polo [2003]
who focus their analysis on whether rms already under investigation should be
eligible for leniency. Moreover, although Motta and Polo [2003] highlight the in-
direct e¤ect of leniency programmes on deterrence by facilitating post-detection
prosecution, Spagnolo [2004] emphasizes the direct e¤ect on deterrence caused by
the undermined trust among cartel members.
Another di¤erence between the two papers is that in Motta and Polo [2003] the
cost of enforcement is exogenous, while in Spagnolo [2004], it is a choice variable.
Moreover, in Motta and Polo [2003] detection leads to conviction only with some
probability, while in Spagnolo [2004] detection and conviction are identied with
a single probability, as in Becker [1968]. A fundamental di¤erence is that Motta
and Polo [2003] do not address risk dominance issues in their model (they assume
in contrary that the equilibrium selection criterion is Pareto dominance), and as
a result a leniency programme cannot induce rms to spontaneously self-report.
Conversely, Spagnolo [2004] introduces risk dominance considerations, which are
captured in the spirit of Harsanyi and Selten [1988].109 The idea is that a leniency
programme increases the risk of unilateral self-reporting, and thus undermines
the trust among collusive rms. An additional di¤erence is that in Motta and
Polo [2003] rms sustain collusive agreements with grim trigger strategies, while
in Spagnolo [2004] collusive agreements are sustained via optimal penal codes à la
109Technically, an equilibrium is risk dominant if the Nash Product (product of surpluses) of
that equilibrium is greater than the Nash Product of every other potential equilibrium. Such
equilibrium is called risk dominant because players try to mitigate the risks associated with their
choices by minimizing the risks for every player. The concept of risk dominancewas introduced
by Harsanyi and Selten [1988]. Risk dominance should be contrasted to Pareto dominance where
players select the Nash equilibrium that Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibria. For a
meticulous discussion on equilibrium selection criteria, see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991a].
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Abreu [1986, 1988]. Contrary to Motta and Polo [2003], Spagnolo [2004] considers
the possibility that a defecting rm cannot be convicted for having taken part to
a cartel, nor is it able to report information on its former partners. Finally, in
Spagnolo [2004] leniency programmes take into consideration recidivism, contrary
to Motta and Polo [2003].
A rst observation by Spagnolo [2004] is that when a leniency programme is
not available, the optimal enforcement policy requires the antitrust authority to
commit not to target the rms that unilaterally defect from the collusive agree-
ment. Prominently, this policy must be publicly known. Intuitively, a rm is more
prone to defect from the collusive agreement if it knows that it will not be ned for
its past illegal conduct. Spagnolo calls this e¤ect protection from punishment110.
In principle, this e¤ect mitigates the costs associated with a deviation from the
collusive agreement, and thereby makes collusion harder to sustain.111
The main result of the study by Spagnolo [2004] is that the rst best, of com-
plete and costless deterrence, is feasible.112 To attain the rst best, the antitrust
authority must impose the maximum feasible ne on all cartel members except the
rst to self-report (known in the literature as the rst informant rule).113 At the
optimal policy, the rst self-reporting rm is rewarded with the nes imposed on
all other cartel members. This nding is in stark contrast to Becker [1968], who
argues that the optimal probability of detection and the investigation costs that
generate such a probability are a dead-weight loss that keeps society away from
the rst best. It is also distinguished from the paper by Motta and Polo [2003],
according to which the leniency programme can, in the best case scenario, result
in a second best solution. This is attributed to the fact that some resources need
110Harrington [2008] rename this e¤ect to deviator e¤ect.
111E¤ectively, this assumption of protecting a defecting rm from the risk of punishment for
participating in a collusive agreement in the past allows to overcome the irrelevance resultin
Motta and Polo [2003].
112This result is based on a rather strong assumption, namely, that the antitrust authority
can o¤er positive rewards to self-reporting rms. This has been criticized in the literature as
politically infeasible. It is worth noting that the UK, South Korea, and Hungary have in place
rewards programs for reporting information on cartels. In 2002 the (South) Korean Fair Trade
Commission introduced a cartel informant reward scheme. This program was modied in 2002
and 2005 to increase the amount of maximum reward from 20 million won (approximately 18,789
USD) to 1 billion won (approximately 1 billion USD). A similar informant reward program was
adopted by the O¢ ce of Fair Trading in UK. The program provides a reward rising to 100,000
GBP. In 2010 Hungary also introduced an informant rewards program. The program provides a
reward of at least 1% of the ne levied against the cartels members with an upper bound of 50
million forints (approximately 238,000 USD). Remarkably, parallel application to the leniency
program and the information reward program is prohibited.
113In Becker [1968] the rst best of complete and costless deterrence could not be attained even
with innite nes. This is because when no resources are invested in the enforcement of law, the
probability of detection is zero. Thus, even innite nes have no impact on crime deterrence.
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to be invested in detection activities in order for the enforcement policy to have
teeth.
Spagnolo [2004] shows that when the leniency programme is su¢ ciently gen-
erous, then two conicting e¤ects on cartel deterrence may emerge. On the one
hand, the value of the collusive agreement increases since the leniency programme
may be exploited; rms can collude and self-report in every period. Thus, a very
generous leniency programme can rein cartel deterrence. This e¤ect is, however,
mitigated when the antitrust authority restricts eligibility for leniency only to the
rst self-reporting rm. This is because if more than one rm is eligible for leniency,
fewer rms will have to pay the ne, and thereby a lower amount will be available
to reward self-reporting rms. On the other hand, the value of deviation from
the illegal agreement increases. A rm that defects from the collusive agreement
is protected both from the antitrust nes (protection from nes e¤ect114) and
from the (temporary) punishment by the other cartel members (protection from
punishment e¤ect115). Thus, a very generous leniency programme can enhance
deterrence. It is important to underline that the protection from punishment e¤ect
exists when the collusive agreement is sustained with two-phase Stick and Carrot
punishment strategies à la Abreu [1986] and the punishment for repeat o¤enders
is stricter. The intuition is the following: with two-phase stick-and-carrot punish-
ment strategies, rms su¤er a cost when participating to the stickphase, and are
willing to do so because it allows them to return back to the collusive (carrot)
phase the following period. Furthermore, if repeat o¤enders are punished more
severely than rst time o¤enders, then a report today by one rm raises future
nes. This diminishes the expected value of further collusion. As a result, the
amount that rms are willing to bear in punishing defections in the rst place
is limited (i.e., the carrot tightens the incentive compatibility constraint for the
punishment phase). E¤ectively, this drains the strongest credible stickthat can
be used to discourage defections in the rst place.
In this context, Spagnolo [2004] proves that if positive rewards are feasible, the
optimal policy is to impose the maximum possible ne to all rms but the rst
to self-report.116 Restricting eligibility (only to the rst self-reporting rm) makes
the leniency programme less exploitable as it triggers a race to the courtroom
caused by the fear to arrive second. Thus, the author infers that a combination
of su¢ ciently high nes and high powered leniency programmes (courageous le-
niency programmes) makes law enforcement redundant. Nevertheless, when the
maximum nes are su¢ ciently small to achieve the rst best, it may be optimal
114In Harrington [2008] this e¤ect is called the cartel amnesty e¤ect.
115Harrington [2008] calls this the deviator e¤ect.
116High nes are now crucial not only because they reduce the expected value of the illegal
cartel, as in Becker [1968], but because they allow the enforcement agency (e.g., the antitrust
authority) to o¤er higher rewards to the rst self-reporting rm.
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to couple rewards with active investigations, given that investigations and rewards
are substitute enforcement instruments.
Moreover, Spagnolo [2004] shows that when positive rewards are infeasible,
there is another e¤ect of leniency programmes on cartel stability and deterrence.
In addition to the protection from nes and protection from punishment e¤ects, a
leniency programme inuences the riskiness of the cartel agreement by undermin-
ing the trust among its members. Collusive agreements are strictly riskier when
the eligibility to the leniency programme is restricted only to the rst self-reporting
rm. A leniency programme that does not restrict eligibility only to the rst self-
reporting rm makes the illegal agreement less risky as rms can exploit such
programs and enjoy ne discounts. Therefore, contrary to Motta and Polo [2003],
Spagnolo [2004] concludes that it is always optimal to have a leniency programme
(even if moderate).
An additional reason why colluding rms spontaneously apply for leniency,
before an investigation is launched in the market, is o¤ered by Ellis and Wislon
[2003]. Their study explores the impact of a leniency programme on rmsbehavior
under Bertrand price competition with di¤erentiated products. Similar to Motta
and Polo [2003], the authors assume that the collusive equilibrium is sustained by
grim trigger strategies. The novelty of the paper is that nes are not xed, but
proportional to revenues.117 This implies that a change in marginal revenue can
impact on rmsbehavior in the market, and, ultimately, on their incentives to
collude.
In this context, Ellis and Wislon [2003] show that rms can exploit the leniency
programme by defecting in the market and denouncing the cartel. Thus, a leniency
programme may destabilize cartels. In particular, a defecting rm can gain market
advantage by raising its rivalscosts through nes and compliance measures. The
authors highlight that rmsincentives to defect and apply for leniency are sharper
when the ne is higher and the market less concentrated.
However, forward looking rms anticipate this opportunistic behavior and,
thus, strategically use the leniency programme as a mechanism to thwart defec-
tions from their illegal agreement. If a rm defects from the agreement but does
not self-report, then the other rms may punish the defector by self-reporting the
cartel to the antitrust authority. In this case, a leniency programme can strengthen
the stability of the cartel.
Contrary to Motta and Polo [2003] and Spagnolo [2004] who assume constant
(time independent) probabilities of detection and conviction, Hinloopen [2003]
studies the e¤ects of leniency programmes when the probability of detection is
117This is a realistic assumption. Importantly, it is consistent with the ne policies in the US
and EU.
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time dependent. In particular, the author assumes that the probability of detection
increases with a cartels record. This may, for example, correspond to a scenario
where the e¢ ciency of an antitrust authoritys prosecution activities constantly
improves over time. A novelty of the paper by Hinloopen [2003] is that the antitrust
authority is assumed to continue its investigation for a nite number of periods
after the collapse of the cartel due to a market defection by one of its members.
This allows the author to examine the e¤ects of the duration of the limitation
period that comes with antitrust law violation.118
By distinguishing two manners whereby a cartel may collapse, either by a devi-
ation in the market or a deviation in the self-reporting stage, the author concludes
that the e¤ectiveness of leniency programmes increase with the generosity of the
ne reduction. The reasoning is that a larger ne reduction for self-reporting rein-
forces rmsincentives to deviate from the collusive agreement by self-reporting,
as opposed to deviating in the market. Furthermore, the rate of reduction of nes
does not impinge on rmsincentives to deviate in the market, while it a¤ects their
incentives to self-report, as the cost of self-reporting diminishes. Thus, an addi-
tional reduction in the ne for self-reporting increases the probability of leniency
application. A necessary condition for this result to hold is the existence of a suf-
ciently transparent leniency programme so that cartel members can accurately
estimate the benets accruing from self-reporting. However, this does not mean
that the antitrust authority should publicly disclose information about the rms
that apply for leniency. Such practice may allow rms to simultaneously apply for
leniency, and thus exploit the leniency programme by paying lower nes.119 More-
over, it may increase the risk for private claims, the costs of which is potentially
greater that the ne imposed by the antitrust authority.120
Hinloopen [2003] argues that if the antitrust authority consistently improves the
e¤ectiveness of its detection activities so that the probability of detection in future
periods increases, then the expected ne, and hence the cost of collusion rises. This
implies sharper incentives to deviate from the cartel and self-report to the antitrust
authority. The author also argues that an increase in the ne has two conicting
e¤ects on rmsincentives. On the one hand, a higher ne implies a higher cost
for collusion. This strengthens rms incentives to defect, either in the market
or by self-reporting to the antitrust authority. On the other hand, a higher ne
implies a higher absolute value of the ne, net of the reduction for self-reporting,
118Acording to Article 25 of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003, the limitation period is (a) 3
years in the case of infringements of provisions concerning requests for information or the conduct
of inspections; (b) 4 years in the case of all other infringements.
119It is precisely for this reason that Motchenkova [2004] argues in favor of condential leniency
programmes.
120On the other hand, the cost for private damages increases the total ne for a cartel member,
and therefore enhances cartel deterrence.
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which mitigates rms incentives to self-report. The net product of these two
opposite forces depends on the ne reduction relative to the sequence of per-period
probabilities. If the percentage of the ne reduction is relatively high, compared
to the increase in future probabilities of detection, then an increase in the level
of the ne is more likely to improve the e¤ectiveness of the leniency programme.
Finally, Hinloopen [2003] argues that an extension to the limitation period makes
self-reporting more likely to be preferred to deviation from the market, given that
with self-reporting the cartel would be convicted immediately. In the case of
deviation from the market, there is a possibility of being convicted in the future
for past violations of the law. The length of the limitation period does not have
any impact on the decision to self-report the cartel. Thus, the e¤ectiveness of the
leniency would not be a¤ected by the duration of the limitation period.
It has to be remarked that, unlike Motta and Polo [2003], the study by Hin-
loopen [2003] cannot predict self-reporting when an investigation is underway. This
is because the probability of cartel detection once an investigation is launched in
the market is intact, contrary to Motta and Polo [2003].
Most studies in the literature on leniency programmes analyze the e¤ects of
such programmes under xed nes, that are independent of the accumulated illegal
collusive gains. However, nes may also be proportional to the accumulated illegal
collusive prots. This is also an assumption that is closer to realism and the actual
ning policies adopted by antitrust authorities in various jurisdictions. A paper
that acknowledges and incorporates the distinction between xed and proportional
nes is by Motchenkova [2004].
Motchenkova [2004] explores the e¤ects of leniency programmes under two
distinct ne regimes, xed and proportional, and two distinct application proce-
dures, condential and non-condential. With a non-condential procedure, rms
can simultaneously apply for leniency.121 Although this is not a very realistic as-
sumption, it allows to highlight the role of condentiality of leniency applications.
Based on the approach of Reiganum-Fudenberg-Tirole122, Motchenkova [2004] an-
alyzes whether the treatment of collusive rms by the antitrust authority should
depend on the timing of their applications for leniency. The main conclusion of
the paper is that the driving force for the e¤ectiveness of leniency programmes in
deterring cartels is the strength of rmsincentives to stop colluding and apply
for leniency before preempted by some other rm (preemption mechanism).123 A
121For instance, if a rm applies for leniency, then this becomes publicly known, and, therefore,
the other rms can instantaneously react and lodge a leniency application too.
122See Reinganum [1981] and Fudenberg and Tirole [1985]. The authors study the decision
of whether and when to build a new plant or adopt a new innovation when the market can
accommodate only one such addition.
123In e¤ect, this mechanism induces rms in a race to the antitrust authority in order to be the
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well designed leniency programme may reduce the duration of cartel agreements;
however this result is ambiguous. Only strict leniency programmes unambiguously
erode cartel stability, and thus enhance the e¢ cacy of antitrust law enforcement.
Similar to Spagnolo [2004], Motchenkova [2004] also shows that programs that
do not restrict the eligibility for leniency only to the rst self-reporting rm may
restrain deterrence because of the reduced expected nes.
Motchenkova [2004] demonstrates that when nes are proportional to the accu-
mulated collusive gains and the application procedure for obtaining leniency is con-
dential, then complete cartel deterrence can be achieved, provided that the ne
is su¢ ciently high. At any rate, the introduction of a leniency programme (with
these specications) does not facilitate cartel formation or increase cartel duration.
When the application procedure is not condential, the leniency programme may
reduce the duration of cartel agreements, but not deter cartel formation. This
result is again ambiguous. When the nes and the probability of detection are
su¢ ciently low, the introduction of a leniency programme may, on the contrary,
foster collusion. Motchenkova [2004] also shows that under xed nes and con-
dential leniency application procedures, the introduction of a leniency programme
does not a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of the enforcement policy at all. In this situation,
cartel duration depends on the size of the ne, while cartel deterrence is not inu-
enced by the leniency programme. Only a su¢ ciently high ne can guarantee the
success of the leniency programme. A policy recommendation that derives from
the paper is that leniency programmes must be condential, which seems to be
the procedure adopted in most jurisdictions.
A typical assumption in the literature (including the studies by Motta and Polo
[2003], Hinloopen [2003], Spagnolo [2004], Motchenkova [2004] and Harrington
[2008]), is that the incriminating evidence retained by rms, and which can be
used to apply for leniency, is symmetric. Although this symmetry assumption
simplies the analysis, it is not very realistic. For instance, rms may retain
di¤erent pieces of evidence. The amount of evidence revealed to the antitrust
authority critically a¤ects the magnitude of the ne reduction and the probability
of successful conviction of the cartel. One of the few papers that explores the
relevance of the amount of reported evidence in the determination of the ne
reductions and the number of rms that should be eligible to receive leniency is
by Feess and Markus [2005].124
More formally, Feess and Markus [2005] develop a (static) model with two self-
reporting stages, one before the investigation and one after the investigation, to
explore the di¤erent amount of revealed evidence that is required to obtain le-
niency. A key result of the paper is that the strategic interaction between cartel
rst to self-report and benet from a lenient treatment.
124A more recent paper that sheds some light on similar research questions is by Silbye [2010].
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members is di¤erent at the two stages. Self-reporting before detection leads collu-
sive rms to a race to the courthouse, whereas after detection, it leads them to a
PrisonersDilemma situation.
Feess and Markus [2005] conclude that the optimal ne hinges on the degree
the evidence provided to the antitrust authority. The team specic characteris-
tics, which a¤ect the probability of cartel detection, also play a pivotal role in the
determination of the optimal ne. Specically, the authors demonstrate that grant-
ing full amnesty at the pre-detection stage is never optimal for the low evidence
provider. Nonetheless, depending on the distribution of team specic characteris-
tics, it may be optimal for the high evidence provider. The authors also show that
the optimal nes are increasing in the amount of additional information delivered
by other members of the cartel. A crucial assumption of the paper is that each
rm is perfectly informed about the evidence retained by others. Furthermore, the
evidence retained by an individual does not inuence the level of the ne, a result
driven by the PrisonersDilemma structure at the conviction stage. However, high
evidence providers should pay a lower ne if they self-report at the pre-detection
stage. Another signicant result of the paper is that it is optimal to o¤er leniency
to the low evidence provider if the high evidence provider self-reports. This pro-
vokes self-reporting by another cartel member, and thus save investigation costs
(as in Motta and Polo [2003]). Finally, the paper concludes that the ne for the
rm providing less evidence should be the same in both self-reporting stages (pre-
detection and conviction), while the ne for the high evidence provider should be
higher in the pre-detection stage. The rationale is that the antitrust authority has
more to economize if self-reporting occurs at an earlier stage of the antitrust pro-
ceedings, while the cartel has more to lose given that the cartel is dissolved sooner.
The authors remark that the theoretical predictions of the paper are consistent
with the EU leniency programme, which may provide leniency to more than one
rm. However, the predictions are in dissonance with the US corporate leniency
programme - which provides leniency only to the rst self-reporting rm.
A critical assumption of the papers discussed above is that the hard evidence
that is generated by cartel members lasts only for one period and thereafter evap-
orates.125 This is not always a realistic assumption. Evidently, evidence can be
durable, and as such it can play the role of a hostageto discourage defections
from the collusive agreement. One paper that factors in this assumption is by
Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a]. The authors study the e¤ects of leniency pro-
grammes in occasional sequential bilateral illegal agreements (or other corruptive
activities) wherein reputation plays no role. Crucially, these types of transactions
are exposed to serious governanceor hold upproblems because of the lack of
125In the paper by Motta and Polo [2003] evidence is produced only if no defection occurs.
Thus, a defecting rm cannot apply for leniency.
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an enforcement mechanism (i.e., a contract) that can constrain the development
of opportunistic behavior by the party delivering last in the transaction.
The authors demonstrate that if the enforcement agency grants a ne reduction,
or at best amnesty, without paying a positive reward to the rst rm that self-
reports, the commitment to cooperate with the enforcement agency may facilitate
the punishment of a defecting party at a relatively low cost. As a result, a poorly
designed leniency programme, for which the ne paid by the self-reporting party
is lower than the expected ne without self-reporting, may provide an e¤ective
governance mechanism or credible threat to any party that attempts to deviate
from the agreed strategy. The transacting parties can collect hard evidence to
discourage opportunistic behaviour. In case of a defection, the mislead party can
report the evidence to the enforcement agency. This counter-productive e¤ect
can be mitigated by o¤ering a su¢ ciently high reward (above the expected gain
from the illegal transaction) only to the rst self-reporting party. To this e¤ect,
the paper by Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a] is in line with Spagnolo [2004].
Both papers conclude that collusion can be completely deterred if the enforcement
agency su¢ ciently rewards the rst self-reporting rm.
The main shortcoming of the papers assuming a xed probability of detection
(and conviction) over time is that they produce the counterfactual result that
a cartel will never use the leniency programme. Nevertheless, this theoretical
prediction contradicts the empirical evidence that many cartels established after
the introduction of leniency programmes and eventually applied for, and obtained,
ne reductions afterwards. Harrington [2008] argues that a logical explanation
for this empirical observation is that the probabilities of successful prosecution
stochastically change over time.
The study by Harrington distinguishes three e¤ects of leniency programmes on
rmsincentives to self-report. These e¤ects are referred as the deviator e¤ect,
the cartel amnesty e¤ectand the race to the courthouse e¤ect. The deviator
e¤ect operates through the payo¤ of defecting in the market. It captures the re-
duction of nes when a defecting rm applies for leniency. Clearly, this e¤ect
makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain as it increases the payo¤ from cheating.
The cartel amnesty e¤ect operates through the expected payo¤ of collusion. It
captures the reduction in the size of the ne when a rm self-reports. This e¤ect
makes collusion easier to sustain when a rm obtains leniency. Similar to the car-
tel amnesty e¤ect, the race to the courthouse e¤ect operates through the payo¤ of
collusion. This e¤ect transpires when only the rst self-reporting rm is eligible
to receive a lenient treatment. The race to the courthouse e¤ect makes collusion
harder to sustain. Harrington [2008] allows for these three e¤ects to simultane-
ously interact, thus permitting a richer analysis of the design of optimal leniency
programmes.
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The paper shows that the overall e¤ect of leniency programmes on rmsincen-
tives hinges on the size of the ne reduction. With an extremely lenient program
that o¤ers leniency only to the rst self-reporting rm only the deviator e¤ect and
the cartel amnesty e¤ect would be at play. In general, the deviator e¤ect domi-
nates the cartel amnesty e¤ect. This implies that a more generous ne reduction
to self-reporting rms makes the cartel agreement more unstable. The underlying
reasoning is that the benet for a rm that applies for leniency and self-reports
today is greater than the expected benet from using the leniency programme in
the future. If those were the only two e¤ects in operation, then collusion would be
made more di¢ cult to sustain under a more generous leniency programme. In this
case, a policy of maximal leniency would be optimal. If, however, the ne reduction
is su¢ ciently mild, only the cartel amnesty e¤ect and the race to the courthouse
e¤ect would be at operation. A deviating rm cannot apply for leniency because
the ne reduction is too small, while a cartel would be detected with certainty if
a rm self-reports to the antitrust authority. In other words, a rm prefers to pay
a lower expected ne than a higher certain ne. In this case, the ne reduction
a¤ects only the future expected collusive payo¤. If the cartel amnesty e¤ect were
the only force at work, then a more lenient program would raise the collusive pay-
o¤, and thus facilitate collusion. A more lenient policy would then revive cartel
stability contrary to the objective of the antitrust policy. The picture is less clear-
cut once the race to the courthouse e¤ect and the cartel amnesty e¤ect are both
in force. In this case, a more generous ne reduction may increase or decrease the
stability of the cartel depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates. Cartel
stability erodes when the race to the courthouse e¤ect dominates.
Harrington [2008] proves that under some plausible conditions126, it is best to
o¤er full amnesty only to the rst self-reporting rm; otherwise, partial leniency
is optimal. Intuitively, when more than one rm is eligible to receive lenient
treatment, the expected ne with self-reporting decreases (i.e., the cartel amnesty
e¤ect strengthens). On the other hand, the deviation prots remain intact (i.e.,
the deviator e¤ect is intact). It is important to note that this result is in line with
Spagnolo [2004], Motchenkova [2004] and Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a]. The
author also shows that it is not always optimal to o¤er unrestricted amnesty to the
rst self-reporting rm. Amnesty should be o¤ered only when the probability of
conviction without self-reporting is su¢ ciently small and a rm delivers evidence
that substantially reinforces the antitrust authoritys case. In particular, the au-
thor shows that it is always optimal ex-ante (not ex-post) to o¤er leniency only if
the probability that the antitrust authority wins the case, without self-reporting,
is less than 50%.
126Technically, the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the probability of detection
must be weakly concave.
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Finally, it is worth noting that, contrary to Spagnolo [2004], the paper by
Harrington [2008] have no implications for spontaneous self-reports.
The papers discussed above consider symmetric rms. The e¤ects of a le-
niency programme on cartelsstability when rms are asymmetric is explored by
Motchenkova and Leliefeld [2010]. In particular, the authors consider two rms
which for historical reasons have asymmetric market shares (one has a large mar-
ket share while the other has a low market share). The asymmetry in the size of
rms implies di¤erent collusive prots for cartel members, and, thus, asymmetric
punishment threats in case of defection from the collusive agreement. In e¤ect, the
larger rm has less to fear from a retaliation than the smaller rm. In this context,
the authors explore the impact of a leniency programme on a cartels stability, by
means of its e¤ect on the severity of the threat of retaliation.
In a setting where the small rm decides whether to self-report or not and
subsequently the large rm decides whether to retaliate or not, the authors show
that the leniency programme may foster cartel stability. The underlying reasoning
lies in the ability of the large rm to use the leniency programme as a mean to
enhance its trust to the small rm not to report the cartel to the antitrust authority.
In other words, the leniency programme facilitates the large rm to coercethe
small rm not to report with the threat of a severe punishment. Thus, rms may
exploit the leniency programme to enhance cartel stability. It is worth noting that
this adverse e¤ect on cartels stability crops up even if the leniency programme
restricts complete amnesty only to the rst self-reporting rm. The authors show
that increasing the ne or the probability of detection helps to alleviate this adverse
e¤ect of leniency programmes.
A policy recommendation that derives from the paper is that self-reporting
rms should be protected from possible retaliation measures by other cartel mem-
bers. For instance, the antitrust authority may closely monitor the market after
a rm self-reports so that to discourage retaliatory measures, which may manifest
with abuse of dominant positions (e.g. predatory pricing). Moreover, the an-
titrust authority may focus its investigations in markets with intermediate degrees
of asymmetry wherein the adverse e¤ects of leniency programmes are more likely
to evolve. Finally, the antitrust policy should put greater emphasis on aggravating
factors, such as coercion, when calculating the nes for illegal cartels.
A common limitation of the papers discussed above is that the collusive price
and prots are xed. In addition, the pricing behaviour of collusive rms does not
inuence the probability of cartel detection. These two assumptions imply that a
leniency programme does not inuence the price charged by a defecting rm, nor
does it a¤ect its prots.
The impact of a leniency programme on the cartel price path and cartel stability
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is explored by Chen and Harrington [2007]. The authors extend Harrington [2004,
2005], where the probability of detection and nes are endogenous to colluding
rmsprices127, by considering a leniency programme as an additional tool for the
enforcement of antitrust law. In this context, the cartel chooses a price path that
ensures compliance by all rms (i.e., it is incentive compatible) without raising
suspicions to buyers or the antitrust authority about the cartel.
A distinctive assumption of the paper is that detection can occur in the period
after the collapse of the cartel (i.e., the period after which a rm defects from the
illegal agreement). This assumption implies that the expected penalties can be
higher when partial leniency is o¤ered, compared to the policy of no leniency. As
a result, a defecting rm can lodge a leniency application even if the ensuing payo¤
is lower than without a leniency programme to preempt others to self-report in
the following period.
The authors show that a leniency programme providing full amnesty only to
the rst rm to self-report the cartel makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain.
Moreover, their analysis shows that o¤ering partial leniency can facilitate collusion
(compared to o¤ering no leniency), nonetheless, this result is ambiguous. When the
probability of detection is weak, a defecting rm would prefer not to self-report to
the antitrust authority. However, anticipating that the other rms will self-report
in the next period and considering that only the rst self-reporting rm receives a
generous treatment, the rm chooses to defect in the market and simultaneously
self-report. This strategy reduces the payo¤ to cheating which allows the cartel to
sustain a higher price path. On the other hand, as the ne discount rate increases,
rms have more incentives to defect in the market and simultaneously self-report
to the antitrust authority. This tightens the incentive compatibility constraint
which induces the cartel to price lower. Hence, even if a leniency programme is
unsuccessful in deterring cartel formation, it may still achieve to impel the cartel
to price lower in order to preserve the stability of the cartel.
The papers by Motta and Polo [2003], Hinloopen [2003], Spagnolo [2004],
Motchenkova [2004], Feess and Markus [2005], Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a],
Harrington [2008], Motchenkova and Leliefeld [2010] and Chen and Harrington
[2007] investigate the e¤ects of leniency programmes on rmsincentives to self-
report. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, an antitrust authority has also other
investigative tools to detect cartels and achieve compliance with antitrust law.
One tool is individual leniency programmes. Such programmes may provide a new
source of information for antitrust authorities. Indeed, if individuals are provided
with su¢ cient incentives, then the rms that breach antitrust law would not only
127In particular, the probability of detection is increasing in price changes while the magnitude
of the penalty, in case of conviction, is increasing in prices (current period and historical prices).
See Section 1.4, pp. 26.
47
be in a race for leniency with their competitors but also with their own employees.
In addition, a typical assumption of the literature on leniency programmes is
that collusion always generates hard evidence.128 The hard evidence may last only
for one period (as in Motta and Polo [2003]), and then evaporate, or it may be
indelible (as in Ellis and Wislon [2003] and Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a]). The
role of evidence retention has not been given su¢ cient attention in the literature.
A notable exception is Aubert et al. [2006] who consider several explanations,
in a rather informal way, for the puzzling fact of evidence retention. Evidence
is crucial both for an antitrust authority and colluding rms. To credibly build
a case against cartels, an antitrust authority needs to nd cogent incriminating
evidence. For instance, documents proving that rms have agreed to coordinate
their conduct (e.g., x prices). Thus, an essential assumption of the literature
is that rms axiomatically keep hard evidence.129 Moreover, to be eligible for
leniency a rm must provide hard evidence to the antitrust authority, which is a
realistic assumption to be made. However, the interesting question is not whether
a cartel produces hard evidence or not but, given that hard evidence is produced,
whether rms consciously decide to retain or destroy the incriminating evidence.
This suggests that it may be indispensable to make the decision to retain or destroy
the hard evidence endogenous, so that to analyze and comprehend the dynamics
of the potential trade-o¤s involved. Considering these remarks, the conclusions
derived by Aubert et al. [2006] are the following.
Firstly, courageous leniency programmes o¤ering positive rewards to individ-
uals have a greater deterrence e¤ect than moderate leniency programmes o¤ering
at best amnesty (as in Spagnolo [2004]). Secondly, rewards to individuals can be
more e¤ective than rewards to rms. Thirdly, su¢ ciently low rewards may insti-
gate adverse e¤ects on the benign cooperation among rms, as well as on rms
organizational structure. Finally, the probability of retaining hard incriminating
evidence by rms, or individuals, increases with the magnitude of the reward.
In particular, the authors contend that positive rewards may exacerbate the
agency problems within rms by encouraging individuals to self-report. Given that
rms must pay higher bonuses to their employees, in order to bribe their silence,
collusion becomes less lucrative, and thus less alluring. The higher the reward,
128An exception is Motta and Polo [2003] who assume that evidence is produced, provided
that defection occurs in the market. For instance, the evidence comprises of scoresheets tracking
the compliance of colluding rms to the illegal agreement. Essentially, this assumption implies
that a colluding rm cannot defect in the market and simultaneously self-report to the antitrust
authority.
129Certainly, a more realistic assumption is that colluding rms can be convicted based on
indirect evidence, e.g. circumstantial evidence, however, with a lower probability than the one
associated with hard evidence. For example, this may be justied on the fact that it is easier
and less costly to prosecute and successfully convict a cartel based on hard evidence rather than
on circumstantial evidence.
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the higher the compensation a rm must pay to its employees to discourage them
from running to the antitrust authority. In addition, a high reward may provide
su¢ cient compensation to the employees for their anticipated reduction in future
earnings, in case of dismissal. It is for this reason that positive rewards have a
stronger deterrence e¤ect than reduced nes.
Nonetheless, a poorly designed individual leniency programme may give rise
to unfavorable e¤ects, such as, the chilling of valuable cooperation between rms
or the restriction of benecial information ows within the rm. For instance, the
exchange of information regarding the future prospects of market demand or costs
which, in e¤ect, may allow rms to adopt better informed decisions.130 More-
over, they can cause rigidities in the job market or the internal structure of rms.
For instance, colluding rms may increase the duration of their informed employ-
eescontracts, rather than hiring new, and probably more productive, employees.
This will be the case if the bribe that has to be paid to new employees is signi-
cantly higher than the productivity di¤erential between new and current employ-
ees. Moreover, positive rewards to individuals may also induce rms to ine¢ ciently
adopt innocent attitudesin order to avoid raising suspicions to their employees.
In particular, rms may strive to prevent their employees from sensing trouble
so as to discourage them from investing their working time into non-productive
activities (e.g. sneaking about and acquiring convicting evidence).131 In addition,
employees may strategically exploit the leniency programme by self-reporting even
if they do not keep valid evidence. Rewards may also result in deterrence of valu-
able inter-rm or intra-rm cooperation. This could be the case if prosecution is
costly for rms and the antitrust authority erroneously consider a legal conduct
as illegal (a type I error). An antitrust authority may, however, mitigate these
ine¢ ciencies by introducing nes for information fabrication or coloring.
The authors also investigate plausible explanations for the puzzling fact that
rms or individuals keep hard evidence that can be discovered by an antitrust
authority. However, the explanations o¤ered cannot justify why rms keep hard
evidence in the absence of leniency programmes, or why rms that keep evidence,
nevertheless fail to report it to the antitrust authority.
Aubert et al. [2006] contend that rms or individuals may decide to keep hard
evidence, running the risk of a higher probability of detection and conviction,
to prevent deviations from the collusive agreement, or to mitigate the agency
problems within the rm. In particular, the authors argue that rms may want
130See, for instance, Athey and Bagwell [2001].
131A more recent study by Avramovich [2011] shows that the hunt for bounties by individu-
als may generate intra-rm productive ine¢ ciencies. For instance, employeesattention may be
destructed from production towards activities related to gathering evidence on rmsmiscon-
duct. The author shows that by rewarding whistle-blowers, the antitrust authority may enhance
deterrence at the expense of compromising productive e¢ ciency.
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to keep hard evidence so as to decrease the expected ne they have to pay in case
of detection by the antitrust authority. The retained evidence can also be used by
rms as a disciplining device to threaten to denounce their partners in case of a
deviation from the collusive agreement, as in Ellis andWislon [2003] and Buccirossi
and Spagnolo [2006a]. Another plausible explanation is that individuals retain
evidence to take advantage of the agency problems within rms. For instance,
an individual may keep evidence pertaining to the negotiations to form a cartel in
order to increase his bargaining power vis-a-vis the manager or the shareholders of
the rm. An individual may also keep hard evidence that proves his conformity to
the orders of his superiors in order to evade conviction by the antitrust authority,
or to threaten to report it in case of deprivation of his bonus, or promotion, or
even his employment to the rm.
1.7 Empirical Literature on Leniency Programmes
From the papers discussed above, it is clear that the theoretical literature on le-
niency programmes is inconclusive with regard to the e¤ectiveness of such incentive
schemes in deterring cartels. Some dynamics work in favour of cartel deterrence
after the introduction of a leniency programme while others work against it. For
example, reducing the nes for self-reporting rms makes collusion less costly ex-
ante which fosters collusion.132 Moreover, when the probability of cartel detection
exogenously increases, as a result of a policy change, the option to self-report be-
comes more valuable to rms.133 On the other hand, a cartel which is otherwise
stable may become unstable after the introduction of a leniency programme. In
particular, a leniency programme may reduce the expected ne in case of convic-
tion134, or increase rivalscosts through revenue based nes and other compliance
measures135, or make the collusive agreement more risky in the sense of Harsanyi
and Selten [1988]. Finally, the deterrence e¤ect of leniency programmes hinges on
i) the punishment strategies that rms adopt to align their incentives and conform
with the illegal agreement136, ii) the condentiality of the leniency application
procedure137, iii) the transparency of the leniency programme138, iv) the ne pol-
icy (xed or proportional to the illegal gains)139, v) whether the probabilities of
132Motta and Polo [2003].
133Chen and Harrington [2007] and Harrington [2008].
134Spagnolo [2004] and Harrington [2008].
135Ellis and Wislon [2003].
136Ellis and Wislon [2003] and Spagnolo [2004].
137Motchenkova [2004].
138Hinloopen [2003].
139Motchenkova [2004].
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detection are endogenous140 and, vi) the heterogeneity of colluding rms141.
Because of the inherently clandestine nature of cartels, the empirical analysis
of the e¢ cacy of leniency programmes in deterring cartels is di¢ cult. The major
challenge involved is the lack of information regarding undetected cartels. The
sample selection problem due to observing only the detected cartels may lead to
biased estimates and misleading conclusions with regard to the impact of leniency
programmes on cartel deterrence.142
There are several empirical studies that attempt to measure the impact of
leniency programmes on cartel deterrence. The success of such programmes can
be measured by their impact on the duration and protability of cartels.
With regard to the duration of cartels, it is worth noting that the theoretical
literature on collusion (see Section 2.2) does not directly consider cartel durations.
It rather focuses on the conditions under which collusion can be sustained after
a change in market characteristics or a policy innovation (e.g. introduction of a
leniency programme). An exception to the literature is Chang and Harrington
[2010]. The authors develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of the
impact of a critical policy change, which a¤ects the magnitude of the nes on
the duration of cartels (e.g. introduction of a leniency programme). The model
predicts that if the policy change is e¤ective, then the average duration of detected
cartels should rise in the short-run and fall (below the initial levels) in the long-
run. Intuitively, after a policy change (e.g. introduction of a leniency programme)
the short-run benet from defecting exceeds the long-run gains from colluding.
Thus, the policy change shifts the marginalcartel (indi¤erent between competing
and colluding) from the population of sustainable and longer-lived cartels, to the
population of unstable and shorter-lived cartels. As a result, the ensuing cartel
detection comes from a population of longer-lasting cartels. This implies that the
average duration of cartels increases in the short-run. In the long-run, the duration
decreases (below pre-leniency levels) due to the enhanced overall deterrence. It is
important to note that no information regarding undetected cartels is necessary to
assess the impact of a change in antitrust policy. The implications of this model
are empirically tested by Brenner [2009] and Zhou [2012].
140Chen and Harrington [2007].
141Motchenkova and Laan [2011].
142For instance, an increasing number of detected cartels or detection of cartels with shorter
duration, after a change in the antitrust policy (e.g. introduction of a leniency programme)
may be attributed to an increase in the probability of detection (e.g. increase in the antitrust
authoritys budget which allows more market investigations) or an increase in the propensity
to collude (Ellis and Wislon [2003], Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a] and Aubert et al. [2006]).
Failing to take these concerns into account may lead to misleading conclusions regarding the
e¤ectiveness of a change in antitrust policy (Posner [1970]).
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An alternative model, which infers the deterrence e¤ects of leniency programmes
from the rate of cartel detection, is suggested by Miller [2009]. Similar to Chang
and Harrington [2010], the model developed by Miller [2009] predicts that the num-
ber of cartel discoveries increases immediately after the introduction of a leniency
programme and subsequently decreases below the initial levels.
With regard to the impact on the protability of cartels (price-cost margins),
the situation is more clear-cut. An e¤ective leniency programme should enhance
competition and thus squeeze rms prot margins. Therefore, the hypothesis to be
tested empirically is whether the price-cost margins contract after the introduction
of a leniency programme.143 This proposition is empirically tested by Klein [2010]
and Cloutier [2011].
Below we survey the most inuential contributions to the empirical literature
on leniency programmes.
Brenner [2009] empirically investigates the e¢ cacy of the rst EU Leniency
programme of 1996 for the period 1990-2003. In particular, the author addresses
two questions. The rst is whether the information revealed under leniency ap-
plications i) induces higher nes per-case, compared to traditional prosecution
methods, and ii) accelerates the prosecution procedure (as advocated by Motta
and Polo [2003]). The second is whether the leniency programme destabilizes ex-
isting cartels and deters future cartel activity (as shown by Spagnolo [2004] and
Ellis and Wislon [2003]).
The econometric analysis shows that the leniency programme induces a higher
level of per-rm nes, controlling for a number of factors that inuence the level of
the nes. To the extent that the level of the nes is inuenced by the strength of the
case against the cartel, this conrms that additional and value-added information
is revealed to the European Commission which would not have access to without
self-reporting. Moreover, the analysis of the data reveals that after the introduction
of the leniency programme in 1996, the average duration of a cartel investigation
decreased by almost 1.5 years, which hints at the economized investigation and
prosecution costs.
The change in cartelsstability is measured by cartelsduration prior and after
the introduction of the leniency programme. The author shows that although
there is a sharp increase in the number of prosecuted and convicted cartels after
adopting the leniency programme, this cannot be interpreted as ample evidence
143However, to get reliable and unbiased results the empirical analysis should take into account
the potential problems due to endogeneity and omitted variables. A reduction in price-cost
margins may be due to other policies that concurrently change with the leniency policies. See
Klein [2010] and Cloutier [2011].
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of the deterrence e¤ects of leniency programmes. The reasoning is twofold. On
the one hand, the particular temporal pattern of detections is not consistent with
su¢ cient conditions on the deterrence e¤ects of leniency programmes as established
by Miller [2009]. On the other hand, the empirical results of the paper do not
corroborate Chang and Harrington [2010] who show that an e¤ective leniency
programme increases the average duration of detected cartels in the short-run.
Zhou [2012] criticizes Brenner [2009] because the econometric specication of
his paper does not allow the impact of a leniency programme on cartel durations
to change over time. As a result, the short-run and long-run e¤ects of leniency
programmes, pointed out by Miller [2009] and Chang and Harrington [2010], are
confounded, leading to biased estimates.
The paper by Zhou [2012] adapts a dynamic model of cartel formation devel-
oped by Chang and Harrington [2010] which predicts that the impact of a more
e¢ cacious policy on the duration of discovered cartels is time-dependent. In par-
ticular, following an increase in the detection capabilities of an antitrust authority
the marginal cartel (indi¤erent between colluding and competing) immediately col-
lapse and the ensuing cartel detection comes from a population of longer-lasting
cartels. Because of such a sample selection e¤ect, the average duration of discov-
ered cartels increases in the short-run; in the long run, the duration decreases due
to the enhanced overall deterrence.
The adapted model is then used to evaluate the e¢ cacy of the new EC leniency
programme of 2002 for the period 1990-2010. In particular, the author examines
whether cartel durations increase immediately following the introduction of the
new leniency programme in 2002144, and whether it falls below the pre-leniency
levels, immediately after the change in the leniency policy.
The econometric results of the paper are consistent with the theoretical pre-
dictions of Chang and Harrington [2010] that following the introduction of a more
e¢ cacious leniency programme, the average duration of discovered cartels increases
in the short-run and falls in the long-run below pre-leniency levels.
Miller [2009] develops a dynamic model of cartel behavior that provides predic-
tions and moment conditions regarding the temporal distribution of the number
of convicted cartels. The theoretical model predicts that the number of detected
cartels increases immediately after the adoption of the leniency programme (be-
cause of a higher rate of detection) and decreases in the long-run (because of a
lower rate of cartel formation). These e¤ects, which depend on the time horizon,
are subsequently used to empirically identify the impact of the amended US cor-
144The change in the leniency policy in 2002 essentially provides an exogenous shock which
identies the impact of the leniency programme on the duration of detected cartels.
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porate leniency programme of 1993, on detection and deterrence capabilities.145
In particular, the author applies the model to the set of convicted cartels by the
DOJ over the period 1985-2005.
The econometric results are consistent with the theoretical predictions suggest-
ing that the number of cartels detected increases immediately following leniency
introduction and then falls below the initial levels. Thus, the author concludes that
the amended US corporate leniency programme of 1993 enhances both deterrence
and detection of cartels.
As Miller [2009] remarks, the results must be interpreted with caution. The
predictions of the theoretical model which the author tests empirically is based
on the assumption that the probability of detection is equal for all cartels. This
remains valid as long as the detected cartels are representative (for the total pool
of cartels detected and undetected) in some fashion. However, a more realistic
assumption is that the probability of detection may depend on the level of the
cartel overcharges.146 Moreover, the empirical results of the paper may be biased.
This is because the identication of the impact of the leniency programme on
detection and deterrence is based on a single time series with only one exogenous
policy change.
A common characteristic of the papers discussed above is that they indirectly
measure the e¤ectiveness of leniency programmes via the change in the probability
of detection or the duration of detected cartels. Below we discuss two papers, by
Klein [2010] and Cloutier [2011], that follow a di¤erent identication approach. In
particular, the e¤ectiveness of leniency programmes is directly measured by their
impact on the intensity of competition at the industry level. Since the ultimate
goal of leniency programmes is to enhance the desistance and deterrence of cartels,
which are harmful for society, a successful leniency policy should have a negative
impact on the protability of rms.
The paper by Klein [2010] studies the e¤ectiveness of leniency policies over a
20 years period from a population of 23 OECD countries. Rather than focusing on
cartel detection, the author measures the e¤ect of leniency policies on price-cost
margins at industry levels. In particular, the author considers whether a countrys
specic leniency policy has an impact on the price cost margin of its industries.
To avoid potential endogeneity problems and measurement problems from omit-
ted variables, since a change in price-cost margins can be due to other factors
than the introduction or amendment of a leniency policy, the author employs the
145The major innovation of the amended corporate leniency programme of 1993 is that the rst
self-reporting rm is automatically guaranteed full amnesty, provided that an investigation is not
underway. Moreover, amnesty was still available even if an investigation was underway.
146See Block et al. [1981], Harrington [2004, 2005] and Houba et al. [2010].
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instrumental variables approach. The author uses two instruments: 1) the imple-
mentation of leniency programmes in other OECD countries and 2) indicators for
the political environment.147
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the national leniency pro-
grammes, as well as the EU leniency programmes of 1996 and 2002, have a positive
impact on industriescompetition intensity, with an approximate decrease in the
price-cost margins of 3-5%. Moreover, the instrumental variable estimation reveals
that these results do not su¤er from signicant endogeneity and omitted variable
bias. Thus, the author concludes that leniency programmes are e¢ cient in detect-
ing and deterring cartels. Robustness checks indicate that a leniency programme
takes on average 1 year after its implementation to become e¤ective, and that its
e¤ectiveness proliferates over time. Finally, the legal system wherein the underly-
ing leniency programme is implemented seems to have an important impact on its
e¤ectiveness.148
Cloutier [2011] criticizes the instrumental variables approach implemented by
Klein [2010] arguing that this method may lead to biased estimates because of
endogeneity. In particular, the author argues that the EU is a considerably in-
tegrated region where many large rms operate at an EU-wide or supranational
level; thus they are a¤ected by the leniency policies of other countries. Therefore,
other countries leniency policies could be directly related to home countrys cartels
and their protability. A similar problem exists with the second instrument used,
the policy position of political parties of a country, which is inuencing several
other policies and not only the leniency policy of a country.
To overcome the potential endogeneity problems, Cloutier [2011]uses the indus-
try concentration as a proxy of the inherent competitiveness of an industry. To the
extend that highly concentrated industries are more prone to collusion, Cloutier
[2011] suggests that leniency programmes should potentially be more e¤ective in
highly concentrated industries.
Thus, he assumes that the leniency policy should be potentially more e¤ective
in highly concentrated industries since those industries are more prone to collusion.
The implicit assumption is that changes in other policies, but the leniency policy
inuence all industries regardless of their concentration levels. The author uses
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, where the low concentration industries is
the control group and the high concentration industries is the treatment group.
147A good instrument must be correlated with a countrys leniency policy, but uncorrelated
with any other policy or shock that a¤ects the protability of the rms operating in the country.
148On average, prots are lower in countries that embrace the English and Scandinavian legal
systems, and, especially, in countries with the German legal system.
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The author uses annual rm-level data of all publicly traded rms in the US
over the period 1991 to 1997. The econometric results show that the amendment
of the US corporate leniency programme in 1993 had no signicant e¤ect on price-
cost margins in the short-run while a persistent e¤ect is present after 1-2 years.
The results are consistent with Klein [2010].
To conclude this section, the main ndings of the existing empirical literature
on the e¤ectiveness of leniency programmes are synopsized below:
i) leniency programmes seem to strengthen the case of the antitrust au-
thority against the cartel - reected in the higher per-rm nes when a leniency
programme is available (Brenner [2009]);
ii) leniency programmes accelerate the judicial procedure, thus economizing
investigation and prosecution costs (Brenner [2009]);
iii) more transparent leniency programmes (the amendment of the US cor-
porate leniency programme in 1993) seem to have a positive impact on deterrence
(Miller [2009]);
iv) o¤ering full amnesty to the rst self-reporting rm enhances the deter-
rence e¤ect of the leniency programme (compare Brenner [2009] and Miller [2009]);
v) leniency programmes enhance both desistance and deterrence of cartels
(Miller [2009], Zhou [2012] and Klein [2010]).
1.8 Conclusions
Cartels are a symptom of free markets. Because of their inimical e¤ects to con-
sumers, and the economy as a whole, cartels are considered as per-se illegal. An-
titrust authorities encounter two key challenges in the war against cartels. The
rst is the budget stringency which restricts the frequency and success of their
investigations. The second is the asymmetry of information which is due to the
inherently secret nature of cartels: rms know whether they participate in a car-
tel while antitrust authorities have only an indication about the existence of the
cartel.
A powerful policy instrument to combat illegal cartels is leniency programmes.
Leniency programmes are information revelation mechanisms incentivising the in-
stability of cartels. The rationale for using such incentive schemes is twofold: facil-
itate the detection and/or prosecution of existing cartels and deter the formation
of new cartels.
The economic literature on leniency programmes has thrived in the last decade.
This survey paper reviews a selective subset of the most inuential contributions
to the relevant literature. To comprehend the operational mechanism of leniency
programmes, and their e¤ects on rmsincentives to collude, this paper reviews
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the literature on collusion in Industrial Economics. Moreover, it surveys the liter-
ature on generic law enforcement, with a focus on self-reporting schemes, both for
individuals and groups of individuals.
The main conclusions derived from the literature on leniency programmes in
antitrust, in the light of the research articles reviewed in this paper, are the fol-
lowing:
1. Post-investigation leniency may provide colluding rms with incentives to
reveal evidence of signicant added value to the antitrust authority. As a re-
sult, the judicial procedure accelerates and the investigation costs diminish.
These benecial e¤ects of leniency programmes are more pronounced when
an antitrust authoritys investigations are not fruitful in detecting incrimi-
nating evidence of good quality.
2. The deterrence e¤ects of a leniency programme may be indirectly amplied
to the extent that the economized resources for the antitrust authority are
used to conduct additional market investigations.
3. The punishment strategy (grim trigger v. stick and carrot) adopted by col-
luding rms in order to enforce their illegal agreement inuence the deter-
rence e¤ects of leniency programmes.
4. Restricting eligibility to the rst self-reporting rm (rst informant rule)
curbs colluding rmsability to exploit the leniency programme - rms can
collude and report in each period, however, all but one has to pay the full
ne.
5. O¤ering a positive reward to the rst self-reporting rm, nanced by the
nes imposed on all other cartel members, provides high-powered incentives
to rms in order to self-report (courageous leniency programmes). In this
case, the leniency programme generates a Prisonersdilemma situation where
all rms run to the antitrust authority to confess their illegal act and benet
from leniency.
6. Extending eligibility to receive leniency to more than one rm when colluding
rms retain asymmetric evidence facilitates the prosecutorial procedure of
cartels.
7. A more transparent leniency programme allows rms to accurately estimate
the benets accruing from a leniency application.
8. More severe punishment for repeat o¤enders enhance the e¢ cacy of a le-
niency programme.
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9. A condential application procedure restricts rmsability and scope to ex-
ploit the leniency programme.
10. A leniency programme for individuals is more e¤ective than a corporate
leniency programme.
11. Reduced nes (because of a lenient treatment) make collusion less costly
ex-ante (pro-collusive e¤ect).
12. Wrongly designed leniency programmes may provide rms with a credible
mechanism to curb the opportunism which is inherent to illegal cartel agree-
ments. Thus, contrary to the policy objectives, a poor leniency programme
may exacerbate cartel formation and/or make existing cartels more robust.
13. A poorly designed leniency programme for individuals may have adverse
e¤ects on intra-rm hiring strategies and inter-rm benign cooperation.
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Chapter 2: Keep to sustain or keep to exploit?
Why rms keep hard evidence
2.1 Introduction
In the last decades, several cartels have been dismantled either because some
of their members have blown the whistle to antitrust authorities149 (henceforth
AAs) or because AAsown investigations have exposed incriminating hard ev-
idence.150 Moreover, numerous cartels have been prosecuted based on indirect
evidence, as the AAs investigations failed to disclose hard evidence.151
Intuitively the cartels whose members keep hard evidence have a higher proba-
bility of detection and, hence, conviction by an AA. For instance, if an AA conducts
a dawn raid152 in a market whereby it detects cogent and irrefutable incriminating
hard evidence (e.g., meetings notes/memos/minutes, emails, videos, voice record-
ings, scoresheets tracking a cartels members compliance etc.), it can directly
and speedily convict the cartel. On the other hand, if an AAs investigations are
not fruitful in tracing hard evidence, then presumably more e¤ort is required to
substantiate the case against the cartel, all else equal.
A question that logically arises is why collusive rms do not destroy the hard
evidence of their illegal communication to curtail the risk of detection by an AA. A
reasonable speculation is that rms keep hard evidence to exchange it with a ne
discount on the basis of a leniency programme (henceforth LP). However, there
are several instances in case law where AAs investigations made clear that rms
keep hard self-incriminating evidence even when LPs were not part of the antitrust
enforcement policy. This suggests that the existence of a LP may not be the
exclusive motive rationalizing a rms decision to keep hard evidence. Nevertheless,
the introduction of a LP arguably inuences rmsdecisions to keep hard evidence.
149For instance, see the following cases: Case COMP/E-1/36 604 - Citric acid, 5/12/2001;
Case COMP/E-1/37.152  Plasterboard, 27/11/2002; Case COMP/E-1/38.069 - Copper
plumbing tubes, 3/9/2004; Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2  Raw tobacco Italy, 20/10/2005;
Case COMP/F/38.899  Gas insulated switchgear, 24/1/2007; Case COMP/E-1/38.823 -
PO/Elevators and escalators, 21/2/2007; Case COMP/38.628 - Nitrile butadiene rubber,
23/1/2008; Case COMP/38511 DRAMs, 19/5/2010.
150For instance, see the following cases: Case IV/31.865 - PVC, 27/7/1994; COMP/C-38.279 -
French beef, 2/4/2003; COMP/38.432 - Professional videotapes, 20/11/2007; COMP/39165 - Flat
glass, 28/11/2007; COMP/38.543 - International removal services, 11/3/2008; COMP/39125 -
Car glass, 12/11/2008.
151For instance, see the following cases: Cases 89/85, 105/85, 114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85
- A. Ahlström Oy v. Commission, 27//9/1988; Case IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar,
24/5/1997; Case IV/33.133 - Solvay ICI, 19/12/1990; COMP/E-1/36.756 - Sodium gluconate
II, 29/9/2004; COMP/B-2/37.666 - Dutch beer market, 18/4/2007.
152A dawn raid is an unannounced inspection at suspected rms premises. The name is
derived from the time of the day when the investigations are normally held.
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Pertinent to this is also the fact that those rms that keep hard evidence do not
necessarily lodge a leniency application. The relevant case law illustrates several
cases where the AAsinvestigations were fruitful in detecting and exposing hard
evidence in rms hands.
The above discussion brings into the surface several interesting questions in
relation to the apparently puzzling behavior of collusive rms. The most critical
questions pertain to i) the factors that inuence rmsdecisions to keep or destroy
the hard incriminating evidence, ii) the impact of a LP on the said decisions and,
iii) the underlying incentives of rms to keep, nevertheless not report the hard
evidence to the AA. Shedding additional light with regard to these questions is
the primal objective of this study.
The majority of the papers in the literature on LPs assume that rms ax-
iomatically keep the hard evidence that is generated by the cartel.153 Nonetheless,
there are a few studies that endogenize rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard
evidence. These studies o¤er plausible explanations for the apparently puzzling
questions. For instance, Aubert et al. [2006] maintains that hard evidence can
serve as a device to discipline rms to the collusive agreement. In other words,
hard evidence can mitigate rmsincentives to defect from the cartel. In the case
where one rm defects in the market (e.g. undercut the collusive price), the other
rms can run to the AA and self-report. As a result, the defecting rm will pay
the full ne with certainty, implying that the benet from a defection contract.
Moreover, a rms that keeps hard evidence and does not self-report can credibly
convince its partners that it complies with the collusive agreement. This is because
a defecting rm would have strong incentives to self-report to the AA at the same
time it defects in the market. Thus, a rm may keep hard evidence in order to
dilute any shades regarding its compliance to the agreement, in particular, in situ-
ations of uncertainty and imperfect information. Another reasonable explanation
o¤ered by Aubert et al. [2006] is that rms keep hard evidence to pay a reduced
ne in the case of detection by an AA. In particular, rms may exploit the LP by
colluding and systematically self-reporting to the AA. A limitation of the paper by
Aubert et al. [2006] is that it cannot justify a rms decision to keep hard evidence
when a LP is not an ingredient of the policy enforcement tools. Furthermore, it
cannot provide an adequate answer why rms keep without self-reporting to the
AA if the market conduct of individual cartel members can be perfectly monitored
(e.g. when the market is su¢ ciently transparent). A relevant shortcoming of that
paper is that it cannot illustrate the impact of a LP on rmsdecisions to keep or
153The existing literature provides answers, among others, as to the optimal level of ne dis-
count that should be o¤ered to self-reporting rms, the number of rms that should be eligible
for obtaining leniency and the stage at which leniency should be o¤ered (before or after the com-
mencement of AAs investigation in the market). See Motta and Polo [2003], Spagnolo [2004],
Motchenkova [2004] and Harrington [2008]. For an excellent literature review see Spagnolo [2008].
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destroy hard evidence and whether to self-report or not to the AA.
Another paper that explores rmsincentives to destroy (partially or fully) or
even to create additional evidence is by Silbye [2010]. This paper highlights the
trade-o¤ associated with rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence.
On the one hand, more evidence qualies a self-reporting rm with a higher ne
discount (the ne discount is positively related to the quantity of evidence submit-
ted). More evidence, on the other hand, implies a higher probability of detection
(and conviction) by the AA, as it is easier for the AA to unravel the cartel if more
evidence exists. Interestingly, Silbye [2010] concludes that the option to destroy
the hard evidence does not a¤ect the design of the LP.
To tackle some of the open questions in the relevant literature, we develop a
model wherein rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence is endogenous,
as in Aubert et al. [2006] and Silbye [2010]. A key assumption of the model is
that a cartels sustainability crucially depends on hard evidence.154 Specically,
we assume that if at least one cartel member destroys the hard evidence, the car-
tel may, with some probability, collapse, and thus rms may forego the collusive
prots. The underlying reasoning for this assumption is that hard evidence allows
more e¤ective implementation and monitoring of the terms of the collusive agree-
ment. We call this e¤ect the cartel collapse e¤ect of hard evidence (henceforth the
CCE). This e¤ect may rationalize a rms decision to keep hard evidence even
in the absence of a LP.
The decision to keep hard evidence does not, however, come without a cost
for the cartel. Similar to Silbye [2010], we assume that the probability of cartel
detection is higher when rms keep hard evidence.155 If the AAs investigation in
the market exposes hard evidence, then the prosecution of the cartel is facilitated.
Thus, the AA does not need to undertake additional e¤ort to validate or further
substantiate its case against the cartel. We call this e¤ect the cartel detection
154It is worth noting that in Aubert et al. [2006] a cartels sustainability is not directly inuenced
by the existence of hard evidence. A cartel, in their model, may collapse if a rms drastic
innovation is successful, as the successful rm would prefer to compete forever rather than to
collude. Within this context, hard evidence may operate as a mechanism to thwart rms to
defect from the cartel. Essentially, by threatening to denounce the cartel, in case of defection
from the collusive agreement, the deviant rms incentive compatibility constraint tightens, as it
has to pay the full ne to the AA. Conversely, our model assumes that the hard evidence directly
a¤ects a cartels sustainability by facilitating colluding rms to closely monitor and react to each
others behaviour.
155Aubert et al. [2006] also make this assumption. However, contrary to Aubert et al. [2006],
we assume that a cartel can be detected even in the absence of hard evidence, based only on
indirect evidence. In our view, this is a more realistic assumption. As already remarked, in the
real world there are cases where AAs in various jurisdictions have convicted rms for collusion
based exclusively on indirect evidence. This assumption would allow us to explore the trade-o¤s
between keeping and destroying the hard evidence, when a LP is not available.
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e¤ect of hard evidence (henceforth the CDE). Intuitively, this e¤ect amplies
the expected cost of the cartel by increasing the expected ne.
Both e¤ects, the CCE and the CDE, cause a contraction to the net expected
collusive prots. On the one hand, when rms destroy the hard evidence the
cartels coordination becomes less e¤ective (the cartel collapse with a positive
probability) and the gross expected collusive prots decrease. On the other hand,
when rms keep the hard evidence, the probability of cartel detection is higher,
thus the expected cost of the cartel increases. The strength of the two e¤ects
will reveal the conditions under which colluding rms choose to keep or destroy
the hard evidence, even though the portfolio of AAs enforcement tools does not
include a LP.
Similar to Aubert et al. [2006], the introduction of a LP o¤ers to collusive
rms an opportunity to exploit the LP.156 In particular, rms may keep the hard
evidence and subsequently exchange it with a reduced ne within the framework
of a LP. We call this e¤ect the cartel amnesty e¤ect of hard evidence (henceforth
the CAE). This e¤ect causes a reduction to the expected cost associated with
a rms decision to keep hard evidence. Therefore, a rm may choose to keep
hard evidence not only to evade the costly breakdown of the cartel but also to
exploit the LP. The interplay of the three e¤ects, CCE, CDE and CAE, allows us
to explore the impact of a LP on rmsdecisions to keep or destroy hard evidence.
Moreover, the introduction of a LP allows the investigation of the conditions under
which collusive rms keep hard evidence without disclosing it to the AA.
The main conclusions of our study is that rms are more likely to keep hard
evidence when: i) the cartels sustainability is more sensitive to hard evidence,
ii) the probability of cartel detection is less depended on hard evidence and, iii)
the collusive prots-ne ratio is high. Moreover, we show that the introduction of
a LP sharpens rmsincentives to keep hard evidence. Finally, we demonstrate
that rms may keep hard evidence without reporting it to the AA if the cartels
sustainability is very sensitive to hard evidence and the (aggregate) probability of
cartel detection is su¢ ciently low.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the model. Section 2.3
presents the baseline model without LP. The extended model with LP is presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.6 concludes.
156Motta and Polo [2003] are the rst to show that rms may strategically exploit the leniency
programme in order to pay lower nes. This potential has been conrmed in a lab experiment
conducted by Hinloopen and Soetevent [2008]. The experiment conrms that rms collude and
report systematically when the LP is su¢ ciently generous. For a more general discussion on LPs
exploitation see Wils [2008], p. 137.
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2.2 Outline of the model
Similar to Motta and Polo [2003], we consider two rms that play an innitely
repeated game in the presence of an AA which enforces antitrust law. This is a
signicant di¤erence to Aubert et al. [2006] who study a dynamic non-repeated
game. In e¤ect, the authors assume that the hard evidence is indelible so that
rms can use it in any future period, as long as the cartel has not been detected.
On the contrary, we assume that there is full information decay after the end of
each period. The repeated structure could be justied on the ground that the
collusive agreement has limited time frame due to changing market conditions.
For instance, the product becomes obsolete and thus rms shift to other markets
which guarantee more lucrative opportunities for trade.
To simplify the analysis, we assume markets where cartel formation is always
protable for rms. We call a market with this feature a pro-collusive market.157
This study does not aim to analyze the deterrence and/or the desistance e¤ects of
LPs. The main goal is to concentrate on the impact of a LP on rmsincentives to
keep or destroy hard evidence, and their incentives to report or not the retained
evidence to the AA. Therefore, the assumption for a pro-collusive market allows to
focus on rmsdecisions after establishing a cartel, rather than on their decisions
to form a cartel a such.
We assume that collusion generates and leaves symmetric hard incriminating
evidence to the two colluding rms. In addition, we assume that the existence of a
cartel cannot be observed by the AA unless the latter conducts an investigation in
the market. The AAs investigation is successful only with some probability. This
probability crucially depends on whether hard evidence exists. Destroying the
hard evidence does not necessarily imply that rms will escape unscathed by the
AAs investigations. The cartel can be detected and successfully prosecuted based
on indirect evidence; evidence of facts and circumstances supporting an inference
of a cartel.158 The probability of detection if both rms destroy the hard evidence
is denoted by p. We call this probability the base probability of detection.159
If the two collusive rms decide to keep the hard evidence, the probability of
detection increases to p+. The latter is called the aggregate probability of detec-
tion. Parameter  represents the incremental probability of cartel detection when
157Technically the existence of a pro-collusive market is guaranteed by Assumptions 2 and 4,
i.e.,   12 and F  1, respectively, of our paper.
158For example, this evidence could include market data on prices or a sudden change in rms
conduct not justied otherwise by the market conditions.
159This probability is constant and independent of rmspricing behaviour (as in the seminal
papers by Motta and Polo [2003] and Spagnolo [2004]). A more realistic assumption would be
that this probability is an increasing function of the collusive price; a higher price (or price cost
margin) may attract more attention by the law enforcement agency, and thus make detection
more likely (as in Harrington [2004, 2005] and Houba et al. [2010]).
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both rms choose to keep rather than to destroy the hard evidence. The parame-
ter has a two-fold interpretation. It may reect 1) the quality of hard evidence
or 2) the AAs e¢ cacy in prosecuting cartels when its investigations expose hard
evidence. The better the quality of hard evidence is or the more e¤ective the AA
is in assessing the hard evidence detected, the higher the incremental probability
of detection would be. We assume that  is exogenous.160
If only one rm chooses to keep hard evidence, the incremental probability of
detection is 
2
.161 The underlying reasoning is that the AA may, in that case,
need to further investigate the market in order to corroborate the quality of the
reported evidence. In the extreme case where the AAs competency in detecting
cartels is not inuenced by the existence of hard evidence or the quality of the
hard evidence is unreliable, then  = 0.
To sum up, the probability of detection when both rms destroy the hard
evidence is p, when both rms keep the hard evidence is p+ 2 [0; 1], and when
only one rm keeps the hard evidence is p+ 
2
.162
In case of detection by the AA, each cartel member must pay a ne f 2 [0; F ],
where F is the maximum feasible ne.163 A typical result in the literature is
that the optimal level of law enforcement is attained by setting the ne at its
maximal level.164 Thus, we assume that f = F . Both p and F are enforcement
policy instruments which are exogenously xed. We dene those instruments as
the antitrust enforcement policy.165 A critical assumption we make is that the
antitrust policy is stationary and that it treats all markets alike.166
160Silbye [2010] assumes that colluding rms can choose how much evidence to keep, and thus
probability  is, in e¤ect, endogenous in his study.
161A similar assumption is made by Aubert et al. [2006]. However, these authors, contrary
to this paper, assume that the base probability of detection is zero, that is, a cartel cannot be
uncovered without hard evidence. As hinted before (see footnote 155), this normalization implies
that rms would always keep the hard evidence when a LP is not available.
162The upper bound on p reects our assumption that a cartel can be detected even if all of its
members destroy the hard evidence albeit with a weakly lower probability to the one associated
when hard evidence exists.
163To simplify the exposition, we assume that the ne is constant and independent of the
nature and/or severity of the illegal cartel. In practice, however, the antitrust nes are, directly
or indirectly, related to the accrued (net) illegal prots or the damages instigated to society
as a result of the law violation. Nonetheless, the maximum feasible ne is capped so that the
colluding rmsnancial stability is not jeopardized.
164See the excellent survey by Polinsky and Shavell [2000].
165The probability of detection p is a determinative factor of the deterrence e¤ect of the en-
forcement of antitrust policy. The limited resources available to AAs condition the level of this
probability. For empirical estimation of the probability of detection see Bryant and Eckard [1991],
Combe et al. [2008] and Ormosi [2011].
166In reality, a convicted cartel would stay under close scrutiny by the antitrust authority,
making it hard to collude for at least some time. Nonetheless, it is not unrealistic to assume
that rms could start colluding again at some future point (as it is assumed by Motta and Polo
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When the enforcement policy encompass a LP, the collusive rms that keep
hard evidence have an additional decision to make. In particular, they may choose
either to exchange the hard evidence with lenient treatment or to keep the hard
evidence without revealing it to the AA. Given that the hard evidence is symmetric
only the rst self-reporting rm is eligible for leniency (rst informant rule). More-
over, we assume that the rst self-reporting rms receives full amnesty. When both
rms simultaneously apply for leniency, then each of them must pay an expected
ne of F
2
.
Hard evidence is of pivotal importance for the successful implementation of the
cartel. On the one hand, it may allow rms to overcome the potential administra-
tion and implementation problems due to the complexity of their illegal agreement.
More precisely, we assume that if at least one rm destroys the hard evidence, the
management of the cartel is rendered more demanding and challenging, ultimately
causing, with some probability, the collapse of the cartel. We denote this prob-
ability by  2 [0; 1] (henceforth the cartel collapse probability). Parameter 
measures the sensitivity of the cartel to hard evidence. A higher  implies that
the cartel agreement is more complex (for instance, in terms of administration,
allocation of duties and tasks) and requires the existence of detailed hard evidence
to overcome the administration decit and/or implementation problems it encoun-
ters. At the extreme case where  = 0, the cartels sustainability (administration
and implementation) is independent of hard evidence. Furthermore, if only one
rm keeps the hard evidence, then again the cartel may collapse with the same
probability . Although the rm that keeps the hard evidence can administer the
agreement, the one that destroys may fail, and thereby the cartel may, as before,
collapse with probability .167
We further assume that if the cartel is implemented, the colluding rms can
perfectly monitor the conformity to the agreement. For instance, the market is
su¢ ciently transparent so that rms can instantly react to any defection from the
agreement.
Assumption 1. Provided that the collusive agreement is implemented rms in-
stantly react to any defections in the market when hard evidence exists.
We concede that this is a very strong assumption to be made. However, it allows
us to simplify the analysis and focus our attention on deviations from the individual
terms of the agreement other than those referred to rmsmarket conduct.168
[2003]). To simplify the analysis, we assume that in the period following a conviction by the AA,
rms can re-establish a cartel.
167A popular song written by Al Ho¤man and Dick Manning and released in 1952 reminds us
that it Takes Two to Tango. The tangometaphor remind us that for some thing in life, more
than one party is involved in an inextricable manner.
168The study by Aubert et al. [2006] is more general and thus does not put the emphasis on
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Given that we assume a pro-collusive market, when the enforcement policy does
not include a LP, rms have only one decision to make: either to keep or destroy
the hard evidence. When a LP is available, collusive rms have two sequential
decisions to make: either to keep or destroy, and if they keep, either to report
or not the hard evidence to the AA. We explore these strategy proles and the
corresponding payo¤s in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
To simplify the exposition we normalize non-collusive prots to zero. Per-rm
collusive prots are denoted by  2 (0; M ]. The upper bound denotes the per-rm
monopoly prots. Moreover, we assume that rms have the same discount factor,
denoted by ; and adopt standard grim trigger strategies to sustain their illegal
agreement. To simplify the analysis we assume that   1
2
.169
Assumption 2.   1
2
.
Another critical assumption of the paper is that a cartel that collapses due to
administration problems avoids prosecution.
Assumption 3. An unsuccessful cartel avoids prosecution.
Essentially, unsuccessful cartels fail to coordinate their conduct and obtain
collusive prots.170
2.3 Baseline Model: without Leniency Programme
This section analyzes the baseline model where the portfolio of antitrust enforce-
ment tools does not include a LP. Given that we assume a pro-collusive market,
the two rms have only one decision to make, namely, to keep or destroy the
hard incriminating evidence generated by the cartel. The analysis of this scenario
allows to rationalize rmsdecisions to keep hard evidence even though a LP is
not available. Moreover, it provides a benchmark to analyze the impact of a LP
on the said incentives of rms. Before deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium
(henceforth SPE), we formally present the game; timing, strategies and payo¤s.
2.3.1 The timing of the stage game
In each period, the timing of the game is as follows:
this aspect associated with rmsdecisions to keep hard evidence.
169The lowest bound to  is the one we obtain in the standard Bertrand duopoly game where
rms sustain collusion by adopting grim trigger strategies in a setting without antitrust enforce-
ment. See Friedman [1971] and Tirole [1988].
170In practice, rms entering a discussion to establish a cartel, even if the discussions are
fruitless, are liable for a breach of competition law.
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 Stage 0 (Policy Design): The AA commits and announces a certain
enforcement policy (p and F ).
 Stage 1 (Cartel Formation): Having observed the policy parameters
and having full and complete information about parameters  and , rms
decide whether to communicate and form a cartel. Hard evidence is pro-
duced.
 Stage 2 (Keep or Destroy): Firms simultaneously decide whether to
keep or destroy the hard evidence of their illegal agreement.
 Stage 3 (Policy Implementation): The AA launches an investigation
into the market. The success of its investigation hinges on the existence of
hard evidence by rms.
2.3.2 Firmsstrategies and payo¤s
For the purposes of our analysis, we consider only the two symmetric strategy
proles: (Keep, Keep) and (Destroy, Destroy).171
First, consider the strategy prole (Keep, Keep). According to this strategies
both rms keep the hard evidence of their illegal communication. With probability
p +  rms obtain the collusive prots  but have to pay a ne F . With the
complement probability, that is, with 1  p , rms evade detection and obtain
the collusive prots . If no deviation occurs, the game is repeated forever and
the collusive agreement is stable. The expected discounted value of this strategy
prole is equal to
VK =
   (p+)F
1  
Notice that VK is non-negative if F  p+.
If a deviation occurs, that is, if one rm destroys the hard evidence instead,
the cartel will encounter administration problems. As a consequence, the cartel
collapses with probability . At the same time, given that only one rm keeps the
hard evidence, the probability of cartel detection decreases to p + 
2
. Thus, the
short-run gain associated with a deviation from the strategy prescription is the
lower expected ne, given that the probability of detection decreases. This gain
171There is also an asymmetric strategy prole that rms may coordinate on. In particular,
rms may agree that one of them will destroy, while the other will keep the hard evidence, i.e.,
coordinate on (Destroy, Keep). The expected discounted payo¤ associate with this prole
is VKD =
(1 )
1  [   (p + 2 )F ]. However, this strategy prole is always Pareto dominated
by the symmetric ones. Notice that VK =
 (p+)F
1  >
(1 )
1  [   (p + 2 )F ] = VKD and
VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  >
(1 )
1  [   (p + 2 )F ] = VKD. Therefore, to simplify our analysis, we
discard the possibility that rms coordinate on asymmetric strategies.
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will be realized by both rms only if the cartel does not collapse, that is, with
probability 1   . With probability  the cartel collapses and both rms obtain
zero prots. After a deviation from the strategy prescription, rms revert to a
permanent punishment phase where they obtain zero prots forever. Therefore,
the expected payo¤ for the deviant rm is equal to
V dK = (1  )[   (p+

2
)F ]
(the superscript stands for deviation).
By Assumption 1, and since the cartel is implemented with certainty, any
defection in the market is instantly detected and punished. Thus, such a deviation
is inferior to the one described above.
Consider the strategy prole (Destroy, Destroy). According to this, both
rms destroy the hard evidence of their illegal communication. Thus, the cartel
collapses with probability . Moreover, the cartel is detected with probability p,
since no hard evidence exists, in which case the rms must pay a ne F . If no
deviation occurs, then the game is repeated forever and the collusive agreement is
stable. The expected discounted payo¤ of this strategy prole is
VD =
(1  )(   pF )
1  
Notice that VD is non-negative if F  p.
If a rm instead keeps the hard evidence, then the probability of cartel detection
increases to p+ 
2
. The cartel remains fragile and collapse with probability  since
one rm, the one that conforms to the strategy prescription, destroys the hard
evidence. Given that a deviation occurs, rms revert to a permanent punishment
phase wherein they obtain zero prots forever. Therefore, the expected payo¤ for
the deviant rm is equal to
V dD = (1  )[   (p+

2
)F ]
By the same line of reasoning, as elucidated before, a simultaneous deviation in
the market, provided that the cartel is implemented, is inferior to the one described
above.
At the beginning of this section, we emphasize that we consider a pro-collusive
market. To guarantee this we need to restrict VK and VD to be non-negative. For
this we need to restrict the ne so that it is bounded above by collusive prots.172
172Notice that the condition that is required so that the strategy prole (keep, keep) results
in a non-negative payo¤ is more stringent than the one required for (Destroy, Destroy).
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Assumption 4. 
F
 1.
E¤ectively, this assumption implies that rms always nd it protable to col-
lude irrespective of the strictness of antitrust policy. This assumption could also
be justied on the basis that the ne level must not jeopardize rmsnancial
stability.
2.3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game we have to analyze is a repeated simultaneous move game with im-
perfect information. Thus, the appropriate solution concept is subgame perfect
equilibrium (henceforth SPE).173 We only consider pure strategies. When mul-
tiple equilibria exist we apply the Pareto dominance criterion.174 Given that in
the scenario that we consider, rms communicate with the aim to reach a collu-
sive agreement it is not unrealistic to assume that rms agree to orchestrate their
actions by coordinating to a particular collusive strategy.
Solution of the baseline game Suppose that the two rms agree to keep the
hard evidence of their illegal communication, i.e., coordinate on (Keep, Keep).
This strategy prole is a SPE if and only if (henceforth i¤) VK  V dK . The latter
inequality holds i¤
p  p1  F   (+ +1)2(+ ) . Observe that p1 > 0 i¤  < 1  F 2(+ )(+ +1)
and p1 < 1  i¤ > 2  ( F  1) 2(+ )(1 )(1 ) . Hence, if the additional probability
of detection is su¢ ciently low ( < 2), then (Keep, Keep) is a strict SPE. If
this probability is su¢ ciently high ( > 1), then (Keep, Keep) is not a SPE.
Lemma 1. (Keep, Keep) is a SPE of the Keep-Destroy game if
p 2 [0;minfp1; 1 g]:
Notice that p1 increases in  and F , while it decreases in . The intuition is
the following. As the cartel becomes less sensitive to hard evidence then, ceteris
paribus, the deviation gain from the strategy prole (Keep, Keep) rise. Moreover,
the expected foregone collusive prots due to the collapse of the cartel increase,
ceteris paribus, in 
F
. Thus, an increase either in  or 
F
makes the collapse e¤ect
(CCE) sharper. In the case where 
F
is su¢ ciently high, and in particular if

F
> (+ +1)
2(+ ) , then the strategy prole (Keep, Keep) is a strict NE. On
173A strategy is optimal in the sense of SPE if it maximizes playerspayo¤ for every period and
every history of the game.
174A strategy satises this criterion if there is no other strategy for which each player of the
game has a strictly higher payo¤. Such a strategy is also called payo¤-dominant. The notion
of Pareto-dominant equilibrium is well established in the literature. See [Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991a, pp. 20-22].
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the contrary, an increase in the additional probability of detection, causes, ceteris
paribus, the deviation prots to shrink since the expected ne increases. Therefore,
the detection e¤ect (CDE) intensies with a higher .
Suppose now that the two rms agree to destroy the hard evidence, that is,
coordinate on (Destroy, Destroy). A unilateral deviation from this strategy
prole is not protable if VD  V dD. The latter inequality holds i¤ p  p2 

F
+ (1 )
2
. Assumption 4 implies that p2  1, and hence (Destroy, Destroy)
is a strict SPE. This is due to the fact that if a rm keeps hard evidence, rather
than destroying it, the probability of detection increases by 
2
, while the stability
of the collusive agreement remains intact. Since one of the two rms complies
with the prescription of the agreed strategies, and accordingly destroys the hard
evidence in every period, the cartel continues to collapse with probability . Thus,
such deviation does not enhance the sustainability of the cartel. On the contrary,
it increases the expected ne, and thus the expected cost, of the cartel. Moreover,
given that a deviation from the agreed strategies occurs, rms are deprived of
future collusive prots, as they enter in an eternal punishment phase.
Lemma 2. (Destroy, Destroy) is a strict SPE of the Keep-Destroy game.
For the set of parameter values of p and  where the Keep-Destroy game has
two SPE we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) i¤ VK > VD. The latter inequality holds i¤
p < p3  F    .
Lemma 3. (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ p < p3;
where p3  F    :
Considering that (i) p3 > 0 i¤ < 3  F and (ii) p3 < 1  i¤ > 4 

1  (

F
  1) and Lemmata 3, 5 and 3 we can state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. For given policy and other parameters (p, , F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the baseline model without a LP is:
1. (Keep, Keep) i¤:
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
i.  2 [0;4] and p 2 [0; 1 ] or
ii.  2 [4;3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
(b) 
F
> 1

,  2 [0; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 ]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
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(a)  2 [4;3] and p 2 [p3; 1 ] or
(b)  2 (3; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 ]
where p3  F    , 3   F and 4  1  ( F   1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. Firms keep hard evidence,
rather than destroying it, if the base probability of detection is relatively low, and
in particular lower than the critical value p3. The latter balances the CCE, that
is, the expected foregone collusive prots if rms destroy the hard evidence (  )
and the CDE, that is, the incremental expected ne due to keeping hard evidence
(  F ).175 The critical value p3 is positively related to the collusive prots-ne
ratio and the cartel collapse probability and negatively related to the additional
probability of detection due to retaining hard evidence. Thus, an increase either
in the collusive prots-ne ratio or in the cartel collapse probability makes it more
likely that rms would refrain from destroying the hard evidence.
Consider the e¤ects of an increase in the cartel collapse probability. If the
rms destroy the hard evidence, then the cartels expected prots shrink, since
the cartel collapses with a higher probability. At the same time, if rms keep
the hard evidence, the expected collusive prots are intact. In other words, the
CCE is reinforced, while the CDE remains unchanged. An increase in collusive
prots also strengthens the CCE, since rms forego higher future prots when the
cartel collapses due to a defection from the agreed strategies. Moreover, the CDE
dehydrates since the net gain from keeping hard evidence increases. A similar
argument holds when the ne decreases. To sum up, rms are more inclined to
keep hard evidence both with an increase in the cartel collapse probability and an
increase in the collusive prots-ne ratio. These e¤ects are illustrated in Figure 1
below.
When the cartel collapse probability is zero, that is, the sustainability of the
cartel is insensitive to hard evidence (i.e.,  = 0), rms always destroy the hard
evidence. Retaining evidence does not bring about any benet in that case. On
the contrary, when the cartel collapse probability in the absence of hard evidence
is su¢ ciently high (i.e.,  > 1
2
), the foregone prots linked to rmsdecisions to
destroy the hard evidence are considerably high. In that case, the CCE dominates
the CDE. Thus, rms keep hard evidence to sustain the cartel, although they run
the risk of a higher probability of detection.
While an increase in the additional probability of detection does not inuence
the CCE, such an increase bolsters the CDE. Thus, rms are more likely to destroy
175Notice that p3 can can be expressed as p3 = 1F ( F ): The rst term in the parenthesis
captures the CCE, while the second term captures the CDE.
71
Figure 1: Without LP. Graph A: An increase in  causes a rotation of p3 to the right
to p03. Graph B: An increase in

F
causes a parallel shift of p3 to the right to p003. Both
graphs are drawn with the initial assumption that 
F
= 1.
the hard evidence. When this probability is su¢ ciently low ( < 5), then the
incremental ne associated with rms decisions to keep hard evidence is very low.
Thus, the CDE dominates the CCE, making rms to keep the hard evidence in
order to enhance the stability of the cartel. Conversely, when  is su¢ ciently high
( > 3), then the incremental ne is very high, the CDE dominates the CCE,
inducing rms to destroy the hard evidence (see Figure 1, Graph B).
Corollary 1. Firms are more likely to keep the hard evidence with a higher 
and a lower . In the extreme case where  = 0, rms always destroy the hard
evidence. If  > 1
2
rms always keep the hard evidence.
2.4 Extended model: with Leniency programme
In this section, we extend the baseline model so that the portfolio of policy in-
struments includes a LP. This extension allows to shed some light on two crucial
decisions rms have to make after forming a cartel, namely, to keep or destroy the
hard evidence and whether to report or not the evidence to the AA. Moreover, it
enables to investigate the conditions under which rms keep hard evidence albeit
not reveal it to the AA.
Within this richer framework, the cartel may be detected either by an AAs
own investigations or after a cartel member self-reports to the AA, before an
investigation is initiated in the market.
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2.4.1 The timing of the stage game
In each period the timing of the game is as follows:
 Stage 0 (Policy Design): The AA commits and announces a certain
enforcement policy which includes a LP.
 Stage 1 (Cartel Formation): Having observed the enforcement pol-
icy and having full and complete information about parameters  and ,
rms decide whether to communicate and form a cartel. Hard evidence is
produced.
 Stage 2 (Keep or Destroy): Firms simultaneously decide whether to
keep or destroy the hard evidence of their illegal agreement. If rms choose
to keep the hard evidence then move to Stage 3. If rms destroy, the hard
evidence then move to Stage 3 with probability 1 . With probability 
the cartel collapse and rms obtain zero prots. The game restarts from
Stage 0.
 Stage 3 (Revelation of hard evidence): Firms simultaneously decide
whether to report or not the hard evidence to the AA.
 Stage 4 (Policy Implementation): If at least one rm applies for le-
niency, then the cartel is detected. If no rm applies for leniency then the
AA initiates an investigation into the market. The success of its investigation
hinges on the existence of hard convicting evidence.
2.4.2 Firmsstrategies and payo¤s
For the purposes of our analysis, we consider only the three symmetric strategy
proles: (Destroy, Destroy), (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report) and (Keep and Report, Keep and Report).176
To begin with, consider the strategy prole (Destroy, Destroy). The two
colluding rms destroy the hard evidence. As shown in Section 2.3.2, the expected
discounted payo¤ associated with this strategy prole is VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  . A
176There are also other possible (asymmetric) strategy proles that rms may coordinate on:
(Destroy, Keep and Report), (Destroy, Keep and Not Report) and (Keep and Re-
port, Keep and Not Report). (Destroy, Keep and Not Report) is Pareto dominated
by (Destroy, Destroy), as VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  >
(1 )[ (p+2 )F ]
1  = VD;KNR. (Destroy,
Keep and Report) is Pareto dominated by (Keep and Report, Keep and Report), as
VKR =
 F2
1  >
(1 )(2 F )
2(1 ) = VD;KR. Note also that the strategy prole (Keep and Report,
Keep and Not Report) yields the same payo¤ as the strategy prole (Keep and Report, Keep
and Report). This is intuitive given that only one rm is eligible to receive amnesty.
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deviant rm that keeps the hard evidence, rather than destroying it, has two
options; either to report the evidence to the AA and obtain full amnesty or retain
the evidence without self-reporting it to the AA. In the former case, the deviant
rm receives an expected payo¤ equal to V (d;r)D = (1 ), while in the latter case
its expected payo¤ is V (d;nr)D = (1  )[   (p+ 2 )F ]. Clearly, a deviant rm will
never keep hard evidence without reporting it to the AA, as V (d;r)KNR > V
(d;nr)
KNR . An
analogous argument to the baseline model holds with regards to defections in the
market.
Remark 1. A rm that deviates from (Destroy, Destroy) will never keep hard
evidence without reporting it to the AA.
Consider now the strategy prole (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). The two colluding rms keep the hard evidence, nonetheless, not report
it to the AA.177 Given that both rms keep hard evidence, the cartel is detected
with probability p+, in which case rms must pay a ne F . The expected dis-
counted payo¤ of this strategy prole is VKNR =
 (p+)F
1  . Two types of deviation
from this strategy prole are possible. A rm may deviate at the revelation stage
and report the hard evidence to the AA. In that case, the deviant rm receives
full amnesty. Given that the cartel does not collapse, since the two rms continue
to keep hard evidence, the deviation payo¤ is V (d;r)KNR = . If instead a deviation
occurs at the keep-destroy stage, whereby the deviant rm destroys the hard ev-
idence, the probability of detection decreases to p + 
2
. However, the cartel may
in that case collapse with probability . Thus, the expected deviation payo¤ is
V
(d;nr)
KNR = (1 )[  (p+ 2 )F ]. Clearly, a deviant rm will never destroy the hard
evidence, given that V (d;r)KNR > V
(d;nr)
KNR .
A similar argument to the benchmark model without LP holds for a deviation in
the market. Therefore, a simultaneous deviation in the revelation stage or the keep-
destroy stage with a deviation in the market is inferior, in terms of protability,
to the deviations described above.
Remark 2. A rm that deviates from (Keep and Not Report, Keep and
Not Report) will never destroy the hard evidence.
Lastly, consider the strategy prole (Keep and Report, Keep and Re-
port). The two colluding rms agree to keep hard evidence and subsequently
report it to the AA. In this case, the cartel is detected with certainty and rms
177(Keep, Keep) from Section 2.3 is equivalent to (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). However, the deviations from this strategy prole are di¤erent. A rm that deviates
from (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) can now report the hard evidence.
This option is not available to rms when a LP is not a part of the portfolio of enforcement tools.
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pay an expected ne F
2
. The expected discounted payo¤ of this strategy pro-
le is VKR =
 F
2
1  . Again, two types of deviations may occur from this strategy
prole. A rm may deviate at the keep-destroy stage and instead of keeping the
hard evidence destroy it. In this case, the cartel collapses with probability .
At the same time, the cartel is detected with certainty given that the compliant
rm keeps and reports the hard evidence to the AA. The deviant rms payo¤
is V dKR = (1   )(   F ). Clearly, a deviation from this strategy does not bring
about any benet, as such deviation radically increases the probability of paying a
ne and, at the same time, it deprives the deviator, as well as the compliant rm,
all future collusive prots. This is because rms defect from the agreed strategy
prole. The second type of deviation may occur at the revelation stage. Triv-
ially, any deviation at this stage will be unprotable as the deviant rm pays the
full ne F with certainty, rather than an expected ne of F
2
. Besides, rms are
deprived of future collusive prots as they enter a permanent punishment phase.
The same line of reasoning for the simultaneous deviation in the market holds as
for the strategy proles discussed above.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game we have to analyze in this section is a repeated sequential move game
with imperfect information. Contrary to the game in Section 2.3, the rm that
chooses to keep the hard evidence at the Keep-Destroy stage has an additional
decision to make at the revelation stage: either to report the hard evidence to the
AA or not.
As in Section 2.3, the appropriate solution concept is SPE. We only consider
pure strategies. When multiple equilibria exist we apply the Pareto dominance
selection criterion.
Revelation subgame - Report v. Not Report This subgame is reached if
rms have already chosen to keep the hard evidence at the Keep-Destroy subgame.
Firmsdecisions are either to report the hard evidence to the AA or keep the hard
evidence without reporting it to the AA.
To begin with, suppose that the two rms agree to keep the hard evidence and
subsequently report it to the AA, i.e., they coordinate on (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report). The latter is a NE i¤ VKR  V dKR. Given Assumption 4
this inequality always holds.
Lemma 4. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is a strict NE of the
Revelation subgame.
Suppose now that rms agree to keep the hard evidence, nevertheless not report
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it to the AA, i.e., coordinate on (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). The latter is a NE i¤ VKNR  V dKNR, which holds i¤ p+  F .
Lemma 5. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE of
the Revelation subgame i¤ p+  
F
.
Notice that when 
F
> 1, (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Re-
port) is a strict NE.
Given Lemmata 4 and 5, we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep and Not Report,
Keep and Not Report) i¤ VKR > VKNR. The latter inequality holds i¤
p+ > 1
2
.
Lemma 6. The Pareto dominant NE of the Revelation subgame is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+  1
2
2. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+ > 1
2
Proof. See Appendix B.
In words, if the (aggregate) probability of detection when rms keep hard
evidence is relatively high, i.e., p +  > 1
2
, rms report the hard evidence. The
underlying reasoning is that when the probability of detection with hard evidence
is greater (lower) than 1
2
, the ne that rms expect to pay, in case of detection
by the AA, is greater (lower) than the one associated with self-reporting (i.e.,
(p+)F > 1
2
F ).
We now proceed backwards to the Keep-Destroy subgame. Depending on which
strategy dominates at the revelation subgame, by Lemma 6 we distinguish two
cases.
Keep-Destroy subgame for p +  > 1
2
If p +  > 1
2
, then at the revelation
stage the rms self-report to the AA, provided that they keep hard evidence. Thus,
for those parametersvalues rmsdecisions is either to destroy the hard evidence
or keep the hard evidence and then report it to the AA.
To begin with, suppose that the two rms agree to keep the hard evidence
(and subsequently report it to the AA). This is a NE i¤ VKR  V dKR. The latter
inequality always holds given that  2 [0; 1].
Lemma 7. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is a strict NE of the
Keep-Destroy subgame for p+ > 1
2
:
Suppose now that rms agree to destroy the hard evidence, i.e., coordinate on
(Destroy, Destroy). This strategy prole is a NE i¤ VD  V dD. The latter
inequality holds i¤ p  
F
.
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Lemma 8. (Destroy, Destroy) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame if
p  
F
.
From Lemma 8 and considering that p 2 [0; 1  ], we distinguish two cases:
i) 
F
 1  and ii) 
F
> 1 . If the former condition holds, then for p > 
F
(Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is the unique NE of the Keep-Destroy
subgame. Otherwise, both (Destroy, Destroy) and (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report) are NE of the Keep-Destroy.
Lemma 9. For p+ > 1
2
the Keep-Destroy subgame has two NE i¤:
1. 
F
 1  and p 2 [1
2
 ; 
F
] or
2. 
F
> 1  and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]
Given Lemma 9 we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤VKR > VD. The
latter inequality holds i¤ p > p4  F 22(1 )F .
Lemma 10. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) i¤ p > p4  F 22(1 )F :
From Lemma 10 and considering that i) p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
, ii) p4 < 12   i¤
 < 5  1  F   2(1 ) and iii) p4 > 1    i¤  < 6  1 22(1 ) + 1  F , we
establish the Pareto dominant SPE of the game when p+ > 1
2
.
Lemma 11. The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+ > 1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 [12  ; 1 ] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;6] and p 2 (p4; 1 ] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a)  2 [5;6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  g; p4] or
(b)  > 6 and p 2 [0; 1 ]
77
where p4 =
F 2
2(1 )F , 5 =

1 

F
  
2(1 ) and 6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition underlying Lemma 11 is the following. Firms keep the hard
evidence and subsequently report it to the AA, rather than destroying it, if p is
relatively high, and, in particular, greater than the critical value p4. The latter
balances the CCE (  ) and the CAE (F
2
).178 The critical value p4 is negatively
related to both,  and 
F
. Thus, with an increase either in  or 
F
rms are less
inclined to destroy the hard evidence. An increase in  makes the CCE sharper, as
the foregone prots in case of the collapse of the cartel are greater, leaving the CDE
intact. When  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), the CCE outweights the CAE. The
foregone prots in the case where the cartel collapses are greater than the expected
ne with self-reporting. Thus, rms keep and report the hard evidence to the AA.
An increase in 
F
makes the CCE sharper, while it mitigates the CDE. Moreover,
when 
F
is su¢ ciently high ( 
F
> 1
2
), rms always keep the hard evidence.
Suppose that  is relatively low ( < 1
2
) and that p, the base probability of
detection, is also relatively low. Furthermore, suppose that  is su¢ ciently high
( > 6), but the aggregate probability of detection is relatively high (p +  >
1
2
). Then, the expected cost associated with rmsdecisions to destroy the hard
evidence, that is, the sum of the ne the rms have to pay in case of detection
by the AA on the basis of indirect evidence and the expected foregone prots
in case of the collapse of the cartel, is lower than the ne associated with self-
reporting to the AA. Thus, rms destroy the hard evidence. On the contrary, if
 is su¢ ciently low ( < 5), then the expected ne with self-reporting (F2 ) is
lower than the cost associated with rmsdecision to destroy the hard evidence
(expected ne and expected foregone prots). Thus, rms keep the hard evidence
to exploit the LP and pay lower expected nes.
Corollary 2. Firms are less likely to destroy the hard evidence with a higher 
and 
F
and lower :
Keep-Destroy subgame for p +   1
2
If p +   1
2
, then by Lemma 6
rms do not self-report at the revelation stage, provided that they indeed keep
hard evidence. Thus, for those parametersvalues, a rmsdecision is between
destroying and retaining the hard evidence without disclosing it to the AA.
To begin with, suppose that the two rms agree to destroy the hard evidence,
i.e., coordinate on (Destroy, Destroy). This strategy prole is a NE if no
protable unilateral deviation exists, i.e., i¤ VD  V dD. The latter inequality
always holds.
178Notice that p4 can be expressed as: p4 = 1(1 )F (
F
2   ).
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Lemma 12. (Destroy, Destroy) is a strict NE of the keep-Destroy subgame
for p+  1
2
.
Suppose now that rms agree to keep the hard evidence that, however, they
do not report to the AA at the revelation stage, i.e., coordinate on (Keep and
Not Report, Keep and Not Report). This strategy prole is a NE i¤
VKNR  V dKNR. This inequality holds i¤ p  p5  F   (+ +1)2(+ ) .
Lemma 13. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE of
the Keep-Destroy subgame i¤ p  p5.
Given Lemmata 12 and 13 for p  p5 there are two NE. Taking into account that
i) p5 >
1
2
   and ii) p5 > 0 i¤  < 7  F 2(+ )+ +1 , we conclude that (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) if VKNR > VD. The latter inequality holds i¤ p < p3  F    . Notice
that this is the same condition as in the baseline model, however here it holds only
for p+  1
2
.
Lemma 14. Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ p < p3  F    .
Considering that: i) p3 > 0 i¤  < 3   F and p3 < 12    i¤   5 

1  (

F
  1
2
) and Lemma 14, we establish the Pareto dominant SPE of the game for
p+  1
2
.
Lemma 15. The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+  1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  < 5 and p 2 [0; 12  ] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  2 [5;3] and p 2 [0; p3] or
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

];  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ] or
iv. 
F
> 1

;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ] or
(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
and
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;3] and p 2 [p3; 12  ] or
(b) 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], [3; 12 ] and p 2 [0; 12  ]
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where p3 = F    , 3 =  F and 5 = 1  F   2(1 ) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The reasoning behind of Lemma 15 is the following. Firms keep hard evidence
without reporting it to the AA, rather than destroying, if p is relatively low, and
in particular lower than the critical value p3. The latter balances the CCE and
the CDE. The critical value of p3 is positively related to F and  and negatively
related to . Thus, an increase either in 
F
or in  makes rms less prone to
destroy the hard evidence. Equivalently, it makes it more likely that rms will
keep, nevertheless not report the hard evidence. Such changes make the CCE
more acute, while the CDE is alleviated. When  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
),
the CCE outweights the CDE so that the rms keep the hard evidence without
reporting it to the AA, rather than destroying it.
The CCE is not inuenced by . Such a change, on the contrary, markedly
a¤ects the CDE. Specically, an increase (decrease)  makes the CDE more (less)
acute. Thus, an increase in  makes rmsdecision to destroy the hard evidence
more likely. When  is su¢ ciently low ( < 5), then the CCE dominates the
CDE (p3 becomes greater than 1) and thus rms always keep the hard evidence.
Conversely, when  is su¢ ciently high ( > 3) then the CDE dominates the
CCE (p3 becomes negative), and, thus, rms always destroy the hard evidence.
Corollary 3. Firms are less prone to destroy the hard evidence with a higher 
or 
F
. They are less likely to keep the hard evidence with a higher .
By Lemmata 11 and 15, we can state the main proposition of this section.
Proposition 2. For given policy and other parameters (p, , F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the extended game with LP is:
1. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a)  2 [5;3] and p 2 [p3; 12  ] or
(b) [3; 12) and p 2 [0; 12  ] or
(c)  2 [5;6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  g; p4] or
(d)  > 6 and p 2 [0; 1 ]
2. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  < 5 and p 2 [0; 12  ] or
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ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  2 [5;3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ] or
(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]
3. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 [12  ; 1 ] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;6] and p 2 (p4; 1 ] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]
where p3 = F    , p4 = F 22(1 )F , 3 =  F , 5 = 1  F   2(1 ) and 6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Depending on the parametersvalues of the game (p; ; ;  ; F ), all three
strategies could emerge as Pareto dominant SPE. If the base probability of de-
tection is relatively low, and, in particular, lower than the critical value p3, rms
agree to keep, nevertheless not report the hard evidence to the AA. In that case,
rms keep the hard evidence in order to enhance cartels sustainability rather than
to exploit the LP. Conversely, if the base probability is su¢ ciently high, and, in
particular, greater than the critical value p3, then rms keep the hard evidence
and report to the AA. In that case, rms keep the hard evidence to exploit the LP
rather than to enhance cartels sustainability. For intermediate values of the base
probability of detection, that is, for p 2 [p3; p4], the CDE and the CAE prevail
over the CCE. Thus, rms destroy the hard evidence in order to minimize the risk
of cartel detection.
Firms are more prone to keep hard evidence with a higher  or 
F
. Their
decisions on whether to self-report or not depend on the aggregate probability of
detection. Firms are less prone to keep without reporting if p or  increase.
Corollary 4. Firms are less likely to destroy the hard evidence when  or 
F
increase. They are more likely to destroy hard evidence when  decrease.
We have to underline that when  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), rms never
destroy the hard evidence. With a su¢ ciently high  the expected foregone prots
are higher than the expected ne associated with rms decisions to keep the
hard evidence. Noteworthy, this is not the case when a LP is not included in the
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Figure 2: With LP. Graph A shows the e¤ect of an increase in . Graph B shows
the e¤ect of an increase in 
F
. Both graphs are drawn with the initial assumption that

F
= 1.
portfolio of policy instruments. As we have seen in Section 2.3, rms destroy the
hard evidence of their illegal cartel when p > p3 regardless of the level of .
Moreover, if  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), rms always keep and exploit the
LP by reporting the evidence to the AA. In this latter case, the expected ne with
self-reporting is lower than the one without self-reporting. The same conclusion is
reached if 
F
is su¢ ciently high ( 
F
> 1
2
).
Corollary 5. If  < 1
2
and 
F
> 1
2
or  > 1
2
then rms always keep hard evidence.
If in addition  < 1
2
then the Pareto dominant SPE is (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report) if p 2 [1
2
 ; 1 ] and (Keep and Not Report, Keep
and Not Report) if p 2 [0; 1
2
  ]. However, if   1
2
, the unique Pareto
dominant SPE is (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) 8p 2 [0; 1 ].
If  = 0 and  > 1
2
(implying that p < 1
2
) then rms always destroy the
hard evidence.179 In words, if a cartels sustainability is independent of hard
evidence and if the additional probability of detection is su¢ ciently high (i.e.,
 > 1
2
), the unique SPE will be (Destroy, Destroy). Given that  = 0, the
CCE evaporates. Moreover, for these parametersvalues the CDE dominates the
CAE, i.e., the expected ne with self-reporting is lower than the one without self-
reporting. Given that the expected ne with self-reporting is higher than the cost
179If  = 0 then 3 = 0, 5 = 0 and 6 = 12 :
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associated with rmsdecision to destroy the hard evidence (foregone prots and
expected ne), rms destroy the evidence. On the other hand, if the additional
probability of detection is relatively low ( < 1
2
), rms destroy the hard evidence
as long as the base probability of detection is relatively low (p < 1
2
). In that
case, the CDE dominates both the CAE and the CCE. The expected ne that
the rms have to pay if convicted on the basis of indirect evidence is lower than
the ne rms have to pay if they decide to keep the hard evidence regardless of
reporting or not to the AA. On the contrary, if the base probability of detection is
su¢ ciently high (p > 1
2
), then rms keep the hard evidence and exploit the LP. In
the latter case the CAE dominates the CDE. It is worth noting that in the baseline
model rms always destroy the hard evidence when  = 0. This is because when
a LP is not available, the CAE does not materialize. In this case, retaining hard
evidence would increase the risk of detection without improving the functioning of
the cartel. For a graphical illustration see Figure 3 below (Graphs A and B).
Corollary 6. If  = 0 then for any p < 1
2
(p > 1
2
) rms always destroy (keep) the
hard evidence.
If  = 1, that is, if hard evidence is imperative for the survival of the cartel,
then rms always keep the hard evidence. The decision on whether to apply for
leniency depends on the aggregate probability of detection. If it is relatively high
(p +  > 1
2
), then rms always nd it advantageous to exploit the LP as the
expected ne with self-reporting is lower than that without self-reporting. If it is
relatively low (p +  < 1
2
), then rms keep the hard evidence, nevertheless not
report to the AA. The expected ne without self-reporting is lower than the one
associated with rmsdecision to self-report. For a graphical illustration see Graph
C in Figure 3.
When  = 1, rms always keep hard evidence. In addition, if
p +  > 1
2
, then they exploit the LP. Otherwise, they keep the hard evidence
only to facilitate the administration and enhance the implementation of the car-
tel.
Before concluding this section, it may worth saying a word about the impact of
the generosity of the LP on rmsdecisions. We have assumed that the LP provides
full amnesty to the rst self-reporting rm. Instead of full amnesty, consider a LP
which is characterized by a ne discount rate equal to . Then, the expected
ne with self-reporting is (1 )F
2
. Clearly, an increase in the ne discount rate
has similar e¤ects to a decrease in the ne for self-reporting rms. Therefore, a
more generous LP has two e¤ects on rmsdecisions: 1) enhance their incentives
to keep the hard evidence and, 2) enhance their incentives to report the retained
evidence to the AA. Intuitively, a more generous LP decreases the expected ne
with leniency (equivalently, it strengthens the CAE).
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Figure 3: Some extreme cases. Graph A: 
F
= 1 and  = 0. Graph B: 
F
= 1 and
 = 1
2
. Graph C: 
F
= 1 and  = 1.
Corollary 7. Firms are more prone to keep and report the hard evidence with a
more generous LP.
2.5 Comparison with the baseline model without a LP
To simplify the comparison of the two settings, with and without a LP, suppose
that  = F so that 
F
= 1. A simple contrast of Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that
the introduction of the LP, as part of the enforcement policy, makes rms more
prone to keep the hard evidence. The reason is that the introduction of the LP
provides an option value to those rms that keep hard evidence. Firms keep hard
evidence not only to enhance the administration of their agreement, and sustain
the cartel, but also to exploit the LP, when such an exploitation is advantageous
for them.
Figure 4 below illustrates the e¤ects of the introduction of a LP. Notice that for
p 2 [1
2
 ; p3] rms continue to keep the hard evidence, however, they exploit the
LP by reporting to the AA (indicated by NR ! R). The principal objective for
keeping hard evidence is to enhance the administration of their unlawful agreement
and not to exploit the LP. However, rms also nd it protable to exploit the LP
and pay a lower ne in case of conviction. For p > maxfp3; p4g, rmsdecisions at
the keep-destroy stage are reversed. Now rms keep the hard evidence primarily
to exploit the LP (indicated by D ! KR in Figure 4 below). The expected
ne linked to rmsdecisions to keep and report the hard evidence is lower than
the cost associated with rmsdecisions to destroy the evidence (foregone prots
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and expected ne). Therefore, by retaining the hard evidence, rms enhance the
administration of their agreement, and thus sustain the cartel. At the same time,
rms exploit the LP by self-reporting to the AA.
Corollary 8. When a LP is available, then for p 2 [1
2
 ; p3] rmsdecisions to
keep the hard evidence remain intact.180 Firms keep the hard evidence primarily
to enhance the implementation of the cartel and secondarily to exploit the LP. On
the contrary, for p > maxfp3; p4g rms decisions to destroy the hard evidence
are reversed when a LP is available.181 Firms keep the hard evidence primarily to
exploit the LP.
Figure 4: The impact of a LP on rmsdecisions.
2.6 Conclusions
The motivation of this paper derives from the empirical observation that many
collusive rms keep hard evidence, even when the enforcement policy does not
encompass a LP. We provide plausible answers to three relevant questions: 1) why
rms keep hard evidence when a LP is not available, 2) what is the impact of a
LP on rmsdecisionsto keep or destroy hard evidence and 3) why rms keep
hard evidence, nevertheless not report to the AA.
180Notice that p 2 [ 12  ; p3] if  < 5.
181Equivalently, if (i)  > 5 and p 2 [p3; 1 ] or (ii)  > p5.
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In the absence of a LP, we have showed that rmsdecisions to keep or destroy
the hard incriminating evidence hinges upon i) the sensitivity of cartels admin-
istration and implementation to hard evidence, ii) the increased risk of detection
when rms keep the hard evidence and iii) the collusive prots-ne ratio. Re-
ecting on these theoretical results, this study puts forward three alternative, but
not exclusionary, explanations for retaining hard evidence even when a LP is not
part of the enforcement policy. First, cartels administration and implementation
is very sensitive to hard evidence, so that rms keep hard evidence to enhance the
stability of their illicit agreement. Second, the e¢ ciency of the AA in detecting
and prosecuting cartels with hard evidence is relatively low, or the quality of hard
evidence is poor, so that the expected incremental ne, if rms keep the hard ev-
idence, is lower than the expected forgone prots associated with rmsdecisions
to destroy the hard evidence. And third, the level of the ne imposed on detected
cartels is su¢ ciently lower than the accrued collusive prots, so that rms have
more to lose if they destroy the hard evidence, and less to pay if detected by the
AA.
We have also showed that the introduction of a LP reinforce rmsincentives
to keep hard evidence. Essentially, the LP provides to those rms that keep
hard evidence an option value, which, ceteris paribus, decreases the expected ne.
Thus, rms may keep the hard evidence not only to enhance the stability of the
cartel but also to exploit the LP and pay lower nes. The empirical fact that we
are experiencing more cartels self-reporting may, therefore, be a side-e¤ect of the
introduction of LPs.
Finally, collusive rms may keep hard evidence without reporting to the AA.
We have showed that this behavior is more likely when i) the probability in which
the cartel collapse in the absence of hard evidence increases, ii) the collusive prots-
ne ratio increases and iii) the additional probability of cartel detection decreases.
Accordingly, the empirical fact that AAsinvestigations expose hard evidence re-
tained by cartelists can be justied on three grounds. First, that the cartel is
very sensitive to hard evidence, so that rms keep hard evidence to enhance the
survival rate of the cartel. Second, that the e¢ ciency of the AA in detecting and
prosecuting cartels with hard evidence is su¢ ciently low, so that the incremental
and total expected ne is lower than the expected ne with self-reporting. And
third, that the level of the ne imposed on detected cartels is su¢ ciently lower
than the accrued collusive prots, so that rms have more to lose if they destroy
the hard evidence and less to pay if detected by the AA. It is worth noting that all
results in our paper are obtained without allowing for positive rewards contrary
to Aubert et al. [2006].
An assumption of the paper is that the LP o¤ers full amnesty only to the
rst self-reporting rm. This is a reasonable assumption to be made and it is
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in line with other studies in the literature advocating for the maximum feasible
ne discount for the rst self-reporting rm. A question that arises is what is the
impact of the level of the ne discount rate on rmsdecisions to keep or destroy
the hard evidence that is generated by the illegal cartel. It is not di¢ cult to notice
that a change in the ne discount rate has similar e¤ects to a change in the level
of the ne. Thus, with a higher (lower) ne discount rate, rms are more (less)
inclined to keep and report the hard evidence to the AA. This observation can be
useful for those designing a leniency policy.
A nal remark. Despite the simple setting, our paper sheds some additional
light on rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard incriminating evidence as well
as on their decisions to report or not the hard evidence to the AA. By abstracting
from behavioral elements or cognitive biases our paper predicts a particular pattern
of behavior by colluding rms. However, our understanding of the underlying
reasons justifying rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence may be
enriched if we diverge from the realm of rational choice theory by integrating
bounded rationality in the analysis. For instance, collusive rms may be time
inconsistent or overcondent, although they know they have to destroy the hard
evidence when they do it is too late!. Such extension to the literature could o¤er
alternative explanations with regard to the research questions of this paper, and
indeed may come up with very di¤erent patterns of behavior. This research avenue
remains open to future exploration.
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Chapter 3: Strategic Antitrust Authorities and
Leniency Programmes - A Signalling Game
3.1 Introduction
Cartels are the most egregious form of anticompetitive behaviour. Because of
their inimical e¤ects to consumers welfare, cartels are considered as per-se illegal.
A central priority of antitrust authorities (henceforth AAs), in various jurisdic-
tions, is dissolving existing cartels, and ultimately deterring the formation of new
cartels.182 This goal is challenging to achieve because of the inherently clandes-
tine nature of cartels. Inevitably, two thorny economic problems emerge. The
rst transpires because of the limited enforcement resources available to the AA
to combat illegal cartels. E¤ectively, an AA cannot monitor all markets.183 The
second is due to the asymmetry of information between an AA and a cartel, which
can be two-sided. On the one hand, rms know whether they participate in a
cartel while, on the other hand, an AA knows how compelling its evidence against
the cartel is. Unlike previous literature, we explore the implications of the second
source of information asymmetry - cartel members do not know the strength of the
AAs case. The main question we aim to answer is whether an AA should disclose
its evidence to the cartel or exploit its informational lead and induce the cartel to
self-report, despite the weakness of its evidence. For this, we develop a stylized
signalling game which resembles to the stylized signalling game introduced by Cho
and Kreps [1987].184 Crucial to the outcome of the strategic interaction between
the AA and the cartel is the impact of the leniency program (henceforth LP)
whereby a cartel member that self-reports its unlawful conduct to the AA pays a
reduced ne.185 The AA must consider its information revelation policy alongside
its LP design. To our knowledge this is the rst paper in the literature to consider
the impact of a LP in the framework of a signalling game.
The existing literature on LPs typically assumes that the information decit
182This is reected in the number of prosecuted cartels. For instance, for the periods 1995-1999,
2000-2004 and 2005-2009, the European Commission has issued 10, 30 and 33 cartel decisions,
respectively.
183Thus, cartels are subject to probabilistic law enforcement.
184The simplest form of a signalling game considers two players which strategically interact.
One player has some private information which inuences the payo¤ of the uninformed player.
Critically, the informed player can signal the privately known information to the uninformed
player with its actions.
185According to the applied European Commissions Notice on Immunity from nes and reduc-
tion of nes in cartel cases (OJ C298, 8/12/2006, pp. 17-22, par. 24), In order to qualify (for
a reduction in nes), an undertaking must provide the Commission with evidence of the alleged
infringement which represents signicant added value with respect to the evidence already in the
Commissions possession.
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is only on the AAs side. However, it may well be the case that an AA retains
some critical information, which is not accessible by cartels. For instance, after an
investigation in a market, an AA may discover evidence whose quality is unknown
to all cartel members. The reversal in the information asymmetry may have pivotal
implications for the outcome of the strategic interaction between an AA and a
cartel. Importantly, it may inuence the e¢ cacy of the LP. Notably, the literature
has not adequately put the spotlight on these implications hitherto.
This remark establishes the foundation stone of our study. In particular, we
explore the strategic interaction between a cartel and an AA whose strength of
evidence against the cartel is private information. The main research question is
whether the AA should outrightly reveal or not how compelling its evidence is to
the cartel. Given the social harm instigated by cartels, an AA would ideally prefer
to unravel the cartel as soon as possible. Thus, crucial in the game is the time
wherein the AA initiates the formal proceeding against colluding rms. Typically,
the formal proceedings commence with the issue of a Statement of Objections
(henceforth SO) by the AA. A SO outlines the evidence against the cartel and
delineates a preliminary conclusion.186 Realistically, the SO is issued on the basis
of the AAs incriminating evidence. The better the quality of evidence, the higher
the probability of conviction. Thus, an AA with good evidence would prefer to
send a SO to the cartel sooner than an AA with poor evidence, which may prefer
to investigate the market more. The ensuing strategic situation provides a fertile
ground for modeling a signalling game. In this context, the AA can essentially
use the timing of issuing a SO to signal (or reveal) how compelling its evidence
is. If the AAs evidence is not good, then it can invest in costly e¤ort to discover
additional incriminating evidence or interpret its existing evidence. We assume
that the AA behaves strategically without committing ex-ante to the intensity of
its prosecutorial e¤ort. In that way, we overcome the problem of dynamic time
inconsistency.
The study provides the conditions under which an AA should refrain from re-
vealing the strength of its evidence to the cartel. In particular, the analysis shows
that, with the appropriate design of its leniency policy, the AA can successfully
induce the cartel to self-report at an early stage of the prosecutorial process, de-
spite its feeble evidence. All else equal, the more generous the ne reduction,
the easier it is to dissolve cartels (i.e., more pronounced desistance e¤ects). The
study casts light on the role of a) the (prior) beliefs the cartel holds regarding
186Drafting and sending a Statement of Objections to the suspected cartel members is a formal
step in an Antitrust Authority investigation. It is a typical procedure rule in EU (and EU
member states) antitrust proceedings. Essentially, a SO sets out the AAs provisional ndings
against the cartel and outlines its preliminary conclusion. See, Antitrust Manual of Procedures,
Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Articles 101
and 102 TFEU, March 2012.
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the AAs evidence, b) the quality or strength of the AAs evidence, c) the social
harm instigated by the cartel, and d) the severity of the ne imposed on convicted
cartels.
A policy implication that logically derives from the analysis is that AAs should
try to manipulate cartelists(prior) beliefs regarding the evidence they hold against
them. For instance, after a dawn raid, an AA may overstate, in a prudent and
careful manner, by an announcement (e.g. a press release) that it has gathered
potentially signicant incriminating evidence and/or that it intends to send a SO
soon. This remains credible as long as it induces a leniency application. Moreover,
an AA may want to build a reputation of winning the antitrust cases it prosecutes
to the courts. For instance, by opening a few profound investigations, rather
than many supercial investigations, an AA may establish itself as successful or
e¤ective in convicting cartels. As a result, rms may revise their prior beliefs
regarding the strength of the AAs case against them. An additional implication
that develops from the analysis is that AAs should prioritize their activities to
more serious and harmful cartels. All the same, it is easier for an AA to fruitfully
elicit self-reporting by cartels that cause a greater harm to society. This is because
AAs divert more prosecutorial resources to serious cartel cases, implying higher
probabilities of conviction. A necessary condition for the last implication is that
AAs must have su¢ cient resources to nance their prosecutorial e¤ort if the cartel
does not self-report its unlawful conduct. A higher budget can alleviate the AAs
constraints. More importantly, it may enable an AA to credibly threaten, without
pre-committing its resources, to successfully prosecute those cartels that decline
to self-report.187
3.1.1 Relevant Literature
The economic literature on LPs has developed over the last two decades after the
pioneer contributions by Motta and Polo [2003] and Spagnolo [2004].188 A general
nding of the relevant literature is that by eroding a cartels internal trust, LPs may
187This resembles to the credible nuclear deterrence. If you have the weapons you will not need
to use them.
188LPs were enacted and implemented for the rst time in the US in 1978 (reformed in 1993)
and the EU in 1996 (revised in 2002 and in 2006). The general consensus is that LPs have been a
story of success. In the U.S., the Corporate Leniency Policy has been the most e¤ective gener-
ator of international cartel cases. See the speech by James Gri¢ n (Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. DOJ, Antitrust Division), The modern leniency program after ten years - A sum-
mary overview of the antitrust division criminal enforcement program, DOS, 2003, US (available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201477.htm). Likewise, in the EU The leniency
instrument has proven to be a formidable tool for encouraging rms to cooperate with the com-
petition authorities. See the speech by Philip Lowe (Director General, DG Competition, E.C.),
Whats the future of cartel enforcement, Understanding Global Cartel Enforcement Brussels, 11
February 2003 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003044en.pdf).
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evoke substantial desistance and deterrence e¤ects (e.g. Motta and Polo [2003],
Spagnolo [2004], Ellis and Wislon [2003] and Harrington [2008]). The direction
and magnitude of these e¤ects depend, among others, on market concentration
(Ellis and Wislon [2003]), the degree of evidence heterogeneity (Feess and Walzl
[2004] and Silbye [2010]), the heterogeneity of rmsmarket shares (Motchenkova
and Leliefeld [2010]), whether nes are xed or proportional to the accumulated
collusive prots (Motchenkova [2004]), whether the probability of cartel detection
deterministically or stochastically changes over time (Hinloopen [2003] Harrington
[2008]) and whether the antitrust policy instruments (penalties and probability of
detection) are endogenous to rmspricing decisions (Chen and Harrington [2007]).
Nevertheless, LPs are not unambiguously optimal. Wrongly designed LPs may
exacerbate collusive behaviour or provoke cartel formation (e.g. Ellis and Wislon
[2003], Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a], Aubert et al. [2006] and Motchenkova and
Leliefeld [2010]).189
Our paper is closely related to Sauvagnat [2010]. The author develops a model
wherein the AA has private information regarding the probability of successful
conviction if an investigation is launched by the AA. In this context, Sauvagnat
[2010] shows that with the appropriate design of its LP, the AA can fool cartel
members to self-report, even if it knows that its investigation will be futile in de-
tecting incriminating evidence. A major di¤erence of the two studies is that we
consider a signalling game. In e¤ect, the scenario we consider allows the AA to
signal or reveal the strength of its evidence to the cartel. Importantly, our study
highlights the vital role of the cartels beliefs regarding the AAs evidence. Con-
trary to Sauvagnat [2010], in our model, the AA does not commit ex-ante to a
certain investigation policy. Thus, our study is not susceptible to dynamic time
inconsistency problems.190 Moreover, in our study the rate of law enforcement is
endogenously determined by the AA, via its decisions about the optimal prosecu-
torial e¤ort level. Another di¤erence is that we consider proportional nes (i.e.,
nes that depend on the collusive prots and the duration of the illegal cartel)
contrary to Sauvagnat [2010] who considers xed nes. Regardless of the di¤er-
ences, both studies conclude that the AA can induce the cartel to self-report even
The empirical ndings must be interpreted with prudence because only the detected cartels are
observed, which unavoidably leads to an intrinsic sample selection bias. For empirical studies
that aim to draw inferences regarding the impact of LPs on cartels see Brenner [2009], Miller
[2009], Chang and Harrington [2010], Klein [2010] and Zhou [2011].
189For a comprehensive survey of the literature on LPs see Spagnolo [2008].
190The ex-ante threat of audit alone su¢ ces to induce the desirable compliance with antitrust
law. Nonetheless, ex-post the AA may have decient incentives to comply with its initial audit
rate commitments, given that audits are costly. This could potentially result in dynamic time
inconsistency problems.The role of commitment in antitrust enforcement has been recently dis-
cussed by Feizi [2010]. The author nds that a credible commitment by the AA regarding the
frequency of its audit policy does not unambiguously enhance the e¢ cacy of antitrust policy.
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if it has unsound incriminating evidence. Finally, both studies conrm that the
desistance e¤ects of LPs are enhanced with more generous ne discounts, which is
in line with previous studies in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
game and its main assumptions. Section 3.3 presents the baseline game wherein
information is perfectly symmetric. The game with asymmetric information is
presented in Section 3.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
3.2 Description of the game
We consider a scenario of strategic interaction between a cartel, comprising of two
identical rms, and an AA which enforces antitrust law. The AAs objective is to
minimize the expected social cost of cartels. Because of the secret nature of the
cartels and the high standard of evidentiary proofs required by the courts, the AA
cannot convict the cartel unless it discovers hard incriminating evidence.191 To
attain its goal, the AA commits to a certain leniency policy whereby it provides
a ne discount only to the rst rm to come forward and denounce the illegal
cartel.192 This is a realistic assumption to be made, as it reects a key feature of
LPs in real word (e.g. US and EU leniency programmes).193 Rather than assuming
that the AA commits to a xed probability of conviction, we consider a strategic
AA which chooses its prosecutorial e¤ort (which determines the probability of
conviction) on a case-by-case basis. Realistically, an AA decides how many of its
limited resources to invest in each case after processing some preliminary evidence
with regard to the suspected cartel. Depending on the quality of the evidence
detected, the AA may prioritize the prosecution of more serious cartels.
An initial step to the AAs investigations is to conduct a market investigation,
(e.g. a surprised inspection - known as dawn raid194) at suspected rmspremises
or elsewhere) whereby it collects all readily available evidence.195 Evidence is dis-
organized and bulky, and crucially its review involves a cost for the AA. Thus, the
191An implicit assumption we made is that the cartel leaves some evidence, which the AA can
discover, if it investigates the market.
192This resembles to the optimal design of leniency programmes by Harrington [2008].
193The EU leniency programme allows for more than one rms to receive lenient treatment,
provided that they submit value added incriminating information to the EU Commission. An
implicit assumption we made in our study is that colluding rms retain symmetric evidence with
regard to their illegal agreement. This implies that self-reporting by more than one rms does
not add anything to the AAs case against the cartel. On the contrary, it may make the LP more
easily exloitable by colluding rms.
194The name is derived from the time of the day when the investigations are normally held.
195The European Commission and national competition authorities of the EU member states
have wide powers to inspect. Among otherts, they can carry out unannounced inspections or
dawn raids at suspected rmspremises. The investigations can be extended to other places
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AA randomly surveys and assess a subset of the accumulated evidence. The pre-
liminary scrutinized evidence (henceforth the prima facie evidence) is privately
known to the AA. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the strength of the
prima facie evidence can be either good or poor.196 The AA is said to be good
when the exposed prima facie evidence is of high quality. On the other hand, the
AA is said to be bad when the prima facie evidence is of poor quality. The better
the quality of evidence, the higher the probability of conviction. We are going
to elaborate this later. What is important to underscore at this point is that the
cartel is uncertain about the quality of the prima facie evidence that the AA holds.
However, it has some prior beliefs regarding the strength of the AAs evidence.
On the basis of the strength of its prima facie evidence, the AA decides in
which period to send a SO to the cartel. We assume that evidence is perishable
and, therefore, the AA has two options, either send the SO in the rst period
(SO at t=0) or in the second period (SO at t=1).197 Ideally, the AA, wishing to
minimize the expected social harm instigated by the cartel, prefers to expose the
cartel at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial proceedings.
After receiving the SO, a colluding rm has two options. Either to collaborate
with the AA and self-report the cartel, in which case it pays a reduced ne, or
refute the SO and do not self-report. In the latter case, that is, if the cartel declines
to self-report, the AA decides the amount of resources to invest in the prosecutorial
process against the cartel (i.e., set up a team of legal and economic experts and/or
hire consultants to scrutinize or rene the existing evidence or search for new
evidence). If the AA successfully convicts the cartel, the colluding rms pay the
full ne, which depends on the cartels record.198 Once dissolved (either by self-
reporting or by the AAs own investigations), the AA intensely monitors the market
and severely punishes recidivists. Thus, after their conviction by the AA, rms
eternally compete.199
as well if there is a reasonable suspicion that evidence related to the inspection is being kept
elsewhere. Sometimes these investigations are held simultaneously at the o¢ ces of multiple
inspected rms in various countries.
196Equivalently, we may assume that some AAs are more e¤ective in distinguishing cogent
convicting evidence and poor/unreliable evidence (profound AA v. supercial AA). We will
elaborate on this distinction distinction in Section 4.5.
197This can also be justied, to some extend, on the limitation period that comes with antitrust
law violation. In essence, an AA cannot have an open investigation against rms forever. Ac-
cording to Article 25 of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003, the limitation period is (a) 3 years
in the case of infringements of provisions concerning requests for information or the conduct of
inspections; (b) 4 years in the case of all other infringements.
198This is consistent with the latest Fining Guidelines of the European Commission. See,
Guidelines on the method of setting nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No
1/2003 (2006/C 210/02).
199In e¤ect, this assumption deters rms from colluding and reporting information in each
period, i.e., exploiting the LP. See, Spagnolo [2004] and Chen and Harrington [2007].
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Critically, the invested resources reinforce the analytical foundations of the case
at hand, and thereby enhance the accuracy of the AAs investigation. For instance,
the AA may undertake further enquiries to discover new evidence, or to interpret
the existing evidence. This is intuitive as the more resources the AA invests in a
case, the higher the probability of cartel conviction, all else equal. To this end,
we assume that the probability of conviction for a good AA is ~p = e+p
1+e
, where
e 2 [0; e] is the e¤ort level (bounded above by AAs budget) and p 2 (0; 1) is a
parameter that reects the quality of the prima facie evidence (or the probability
of inspection).200 To simplify the analysis, we assume that p = 0 for a bad AA.201
This implies that the probability of conviction for a bad AA is e
1+e
. Essentially, a
bad AA cannot convict the cartel unless it exerts more e¤ort.
The adopted functional form for the probability of conviction has the following
properties: 1) lim
e!0
~p = p, 2) lim
e!1
~p = 1, 3) @~p
@e
> 0, 4) @
2~p
@e2
< 0, 5) @~p
@p
> 0 and
6) @
2~p
@e@p
< 0.202 Property 1 implies that with no further prosecutorial e¤ort the
probability of conviction hinges only on the quality of the prima facie evidence.
Property 2 implies that when the AA invests innitely many resources in the case
at hand, the probability of conviction tends to 1. Properties 3 and 4 imply that
the probability of conviction is increasing with the AAs e¤ort. However, the mar-
ginal productivity of e¤ort is decreasing with additional e¤ort. In other words,
the AAs technology of scrutinizing its existing evidence or detecting additional
evidence exhibits diminishing marginal returns. Property 6 implies that the mar-
ginal productivity of AAs e¤ort is decreasing with the quality of the evidence
already scrutinized. The added value of the AAs prosecutorial e¤ort depend on
the evidence it has already scrutinized. In particular, the AAs e¤ort become less
productive in increasing the probability of conviction when the strength of the
prima facie evidence is high.
More accuracy, however, comes at a cost. We assume that the AAs cost of
e¤ort is C(e) = e, where  > 1 for a bad AA that sends a SO at t=0 and  = 1
otherwise. Parameter  represents the marginal cost (or the opportunity cost) of
e¤ort. We assume that this cost is higher for a bad AA, if it sends a SO at t=0.
Intuitively, an AA with poor quality of prima facie evidence can invest its limited
resources more productively to other activities or antitrust cases. Equivalently, it
is too costly for a bad AA to divert resources from other activities and relocate
them to the case at hand, given the poor quality of its prima facie evidence. On
the other hand, at t=1 the opportunity cost of e¤ort is equal for the two types
of AA. This implies that it is not as costly for a bad AA to channel resources to
200The lower the probability of erroneously exonerating the cartel, i.e., the lower the type II
error probability 1 p1+e .
201Thus, the probability of conviction for a bad AA is e1+e .
202All calculations can be found in Appendix C.
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the case since, otherwise, it will have to drop the case. This is grounded on two
facts: i) the incriminating evidence is perishable and ii) the limitation period that
comes with antitrust law violation (i.e., the AA cannot have an open investigation
forever).203
A key assumption of the game is that there is no strategic interaction among
cartel members in the market. Essentially, this allows us to abstract from the
possibility of defections in the market by individual cartel members.204 This can
be justied on the fact that after the dawn raid at rmspremises, the market is
tightly monitor, and, therefore, rms cannot change their market conduct with-
out this smelling shy to the AA. A sudden and unusual change in the rms
conduct, not justied by any change in market conditions and fundamental eco-
nomic parameters, provides su¢ cient evidence to the AA to convict the cartel.
Nonetheless, rms can (unilaterally) run to the AA to self-report and benet from
a lenient treatment, which materializes in a lower ne. We assume that only the
rst self-reporting rm is eligible to a ne discount.205
The emerging game is portrayed in Figure 5. A formal description of the game
follows.
203This basically implies that the AA must prioritize the prosecution of the cartel cases which
are more clear-cut (i.e. has better incriminating evidence). As we will see later, this may have
a concrete impact on AAs reputation, and thus its e¤ectiveness.
204Although there is no strategic interaction among cartel members in the market, protection
from punishment e¤ect (Spagnolo [2004]) or the deviator amnesty e¤ect (Harrington [2008]) is
present in our model. This is because we assume that the SO is issued at the end of each period;
therefore colluding rms obtain the per-period collusive prots even when self-reporting occurs.
205This restriction on the eligibility to leniency induces rms into a race to the AA in order
to be the rst to self-report and pay a reduced ne. This e¤ect of LPs is known as the race to
the courthouse e¤ect. Given the symmetry of rms (size, market shares, evidence they hold etc.)
o¤ering leniency to more than one rm would short-circuit this e¤ect of leniency programmes on
rms incentives to self-report their unlawful conduct. See, Spagnolo [2004].
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Figure 5: Game tree.
Players
The game consists of three players, 1) Nature, 2) AA and 3) Cartel.
Timing
The game unfolds as follows: 1) nature draws a type for the AA (Good, Bad),
2) the AA observes its type and decides in which period to send a SO to the cartel
3) the cartel observes the AAs action but not its type, then update its beliefs and
decides whether to self-report or not and 4) the AA decides its prosecutorial e¤ort,
if the cartel does not self-report its illegal act.
Strategies
The two types of AA have the same strategy space, f(SO at t=0; SO at t=1) e 2 [0; e]g.
Recognizing that the AA will choose its e¤ort level optimally e = etj, where
t = f0; 1g is the time wherein the AA issues the SO and j = fG;Bg is the AAs
type, we can essentially distinguish four strategies:
1. Send a SO at t=0 and choose e¤ort level e
0;G
if good type, Send a SO at t=0
and choose e¤ort level e0;B if bad type;
2. Send a SO at t=0 and choose e¤ort level e
0;G
if good type, Send a SO at t=1
and choose e¤ort level e1;B if bad type;
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3. Send a SO at t=1 and choose e¤ort level e
1;G
if good type, Send a SO at t=0
and choose e¤ort level e0;B if bad type;
4. Send a SO at t=1 and choose e¤ort level e
1;G
if good type, Send a SO at t=1
and choose e¤ort level e1;B if bad type.
The cartel has two information sets, I1  f(Good; SO at t=0); (Bad; SO at t=0)g
and I2  f(Good; SO at t=0); (Bad; SO at t=0)g, at each of which it has two ac-
tions. So, the cartel has also four strategies:
1. Self-report at I1 and Self-report at I2;
2. Self-report at I1 and Not self-report at I2;
3. Not self-report at I1 and Self-report at I2;
4. Not self-report at I1 and Not self-report at I2.
AAs payo¤s
Before we derive the payo¤s, two remarks are in order. The rst is that the SO is
issued by the AA at the end of each period, i.e., either at the end of t=0 or the end
of t=1. The second is that the historical record of the cartel does not inuence
the AAs or cartels decisions. Thus, we normalize all historical harm caused by
the cartel to zero. This is without loss of generality since the strategic interaction
between the AA and the cartel begins at t=0. The cartels record may only be
considered by the AA when calculating the ne.
The payo¤ (loss function) to the AA of either type, if it sends a SO at t=0 and
the cartel self-reports, is:
WR0;G = W
R
0;B = L
where L is the per-period social harm caused by the cartel.206 This is because the
SO is sent at the end of t=0, which implies that the social harm caused by the
cartel in t=0 cannot be deterred.
The payo¤ to a good AA when it sends a SO at t=0 and the cartel declines to
self-reports is:
WN0;Gje=e0;G = L+

1  p
1 + e


1  

L+ e
206A remark for the notation. The superscript denotes the cartels strategy (R is for Self-
Report and N is for Not Self-Report). The subscript comprises of two indicators. The rst
denotes the period wherein the AA sends a SO. It is equal to 0 when the AA sends a SO at t=0
and 1 when the AA sends a SO at t=1. The second denotes the type of the AA (Gfor good
and Bfor Bad).
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where e
0;G
= argmin
e
W0;G. Parameter  denotes the discount rate for future
payo¤s (common to all players). In words, the payo¤ for the AA comprises of three
elements. The rst is the social harm caused by the cartel in period t=0. The
second is the present value of the cost of an erroneous decision, i.e., the expected
social harm caused by the cartel in the case of a type II error. This cost is estimated
by the product of type II error probability and the expected present value of the
discounted social harm caused by the cartel in the future. The third is the cost of
the AAs prosecutorial e¤ort.
Similarly, the payo¤ to a bad AA when it sends a SO at t=0 and the cartel
does not self-report is:
WN0;Bje=e0;B = L+

1
1 + e


1  

L+ e
where e
0;B
= argmin
e
W0;B. The cost of a type II error is higher in this case
since the AAs prima facie evidence is poor.
The payo¤ to the AA, of either type, when it sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel
self-reports is:
WR1;G = W
R
1;B = L(1 + )
The welfare loss when the AA sends a SO at t=1 is higher compared to the
welfare loss if the AA sends a SO at t=0 since the cartel operates for an additional
period. This is precisely the reason why the AA prefers to unravel the cartel sooner
than later.
The payo¤ to a good AA when it sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel does not
self-report is:
WN1;Gje=e1;G = L+ L+

1  p
1 + e

2
1  

L+ e
where e
1;G
= argmin
e
W1;G. The payo¤ consists of four elements. The rst is
the social harm caused by the cartel in period t=0. The second is the social harm
caused by the cartel in period t=1. The third represents the expected present value
of the discounted social cost of the cartel if it evades detection. It is estimated
by the product of the type II error probability and the present value of the social
harm caused by the cartel in the future. The fourth corresponds to the cost the
AA incurs to prosecute the cartel.
Similarly, the payo¤ to a bad AA when it sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel
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does not self-report is:
WN1;Bje=e1;B = L+ L+

1
1 + e

2
1  

L+ e
where e
1;G
= argmin
e
W1;B.
Collusive rmspayo¤s
The expected payo¤ to a rm, if both rms self-report to an AA which sends a
SO at t=0 is:
UR0;G = U
R
0;B =    (1 

2
)a
The self-reporting rm obtains the period collusive prots  and pays a dis-
counted ne, which is proportional to the collusive prots.207 Parameter  is the
ne discount rate and is divided by 2 because only the rst self-reporting rm is
eligible to receive lenient treatment.208 Parameter a 2 (0; 1
~p
] is the proportion of
collusive prots paid as a ne.209 We assume that a is exogenously set by law.
As remarked before, once detected colluding rms eternally compete and obtain
the competitive prots. To simplify the exposition the competitive prots are
normalized to zero.
The payo¤ to a rm, if both rms decline to self-report to a good AA that
sends a SO at t=0 is:
UN0;G =   

1  1  p
1 + e
0;G

a +

1  p
1 + e
0;G


1  


The payo¤ consists of three elements. The rst is the period per-rm collusive
207Proportional ne schemes closely reect the current antitrust rules on both sides of the At-
lantic. In particular, the relevant ne guidelines in the EU and the US specify nes as proportions
of illegal (net) prots or damages caused to society. See, US sentencing guidelines (chapter 8:
Sentencing of organizations), and Guidelines on the method of setting nes imposed pursuant
to article 23(2)(a) of Regulation no 1/2003, O¢ cial Journal of the European Union (2006/C
210/02). Remarkably, most contributions in the literature on LPs (including the seminal papers
by Motta and Polo [2003] and Spagnolo [2004]) consider constant nes that are independent of
the accrued (net) illegal prots (or damages to society). Among the exceptions that consider
proportional nes are the studies by Motchenkova [2004] and Houba et al. [2011].
208The rst informant rule of the LP implies that the expected ne in case of self-reporting is
+(1 )a = (1  2 )a. Fines are capped so that rmsnancial stability is not jeopardized.
Empirically, nes hardly exceed the illegal prots earned by cartels. For instance, see Craycraft
et al. [1997] and Combe and Monnier [2011].
209The expected ne cannot be higher than the (net) gain from the illegal conduct, i.e.,   ~pF
where F = a.
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prots, the second is the ne a rm pays if it is detected and successfully prose-
cuted, and the third is the present value of the discounted future collusive prots
a cartelist gets if the AA commits a type II error.
The payo¤ to a rm, if both rms decline to self-report to a bad AA that sends
a SO at t=0 is:
UN0;B =   

1  1
1 + e
0;B

a +

1
1 + e
0;B


1  


Notice that, contrary to a good AA, if the bad AA exerts no further prosecu-
torial e¤ort, the rm obtains the discounted stream of full collusive prots. This
is because, unless the bad AA exerts e¤ort, the probability of a type II error is 1.
The payo¤ to each rm, if both rms self-reports to either type of AA that
sends a SO at t=1 is:
UR1;G = U
R
1;B =    a(1 

2
)( +


)
The cartel receives the period collusive prots and pays a discounted ne that
takes into account the cartels record.
The payo¤ to a rm, if both rms decline to self-report to a good AA that
sends a SO at t=1 is:
UN1;G =   

1  1  p
1 + e
1;G
h
a

 +


i
+

1  p
1 + e
1;G


1  


The payo¤ comprises of three elements. The period collusive prots, the ne
paid in case of conviction by the AA, which takes into account cartels record, and
the present value of future prots that accrue to the cartel if the AA commits a
type II error.
Similarly, the payo¤ to a rm, if both rms decline to self-report to a bad AA
that sends a SO at t=1 is:
UN1;B =   

1  1
1 + e
1;B
h
a

 +


i
+

1
1 + e
1;B


1  


Beliefs
Before observing the AAs decisions regarding the timing of issuing a formal SO,
the cartel believes that the AA has good quality of evidence (AA is of good type)
with probability  . With the complementary probability 1  , the cartel believes
that the AA has poor quality of evidence (AA is of bad type). We dene the
cartels beliefs at its two information sets, I1 and I2, by (q; 1   q) and (r; 1   r),
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respectively. Particularly, if the cartel receives a SO at t=0, then it believes that
it is issued by a good (bad) AA with probability q (1  q):
prob(good AAjI1) = q and prob(bad AAjI1) = 1  q
If the cartel receives a SO at t=1, then it believes that it is issued by a good
(bad) AA with probability r (1  r):
prob(good AAjI2) = r and prob(bad AAjI2) = 1  r
3.3 Base model: Complete information
In this section, we solve the game assuming that there is no information asymmetry
between the AA and the cartel. For example, when the AA truthfully reveals the
complete set of its evidence in the SO or when the cartel has acquired, in some
way, perfect knowledge about the strength of the AAs prima facie evidence. The
base model would allows to impose some restrictions on the parametersspace, to
establish a meaningful and interesting signalling game.
3.3.1 Equilibrium analysis
To solve the complete information game we distinguish the two subgames originat-
ing from a good AA and a bad AA. Then, we consider the two possible scenarios:
1) the scenario whereby the AA sends a SO at t=0 and 2) the scenario whereby the
AA sends a SO at t=1. To derive the equilibrium we use the backward induction
algorithm.
Good AA sends a SO at t=0 The optimal e¤ort e
0;G
for the good AA, if
it sends a SO at t=0 and the cartel declines to self-report, is determined by the
following optimization problem:
e
0;G
= argmin
e


1  

1  p
1 + e

L+ e

(1)
In words, the AA chooses its e¤ort intensity to minimize the sum of the ex-
pected cost of the type II error and the cost of its e¤ort. The rst-order condition
(FOC) of (1) implies an optimal e¤ort equal to e
0;G
=
q
(1 p)L
1   1.210 The optimal
e¤ort level equalizes the (social) marginal benet (reduction in the social cost of
the type II error) and the marginal cost of e¤ort (which equals to 1). The AAs
e¤ort is positive if the quality of the prima facie evidence is relatively weak. In
210The SOC for a minimum is satised since 2(1 p)L(1 )(1+e)3 > 0.
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particular, e
0;G
> 0 if p < p1, where p1 =
(1+L) 1
L
. If, on the contrary, the prima
facie evidence is su¢ ciently potent, i.e., p > p1, the AA optimally prosecutes the
cartel without additional prosecutorial e¤ort. The cost of e¤ort, from a welfare
point of view, is too high in this case. Moreover, p1  0 if L  1   L1. If
the social harm instigated by the cartel is relatively low, i.e., lower than L1, then
the AA need not invest additional resources to the case. For the purposes of our
study, we restrict L  L1 so that e¤ort is always positive if p < p1.
e =

e
0;G
p < p1 and L > L1
0 otherwise
Simple comparative statics on e
0;G
reveal that the optimal e¤ort level is in-
versely related to the quality of the prima facie evidence (
@e
0;G
@p
< 0) and positively
related to the seriousness of the cartel (
@e
0;G
@L
> 0). Intuitively, when the AA holds
prima facie evidence of higher quality, the type II error probability declines. In
this case, a lower level of e¤ort is required by the AA to achieve the optimal law
enforcement rate. On the other hand, when the cartel causes a greater harm to
society, the cost of type II error escalates. Thus, a higher e¤ort level is required
to achieve the optimal law enforcement rate.
The cartel anticipates the AAs e¤ort e
0;G
. If rms do not self-report, they
receive an expected payo¤ equal to:
UN0;G = (1  a) +
[( + a(1  )] (1  p)p
(1  )(1  p)L
If both rms self-report, then each gets a payo¤ equal to:
UR0;G =    (1 

2
)a
Firms self-report if the payo¤ with self-reporting is higher than the one without
self-reporting, i.e., UR0;G  UN0;G. The latter inequality holds if   1, where
1 =
2(1 p)[(1 a)+a]
a
p
(1 )(1 p)L . In words, if the ne discount rate for self-reporting is su¢ -
ciently high, then the rms self-report after receiving a SO at t=0 from a good
AA. Notice that the AA should not o¤er positive rewards if the cartel generates
a relatively high social harm. In particular, 1  1 if L  4(1 p)[(1 a)+a)]
2
a2(1 )  L2.
If, on the other hand, the per period social harm caused by the cartel is relatively
low, then the rms self-report only if it is provided with a positive reward. The
reasoning is that when the social harm instigated by the cartel is relatively low, the
benet from a lower type II error contracts. Given that the productivity of e¤ort
diminishes, the AAs optimal level of e¤ort declines. Thus, the expected payo¤
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to the cartel if it refuses to self-report increases. As a result, the AA must o¤er
courageous incentives to the cartel, i.e., a positive reward, to induce self-reporting.
Lemma 1. If the social harm instigated by the cartel is relatively low,
i.e., L < L2, then the AA must o¤er a positive reward to induce self-reporting:
1
  1 if L  L2
> 1 otherwise
The optimal ne discount rate is decreasing in L, p and a. As the social
harm caused by the cartel or the quality of the prima facie evidence improves, the
productivity of AAs prosecutorial e¤ort increases. Therefore, the AA intensies
its prosecutorial e¤ort, and thus a lower ne discount rate is required to induce
the cartel to self-report. Similarly, with a more severe ne the AA can achieve
the optimal enforcement rate with a less generous ne discount. In e¤ect, this is
because  and  are substitute policy instruments. This is a standard result in
the literature on LPs, and it suggests that the model of the paper is sensible.211
Good AA sends a SO at t=1 The optimal e¤ort e
1;G
for the good AA, if
it sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel refuses to self-report, is determined by the
following optimization problem:
e
1;G
= argmin
e


1  

1  p
1 + e

L+ e

(2)
This is identical to the problem of the AA at t=0, as it is represented by
equation (1) above. Thus, the optimal e¤ort is e
1;G
=
q
(1 p)L
1    1. As remarked
before e
1;G
> 0 if p < p1. Moreover, p1  0 if L  L1.
The cartel anticipates the e¤ort level e
1;G
. If rms do not self-report, then each
receives an expected payo¤ equal to:
UN1;G = [(1  a)   a]


+

2(1  a)  a) (1  p)

p
(1  )(1  p)L
If, on the contrary, rms self-report, then each receives a payo¤ equal to:
UR1;G =    a(1 

2
)( +


)
Firms receive the period collusive prots and pay a reduced ne, which takes
into account the cartels record. Given this, rms self-report if their payo¤ with
211See, for instance, Feess and Walzl [2004], Harrington [2008] and Silbye [2010].
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self-reporting is higher than that without self-reporting, i.e., UR1;G  UN1;G. The
inequality holds if   2, where 2 = 2(1 p)[
2(1 a) a]
a(1+)
p
(1 )(1 p)L . Thus, if the ne discount
is su¢ ciently high, and in particular if   2, the rms self-report after receiving
a SO at t=1 from a good AA. The AA need not o¤er positive rewards if L 
4(1 p)[2(1 a) a]2
a2(1 )(1+)2  L3.
Lemma 2. If the social harm instigated by the cartel is relatively low,
i.e., L < L3, then the AA needs to o¤er a positive reward to induce self-reporting:
2
  1 if L  L3
> 1 otherwise
The optimal ne discount rate is decreasing in both L and a. The intuition is
similar to the one outlined in Section 3.3.1.
AAs decision With the appropriate design of its LP the AA can induce the
cartel to self-report at both periods. As shown above the optimal ne discount
rates are 1 for t=0 and 2 for t=1. Given that, the AA has to decide in which
period to issue and send a SO. If it sends a SO at t=0, and the cartel self-reports,
the welfare loss will be WR0;G = L. If, on the other hand, the AA sends a SO at
t=1, and the cartel self-reports, then the welfare loss will beWR1;G = L+L. Given
that WR0;G < W
R
1;G, the AA sends a SO at t=0 and dissolves the cartel sooner.
We summarize the above results in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If e
0;G
 e, then a good AA sends a SO at t=0 and the cartel self-
reports. The optimal LP species ne discount rates 1 =
2(1 p)[(1 a)+a]
a
p
(1 )(1 p)L at t=0
and 2 =
2(1 p)[2(1 a) a]
a(1+)
p
(1 )(1 p)L at t=1.
It is straightforward to show that 1 > 2, which is consistent with the current
practice, in many jurisdictions, of rewarding early cooperators with a more gener-
ous ne discount. The rationale for this remark is twofold. Firstly, the expected
lifespan of the cartel is higher from the period 1 perspective, and, therefore, the
stream of the expected collusive prots is higher. Thus, a higher ne discount
must be o¤ered to the cartel in order to be compensated for the foregone future
collusive prots, when it self-reports at t=0. Secondly, the ne in the second pe-
riod is higher because it takes into account the cartels record. Thus, the AA can
successfully force the cartel to self-report with a lower ne discount rate.212
Corollary 1. A good AA must o¤er a higher ne discount to induce self-reporting
at t=0 rather than at t=1, i.e., 1 > 2.
212This is because  and  are substitute policy instruments.
104
Bad AA sends a SO at t=0 The optimal e¤ort e
0;B
for the bad AA, if it sends
a SO at t=0 and the cartel refuses to self-report, is determined by the following
optimisation problem:
e
0;B
= argmin
e


1  

1
1 + e

L+ e

(3)
As already mentioned parameter  represents the opportunity cost of e¤ort for
a bad AA that sends a SO at t=0. The FOC of (3) implies an optimal e¤ort equal
to e
0;B
=
q
L
(1 )   1. Notice that if  is su¢ ciently high, then e¤ort is too costly
from a social point of view, and, therefore, the AA prefers to dismiss the case.
In particular, if   L
1    then e0;B = 0. If this is the case, the type II error
probability equals to 1.
e
0;B
=
(
0 if   q
L
(1 )   1 otherwise
Assumption 5. For a bad AA that sends a SO at t=0,   .
This assumption ensures a meaningful signalling game since the two types of
AA have disparate interests, and thus behave di¤erently. In e¤ect, the restriction
on  implies that the cartel never self-reports when it receives a SO at t=0 from
a bad AA, when rms know the weakness of the AAs evidence. Anticipating this
reaction by the cartel, the AA postpones the SO for t=1 when the cost of e¤ort
is not prohibitively high. In other words, the AAs e¤ort to prosecute the cartel
in period t=0 would be fruitless since the cartel knows that the AA does not have
good incriminating evidence. As remarked before, the restriction on  can be jus-
tied on the ground that the AA with poor quality of prima facie evidence can
allocate its limited resources to other antitrust cases more productively. Equiva-
lently, it is very costly for the AA to divert resources from other activities to the
case at hand.
Bad AA sends a SO at t=1 The optimal e¤ort e
1;B
for a bad AA, if it sends
a SO at t=1 and the cartel declines to self-report, is determined by the following
optimisation problem:
e
1;B
= argmin
e


1  

1
1 + e

L+ e

(4)
Contrary to t=0 the opportunity cost of e¤ort is equal to that of a good AA
i.e.,  = 1. The AA cannot have an open investigation against the cartel forever.
Thus, the AA knows that if it does not prosecute the cartel in t=1, it will have to
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drop the case. Thus, the opportunity cost of e¤ort is not as high as in t=0 where
the AA has the option to postpone the SO for the next period. The FOC of (4)
implies an optimal e¤ort of e
1;B
=
q
L
1    1, which is higher than that of a good
AA that sends a SO within the same period, i.e., e
1;B
 e
1;G
. This is because a
good AA has better quality of prima facie evidence than the bad AA, and thus
a lower e¤ort level is required to achieve the optimal level of law enforcement.213
Notice that the optimal e¤ort for a bad AA is positive if the social harm instigated
by the cartel is su¢ ciently high. In particular, e
1;B
> 0 if L > L1.
The cartel anticipates the e¤ort level e
1;B
. Thus, if rms decline to self-report,
they receive a payo¤ equal to:
UN1;B = [(1  a)   a]


+

2(1  a)  a)

p
(1  )L
If, on the contrary, the cartel self-reports then each rm obtains:
UR1;B =    a(1 

2
)( +


)
Therefore, the rms self-report if UR1;B  UN1;B. The latter inequality holds if
  3, where 3 = 2[
2(1 a) a]
a(1+)
p
(1 )L . In words, if the ne discount is su¢ ciently
high (  3), then the rms self-report after receiving a SO at t=1 from a bad
AA. Notice that the AA need not o¤er positive rewards if L  4[2(1 a) a]2
a2(1 )(1+)2  L3.
Lemma 4. If the social harm instigated by the cartel is relatively low,
i.e., L < L3, then the AA needs to o¤er a positive reward to induce self-reporting:
3
  1 if L  L3
> 1 otherwise
The optimal ne discount rate is decreasing in L and a. The intuition is as
described in Section 3.3.1. Notice that 3 > 2. In words, an AA with weak
prima facie evidence has to o¤er a more generous ne discount rate to induce the
cartel to self-report. This is intuitive given that the probability of erroneously
exonerating the cartel, and thus the cost of type II error, is higher for a bad AA.
This observation is consistent with the LPs in real world - the more value added
the evidence provided to the AA, the higher the ne discount o¤ered in exchange.
213Technically, this is attributed to the fact that the second order cross partial derivative of the
type II error probability is positive, i.e., @~p@e@p > 0. For a graphic illustration see Appendix D.
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AAs decision With the appropriate design of its LP the AA can induce the
cartel to self-report only in period t=1. As shown above the optimal ne discount
rate is 3. Given that, the AA decides in which period to send a SO. If the AA
sends a SO at t=0 then the welfare loss will be WN0;B =
L
1  . If, on the other hand,
the AA sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel self-reports, then the welfare loss will be
WR1;B = L+ L. Since W
R
1;B < W
N
0;B, the AA prefers to send a SO at t=1.
We summarize the above results in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If e
1;B
 e, then a bad AA sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel self-reports.
The optimal LP species a ne discount rate 3 =
2[2(1 a) a]
a(1+)
p
(1 )L .
Given assumption 5 and using Lemmata 3 and 5, we derive the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. In the game with complete information a good AA sends a SO
at t=0, while a bad AA sends a SO at t=1. Once the cartel receives a SO it
self-reports. The optimal LP is determined by 1 =
2(1 p)[(1 a)+a]
a
p
(1 )(1 p)L at t=0 and
3 =
2[2(1 a) a]
a(1+)
p
(1 )L at t=1.
The equilibrium of the game with complete information is visualized in Figure
6 below.
Figure 6: Complete information equilibrium: a good AA sends a SO at t=0 while
a bad AA sends a SO at t=1. Firms self-report when they receive a SO by the
AA.
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3.4 Incomplete information: Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we consider the strategic interaction between the AA and the cartel
when they are asymmetrically informed. More precisely, cartelists are uncertain
about the quality of the AAs prima facie evidence. However, they hold some prior
beliefs regarding the strength of the AAs evidence. Particularly, the rms believes
that with probability  (1    ) the AA holds good (poor) quality of prima facie
evidence.
Following Harsanyi [1968] and Kreps and Wilson [1982], we transform the
emerging incomplete information game to a game of imperfect information. To
solve the game we use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).214 For-
mally, a PBE is a strategy prole coupled with a set of beliefs such that: i) the
strategy prole is sequentially rational given beliefs and 2) the system of beliefs
is consistent given the strategy prole. Given that the PBE is a relatively weak
equilibrium concept, we invoke Cho and Kreps [1987] intuitive criterion to restrict
the beliefs for information sets that are o¤-the-equilibrium path.
The PBE are typically classied in two categories, pooling and separating.215
In a pooling equilibrium, all senders choose the same message (action) regardless
of their type. Therefore, the senders message does not convey to the sender any
information regarding its type. For instance, in our game, a pooling equilibrium
is one where both types of the AA send the SO at the same period. This could be
the case if the AA is unwilling to reveal the strength of its prima facie evidence to
the cartel. A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium where senders with di¤erent
types choose di¤erent messages (actions). In our game, a separating equilibrium
is one where the two types of the AA send a SO at di¤erent periods of time. This
could be the case if the AA wants to reveal the strength of its evidence to the
cartel via the timing in which it sends the SO.
Considering the above, we examine whether or not it pays for the AA to reveal
(signal) the strength of its prima facie evidence to the cartel via the time at which
it sends the SO. We are particularly interested in the pooling equilibrium whereby
both types of the AA send a SO at t=0 and unravel the cartel sooner, even when
the evidence the AA retains is weak.
Subsequently we explore the four potential equilibria (in pure strategies):
214Fudenberg and Tirole [1991b] proved that in a multistage game of incomplete information
and with independent types the set of PBE is identical to the set of Sequential equilibria if either
each player has at most two possible types or there are only two periods. For a brief discussion
of the comparison between a PBE and Sequential equilibria see [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a,
pp. 345-350].
215There is also another category; partially pooling (also termed partially separating or hybrid),
whereby all types in a given set of types send a common message, but di¤erent sets of types send
di¤erent messages. In this case, the signal is partially revealing.
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1. Pooling equilibrium whereby both types of the AA send a SO at t=0;
2. Pooling equilibrium whereby both types of the AA send a SO at t=1;
3. Separating equilibrium whereby the good AA sends a SO at t=0, while the
bad AA sends a SO at t=1;
4. Separating equilibrium whereby the good AA sends a SO at t=1, while the
bad AA sends a SO at t=0.
Before we delve into the analysis it is worth restating the beliefs the rms hold
at the two information sets, I1 and I2, at which it has to make a decision in the
game.
Cartels beliefs
good AA bad AA
SO at t=0 q 1  q
SO at t=1 r 1  r
3.4.1 Pooling equilibrium: AA sends a SO at t=0
In this subsection, we investigate whether a pooling equilibrium whereby both
types of the send a SO at t=0 is feasible. Crucially, in a pooling equilibrium the
time in which a SO is sent does not convey or reveal to the cartel any additional
information with regard to the AAs true type. Thus, when both types of the AA
send a SO at t=0, the cartel cannot infer the quality of the prima facie evidence the
AA holds. Thus, posterior and prior beliefs coincide i.e., q =  and 1  q = 1  .
If the rms self-report then they obtain the period collusive prots and pay the
reduced ne:
V R0 =    (1 

2
)a
If, on the contrary, they do not self-report then given their beliefs regarding
the AAs type, their expected payo¤ is:
V N0 =  U
N
0;G + (1   ) UN0;B
Given rmsbeliefs regarding the AAs prima facie evidence, their payo¤ com-
prises of two elements. The rst is the expected payo¤ a rm obtains if it declines
to self-report to a good AA that sends a SO at t=0. The second is the expected
payo¤ a rm obtains if it declines to self-report to a bad AA that sends a SO at
t=0.
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Considering the above the rms self-report at I1 if V R0  V N0 . This inequality
holds if    , where:
 =

 + a(1  
2
)(1  )p(1  )(1  p)L
[(1  a) + a]
hp
(1  )(1  p)L  (1  )(1  p)
i
In words, if the rms believe that the AA is of a good type with a relatively
high probability, greater than the threshold value of  , then they self-report after
receiving a SO at t=0. Note that, when the social harm instigated by the cartel
is su¢ ciently low, and in particular L < 4(1 p)[(1 a) a]
2
a22(1 )  L4, then  >1. In this
case, the pooling BNE whereby both types of AA send a SO at t=0 cannot be
sustained.
Thus, assuming that i) the opportunity cost of e¤ort for a bad AA at t=0 is
su¢ ciently high i.e.,  > , ii) the AA o¤ers a ne discount 3 at I2, so that the
rms self-report at t = 2 regardless of their beliefs and iii) the e¤ort level e
1;B
is
feasible (i.e., e
1;B
< e), we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the incomplete information game the AA commits to a LP such
that  = maxf1,3g. Both types of AA send a SO at t=0. The cartel self-reports
whenever it receives a SO, if  >  and 8r 2 [0; 1].
This pooling PBE satises the intuitive criterion for r = 0. Intuitively, a good
AA does not have any incentives to deviate from its strategy, given that it is a
strictly dominant strategy for a good AA to send a SO at t=0. This implies that if
the cartel members receive a SO at t=1, then it must have been sent by a bad AA.
Therefore, the beliefs o¤-the-equilibrium path must be such that (r; 1 r) = (0; 1).
Corollary 2. The pooling PBE whereby the AA sends a SO at t=0 satises the
intuitive criterion for r = 0.
Comparative statics on  reveal that given rmsbeliefs, it is easier for the AA
to induce the rms to self-report at t=0, even if it is of a bad type, with a more
generous LP (@
 
@
< 0). This implies that the optimal ne discount must be at the
maximum feasible level. The lure of a higher ne discount can be used to facilitate
AAs objective to induce the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the proceed-
ings. Similarly, the more e¤ective the AAs preliminary investigation in detecting
good quality of incriminating evidence, the easier for the AA to compel the cartel
to self-report at t=0. When the AAs preliminary investigation is very e¤ective in
exposing good quality of evidence. Moreover, it is easier to sustain this pooling
equilibrium when the social harm caused by the cartel is higher (@
 
@L
< 0). This is
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attributed to the fact that the AAs optimal e¤ort e
0;G
is higher when confronted
with more serious cartels, implying a lower type II error. The magnitude of the
ne also makes it easier to attain this pooling equilibrium (@
 
@a
< 0). A higher
ne increases the expected ne paid by the cartel in case of conviction by the AA.
Finally, it is also more di¢ cult to obtain this pooling equilibrium when the cartel
is more robust, i.e., it ascribes a higher value to future prots (@
 
@
> 0).216
Corollary 3. Given the cartels prior beliefs regarding the AAs types, it is easier
to sustain the pooling equilibrium whereby the AA sends a SO at t=0 and the
cartel subsequently self-reports with higher i) social harm caused by the cartel,
ii) ne level, iii) ne discount rate and iv) quality of prima facie evidence, and
with lower vi) (expected) cartel duration and iv) discount rate.
As shown above, a higher ne discount rate sharpens rmsincentives to de-
nounce the cartel. In light of this, the analysis suggests that the optimal ne
discount rate is the maximum feasible. This result is consistent with Becker [1968].
Corollary 4. The optimal LP provides the maximum feasible ne to the rst self-
reporting rm.
As remarked in Section 3.3.1, given that the cartel is harmful to society, the
AA strictly prefers to send a SO at t=0 and dissolve the cartel earlier. Thus,
the pooling equilibrium whereby both types of the AA send a SO at t=0 and
the cartel subsequently self-reports is (weakly) superior, from a welfare point of
view, to the complete information equilibrium. This is straightforward since with
incomplete information a bad AA deceives the cartel to self-report in the rst
period. In contrast, the cartel never self-reports to a bad AA, and that is why in
the setting with complete information the bad AA prefers to send a SO at t=1. An
implication of this analysis is that the desistance e¤ects of the LP may enhance
with incomplete information. In other words, when the cartelists are uncertain
about the quality of the AAs prima facie evidence, the AA may fruitfully deceive
the cartel to self-report, even though the strength of its evidence is poor.
From the above analysis we arrive at the following recommendations. Firstly,
the AA, should refrain from revealing the strength of its prima facie evidence.
It is possible to elicit self-reporting even if the AA has weak prima facie evidence
against the cartel. Secondly, the AA should manipulate the cartels prior beliefs or
act strategically in a manner that deceives the cartel regarding the strength of its
216Another interpretation for parameter  is that it reects how long it takes for the AA to
convict the cartel if the latter does not self-report its unlawful conduct. In e¤ect, a higher 
implies a lengthier period to convict the cartel. With this interpretation, a more competent and
e¢ cient AA, can successfully conclude the prosecution of the cartel sooner. Thus, such an AA
can elicit self-reporting at an earlier stage of the proceedings despite having poor evidence.
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Figure 7: Pooling BNE: both types of AA send a SO at t = 0. Firms always
self-report.
evidence. The more biased the cartels beliefs, the easier to induce self-reporting at
an earlier stage of the prosecutorial proceedings, despite having weak prima facie
evidence. Thirdly, the AA should prioritize the prosecution of more serious cartels,
i.e., those cartels that cause a greater harm to society. As remarked before, it is
easier for the AA to compel more serious cartels to self-report, in spite of having
poor quality of prima facie evidence.217
The above analysis is visualized in Figure 7 below.
3.4.2 Pooling equilibrium: AA sends a SO at t=1
As with the previous pooling equilibrium, the SO does not communicate to the
cartel any additional information regarding the AAs types (or equivalently the
AAs strength of evidence). Consequently, the cartel cannot revise its prior beliefs.
In this case, posterior beliefs at information set I2 are such that: (r; 1   r) =
( ; 1    ). Given these beliefs, if both rms self-report after receiving a SO at
t=1, then each rm obtain the period collusive prots and pay a discounted ne,
which takes into account the cartels record:
V R1 =    a(1 

2
)

 +



217To illustrate the analysis consider the following numerical example. Suppose that a = 1,
 = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:6, L = 50;  = 100: Then, our equilibrium analysis predicts that
 = 0:93. If  = 1 (full amnesty) then  = 0:84.
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If the rms do not self-report at t=1, then the expected payo¤ is:
V N1 =  U
N
1;G + (1   )UN1;B
The rst (second) element is the expected payo¤ to the cartel given its beliefs
that the SO is issued by a good (bad) AA. By construction of the model and
to simplify the analysis we assume that the ne discount rate is such that the
cartel always self-reports at I2, regardless of the cartels beliefs. This requires
 = 3. Moreover, from Section 3.4.1 we know that the cartel does not self-report
at information set I1 if the rms strongly believe that the SO was issued by a bad
AA. In particular, the cartel declines to self-report if q <  . To begin with, suppose
that q <  . Now, consider the AAs incentives given the (anticipated) cartelists
behavior at information sets I1 and I2. Notice that the bad AA would never have
any incentive to deviate and send a SO at t=0. This is because the quality of prima
facie evidence is poor, and thus the cost of prosecutorial e¤ort is prohibitively
high. This is not the case for a good AA though. Given the rmsbeliefs and
their anticipated behaviour at I1, the AA would prefer to send a SO at t=0 if
WN0;G > W
N
1;G. This inequality holds if p < p, where
p =
L25 + (L2 + 2L)4 + (1 + 2L  L2)3 + (1  2L  L2)2 + (2L  1)   1
4L
In words, if the AA has poor quality of prima facie evidence, then given the rms
beliefs, it will be better for the AA to postpone the SO for t=1. It is too costly
and risky to convict the cartel in t=0. If, on the other hand, the AA holds good
quality of prima facie evidence, then it is better to send a SO at t=0, even if the
rms decline to self-report. The cost of postponing issuing the SO is greater than
the risk of erroneously exonerating the cartel at t=0.
Thus, assuming that i) the opportunity cost of e¤ort for a bad AA at t=0 is
su¢ ciently high i.e.,  > , ii) the AA o¤ers a ne discount 3 at I2, so that the
rms self-report at t = 2 regardless of their beliefs and iii) the e¤ort level e
1;B
is
feasible (i.e., e
1;B
< e), we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In the incomplete information game both types of the AA send
a SO at t=1 and the cartel self-reports if the cartels beliefs are such that r =  
and q <  and the quality of the AAs prima facie evidence is such that p < p.
Moreover, the LP species a ne discount 3.
Given the cartels beliefs at the information set I1 (o¤-the-equilibrium), the
pooling BNE whereby both types of AA send a SO at t=1 satises the intuitive
criterion. As mentioned before only a good AA would have incentives to deviate
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from this pooling BNE. But if the rmsbeliefs are such that q <  , the good AA
complies with the equilibrium strategy prescription.
Corollary 5. The pooling PBE whereby the AA sends a SO at t=1 and the cartel
self-reports satises the intuitive criterion.
The above analysis is visualized in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8: Pooling BNE: both types of AA send a SO at t=1. At t=1 rmsself-
report only when they receive a SO from a good AA. Firms always self-report at
t=2.
3.4.3 Separating equilibrium: good AA sends a SO at t=0, bad AA
sends a SO at t=1
To begin with, suppose that the good AA sends a SO at t=0, while the bad
AA sends a SO at t=1. Then, the rms update their beliefs, given that both
information sets at which it has to make a decision, I1 and I2, are on the equilibrium
path. Using the Bayes rule the rmsposterior beliefs are: q = 1 and r = 1. Given
their beliefs, and provided that i) the LP is such that  > maxf1; 3g, and ii)
e¤ort level e
1;B
is feasible, i.e., e
1;B
 e, the rms self-report regardless of the
period in which the SO is sent by the AA, i.e., at both information sets I1 and
I2. Notice, however, that given that the cartel self-reports at information set I1,
a bad AA has an incentive to deviate and send a SO at t=0 rather than at t=1,
and thus unravel the cartel sooner. Therefore, this cannot be a separating BNE.
The above analysis is visualized in Figure 9 below.
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Figure 9: Separating equilibrium: a good type of AA sends a SO at t = 0, while a
bad type of AA sends a SO at t = 1. Firms self-report regardless of the strength
of the AAs evidence.
3.4.4 Separating equilibrium: good AA sends a SO at t=1, bad AA
sends a SO at t=0
Suppose that the bad AA sends a SO at t=0, while the good AA sends a SO
at t=1. Then, the cartel updates its beliefs, given that both information sets at
which it has to make a decision, I1 and I2, are on the equilibrium path. Using
the Bayes rule the rmsposterior beliefs are: q = 0 and r = 1. Given their
beliefs, and provided that i) the LP o¤ers a ne discount of 1, and ii) e¤ort levels
e
1B
= 0 and e
2G
 e, the rms decline to self-report at I1, while it self-reports at
I2. Thus, if a SO is send at t=0 by a bad AA the cartel remains unconvicted since
the probability of a type II error is 1. Notice, however, that given that the cartel
self-reports at information set I2, a bad AA has an incentive to deviate and send
a SO at t=1, and thus unravel the cartel. Therefore, this cannot be a separating
BNE.
The above analysis is visualized in Figure 9 below.
3.5 Concluding remarks
A prominent feature characterizing the strategic interaction between an AA and a
cartel is the existence of asymmetric information. The latter can be two sided. On
the one hand, rms know whether they participate in a cartel while, on the other
hand, an AA knows the strength of its evidence against the cartel. Unlike previous
literature, this paper explores the implications of a scenario where an AA has an
informational advantage vis-a-vis a cartel. In particular, within the framework of
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Figure 10: Separating equilibrium: a good AA sends a SO at t=1 while a bad AA
sends a SO at t=0. Firms self-report only at t=2.
a signalling game, we address whether the AA can exploit its informational lead
and deceive the cartel about the strength of its evidence, ultimately inducing self-
reporting. A crucial assumption of our study is that the AA makes its decisions
regarding the intensity of its investigations on a case-by-case basis, after reviewing
some preliminary evidence concerning the inspected cartel. This is a realistic and
desirable assumption and it reects the actual practice of many AAs in various
jurisdictions. Importantly, it allows to overcome potential dynamic inconsistency
problems which may arise ex-post if the AA pre-commits to a certain prosecutorial
e¤ort.218
The role of the message in our signalling game is played by the time wherein
the AA sends a SO and initiates the formal proceedings against the cartel. An AA
with better quality of evidence prefers to send a SO to the cartel at an earlier stage
of the prosecution proceedings. This is because the risk of erroneously exonerating
the cartel, if it declines to self-report, is not as high for an AA which retains high
quality of evidence compared to an AA which has poor quality of evidence. In this
context, our equilibrium analysis shows that it is feasible for the AA to deceive
the cartel and induce it to self-report even though it has decient incriminating
evidence.
A logical question that arises is why the AA does not scrutinize all possible
evidence before issuing a SO. Apart form the obvious cost of doing so, the analysis
of this study suggests that it is not essential for the AA to process all feasible
218Although issuing a SO is the standard procedural rule in the EU, the scenario we consider
can be easily tailored to reect the procedural rules in other jurisdictions. For instance, the
grand jury plea bargaining system in the US, which strongly favors early settlements.
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evidence in order to secure a conviction. By behaving in a strategic manner, the AA
can elicit self-reporting by colluding rms even if it has poor prima facie evidence.
We do not assert that an AA should write whatever comes to mind or lie in the
SO or in the press releases219. What we claim is that the AA should be prudent
in the way it lays down its evidence against the cartel. Additionally, it must be
very careful in the approach it sets forth the arguments on which it will base its
preliminary conclusion. Di¤erent ways of presenting or making an allegation may
concretely impact on a cartels beliefs, and, ultimately, its behavior.220 This is
because the cartel is uncertain about the strength of the AAs evidence. The fact
that colluding rms receive a SO at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process
may confound them about the AAs evidence. They know that a good AA prefers
to send a SO at an earlier stage of the prosecutorial process, but, at the same time,
they know that a bad AA has potent incentives to mimic the conduct of a good AA.
A strategic AA can take advantage of its informational lead. More formally, it can
convert a separating equilibrium (which an early SO would uniquely signal strong
evidence) into a pooling equilibrium. With the lure of a su¢ ciently generous ne
discount, the AA can fruitfully undermine the cartels vulnerable internal trust.
As a result, colluding rms race to the AA in order to be the rst to self-report
and benet from the LP.
The role of a cartels (prior) beliefs is of pivotal importance. The more biased
these beliefs are towards compelling evidence, the easier it is for the AA to induce
the cartel to self-report at an earlier stage of the antitrust proceedings. A critical
question that arises is where these beliefs come from and how they are formed.
Realistically, these beliefs are molded on the basis of an AAs competency in
detecting and processing the evidence collected from its own investigations. In this
respect, we can distinguish between two types of AAs: profound and supercial.
A profound AA, which opens only a few investigations, may be fruitful in exposing
high quality of incriminating evidence. On the other hand, a supercial AA, which
opens a large number of investigations, may not be as competent as a profound AA
in detecting good quality of evidence or ltering the collected (crude and bulky)
evidence.221 Clearly, the depth of an AAs investigations inuences the cartels
219For instance, see the case of the large supermarkets cartel in the UK. In that particular case,
the O¢ ce of Fair Trading was forced to make an unprecedented public apology and pay damages
to Morrisons, after admitting that a press release (OFT, press release 134/07, 20/09/2007)
deceptively upgraded the provisional ndings into claims of price-xing.
220A similar argument holds for the announcements an AA releases during the investigations
(e.g. after a dawn raid). However, this issue is more subtle. An AA must protect suspected
rms from speculations or rumors. At the same time, the AA may leave suspected rms with a
nuance of ambiguity with respect to the detected evidence.
221A similar argument holds for experienced AAs v. inexperienced AAs. This is consistent with
Hinloopen [2003] who argues that the AA can increase the likelihood of detecting cartels if it
creates a reputation for exposing cartels.
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beliefs. This reasoning is consistent with the ndings of a recent experimental
study by Dijkstra et al. [2011]. The authors show that self-reporting is signicantly
higher with a profound AA. Thus, a policy implication of our study is that AAs
should open a few profound investigations rather than a large number of supercial
investigations. A meticulous AA which profoundly performs its investigations may
be able to establish a reputation of being e¤ective in winning the cases it prosecutes
to courts. When such reputation is established, the AA can exploit it by issuing
an early SO even with weak evidence. As long as colluding rms self-report, so the
weakness of evidence never becomes public knowledge, the AAs reputation will
not be undermined. So, an early establishment of reputation with a few profound
cases is essential.
The LP plays a critical role too. As in Motta and Polo [2003], the LP is a
powerful tool to enhance welfare, even after an investigation is launched in the
market. We claim that, contrary to the existing literature, rms incentives to
apply for leniency when an investigation is underway are potent. The argument is
valid as long as the cartel members are unaware about the strength of the AAs
incriminating evidence. In particular, we show that the more generous the LP,
the more pronounced the cartel desistance e¤ects. This implication is in accord
with previous literature advocating for su¢ ciently generous ne discount rates to
self-reporting rm(s). Moreover, it underpins the recent amendment of the EU
LP so that to provide amnesty to the rst rm to denounce the cartel, even if an
investigation is underway.
The deterrence e¤ects of LPs are not explicitly modeled in our study. Nonethe-
less, the argument or recommendation for profound market investigations (pro-
found AAs), which impacts on cartels beliefs, indirectly hints to the positive car-
tel deterrence e¤ects. The underlying mechanism of our signalling game implies
that the investigation resources of the AA can be e¢ ciently used to increase the
frequency (number) of investigations, and thus the e¤ectiveness of the leniency
programme in deterring cartels.
In our study, self-reporting occurs only if the AA credibly threatens cartels
with a su¢ ciently high prosecutorial e¤ort. Thus, the AA can successfully induce
colluding rms to self-report if it has a su¢ ciently high budget to nance its
investigations. Nonetheless, since the AA does not commit in advance to a certain
prosecutorial e¤ort, its budget may remain under-spent. The fact that the budget
is unspent may create a temptation for a government to cut the AAs budget. The
analysis of this paper suggests that this would undermine both self-reporting and
deterrence. In addition, the AA can strategically overstate the resources to be
invested in the case at hand.222 Although the AAs budget is publicly available
222For instance, it can announce the total number of employees to handle the case including
the administration sta¤, rather than the number of case handlers and experts.
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and accessible, the resources of the AA to be directed in a particular case is not
public information.
Our study also supports the recent direction of AAs in various jurisdictions
to prioritize the prosecution of more serious cartels in terms of the gravity of the
harm caused to society. All the same, the more harmful the cartel, the higher the
cost of an erroneous decision by the AA. Thus, an AA aiming to minimize the
social cost of cartels would intensify its prosecutorial e¤ort when confronted with
more serious cartels. This implies a higher probability of conviction, and thus a
higher expected ne, which makes self-reporting more appealing.
As a nal remark, we highlight the fact that the signalling game of this paper
can apply to the US (and Canada as well) grand jury plea bargaining system and
more generally to the enforcement of generic law (e.g. criminal law).
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Chapter 4: Optimal Leniency Programme with
Detection Avoidance
4.1 Introduction
The economic literature on law enforcement crystallizes that crime deterrence de-
pends on the expected ne. The latter is determined by the product of the actual
ne and the probability of detection.223 A prominent limitation to the e¤ectiveness
of public policies in the area of crime deterrence is avoidance. In general, avoid-
ance involves e¤ort by violators aimed at decreasing the expected ne by reducing
either the probability of detection or the magnitude of the ne if convicted.224 De-
tection avoidance activities are costly for violators. Essentially, the cost of e¤ort to
avoid detection constitutes an additional component to the expected ne. To this
extend, such activities inuence the mechanics of deterrence, and, in consequence,
the optimal enforcement policy mix.225
Although avoidance and its social cost play a pivotal role in the conventional
literature on (generic) law enforcement, it has been given very little attention by
the economic literature on antitrust law enforcement. Avoidance is undoubtedly
a widespread phenomenon and it seems to be a reasonable strategy for rms,
especially when the stakes from collusion are high. Just as an antitrust authority
(or more generally an enforcement agency) invests resources to monitor markets
and uncover cartels, colluding rms invest in avoiding that detection.
Detection avoidance include all activities that inuence the probability of cartel
detection (e.g., meetings in exotic resorts, concealment of incriminating evidence,
use of encryption mechanisms, hire third parties to organize and administer the car-
tel, etc.). The rms that engage in such activities incur a direct cost. Importantly,
the level of the cost depends on the intensity of rmse¤ort to avoid detection.
This type of avoidance activities needs to be distinguished from strategic rms
behavior which may indirectly inuence the probability of detection. For instance,
223For a survey of the literature see Garoupa [1997] and Polinsky and Shavell [2000].
224Avoidance activities encompass various expenditures engaged by violators in order to reduce
their exposure to the risk of punishment. For instance, installing radar detectors to avoid speeding
tickets, lobbying politicians to relax the enforcement of regulations, bribing an enforcement agent,
destroying or concealing incriminating evidence, investing in costly litigations.
225For instance, Malik [1990] maintains that high nes may exacerbate socially costly detection
avoidance activities. Thus, he argues that nes should not simply be set as high as possible,
contrary to Becker [1968]. Moreover, Nussim and Tabbach [2009] show that a more severe ne
may lead to more crime, since avoidance and crime are generally complements. Similarly, Jensen
et al. [2012] show that a tougher ne policy may lead to more severe crime being committed.
Finally, Innes [2001] establishes an additional benet of self-reporting schemes when avoidance
is possible, beyond those identied by Kaplow and Shavell [1994]. More precisely, those violators
that self-report do not engage in socially wasteful detection avoidance activities.
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rms anticipate that the detection probability is function of the price changes, so
they design a prudent price sequence that avoid raising suspicions to consumers
or antitrust authorities about the cartel.226
There is empirical evidence documenting that colluding rms undertake con-
siderable e¤orts to avoid detection by antitrust authorities. According to Stephan
[2010] e¤orts to conceal a cartel include: destruction of incriminating evidence and
other abuses of evidentiary rules and procedures, cover-up of evidence, meetings
in luxury hotels, cook of accounting books, use of encrypted messages, litigation
e¤ort, etc.227
Despite signicant advancements to the economic literature on leniency pro-
grammes, the inuence of rmsdetection avoidance activities on the design of
leniency programmes has not been adequately explored. A failure to take into
account avoidance when designing leniency policies entails a real risk of corroding
rmsincentives to self-report their unlawful conduct.
In this paper, we extend the analysis by Chen and Rey [2012] to incorporate
rmse¤ort to avoid detection. The major objective is to explore the impact of
rmsdecisions to engage in detection avoidance activities on the leniency pro-
gramme that achieves the optimal level of cartel deterrence. We show that the
intensity of rmsavoidance e¤ort increases with the frequency of investigations
and the level of the ne and decreases with the cost of avoidance e¤ort. More-
over, we demonstrate that the optimal ne discount rate depends positively on the
severity of the ne and negatively on the probability of investigation and the cost
of avoidance activities. Contrary to Chen and Rey [2012], we show that when the
ne is relatively low and the cost of avoidance e¤ort relatively high no leniency
should be o¤ered. Finally, we show that a leniency programme that fails to take
into consideration rmsdecisions to undertake e¤ort to avoid detection is subopti-
mal, in the sense that it results in under-deterrence. These results are particularly
interesting and useful for the policy designers. More broadly, the paper contributes
to the theoretical literature on the design of optimal leniency programmes.
226In Harrington [2004, 2005] and Chen and Harrington [2007], the probability of cartel detec-
tion depends on rmsintertemporal pricing decisions. In particular, large price movements raise
more concerns to buyers and antitrust authorities about collusion, implying a higher probability
of detection.
227See, for instance, the recent decisions by the European Commission: COMP 39.437 - TV and
computer monitor tubes; COMP 39.125 - Car glass; COMP 38,823 - Elevators and escalators;
COMP 38.899 - Gas insulated switchgear ; COMP 36.490 - Graphite electrodes.
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4.1.1 Relevant literature
This paper is related to the economic literature on detection avoidance228 and
leniency programmes229.
Malik [1990] provides the rst systematic study of the implications of detection
avoidance for the design of law enforcement. The author concludes that contrary
to Becker [1968], the ne should not be set at its maximum feasible level. This is
because a higher ne triggers more socially costly avoidance e¤ort by o¤enders.230
The interplay between avoidance and crime is explored by Nussim and Tabbach
[2009]. Contrary to Malik [1990] who assumes that o¤enders choice of crime is a
binary decision, the author allows for di¤erent levels of crime to be committed.
An essential insight of Nussim and Tabbach [2009] is that crime and avoidance
are generally complements: more crime induces more avoidance and vice-versa.
Intuitively, more crime increases the marginal benets of investments in avoidance,
which reduces the marginal cost of engaging to criminal activities.
Innes [2001] extends the analysis by Malik [1990] when criminals can self-report
their illegal act in exchange of a reduced ne. His analysis highlights another
benet of self-reporting schemes, namely, avoidance costs are reduced. This is
because those criminals who self-report do not engage in socially costly avoidance
activities.231
A distinguishing characteristic of the papers discussed above is that they con-
sider non-repeated single crimes committed by individuals. Below we discuss some
papers which deal with repeated crimes committed by groups of individuals, such
as cartels.
Avramovich [2010] explores the optimal allocation of colluding rmsresources
to productive e¤ort that reduces the cost of production and avoidance e¤ort that
decreases the probability of cartel detection. The author shows that the optimal
allocation of rmsresources depends on the strictness of the antitrust policy (mag-
nitude of the ne and frequency of investigations). A more severe antitrust policy
has two e¤ects. On the one hand, it increases the cost of collusion and, thus, en-
hance deterrence. On the other hand, it increases the resources devoted to unpro-
ductive avoidance activities (equivalently, it increases the productive ine¢ ciency)
and, thus, reduce welfare. Importantly, Avramovich [2010] demonstrates that a
su¢ ciently generous leniency programme can attain the same level of deterrence
228For a lucid survey on detection avoidance and enforcement theory see Sanchirico [2011]
229For an excellent literature review on leniency programmes see Spagnolo [2008].
230However, Langlais [2008] shows that when criminals e¤orts to avoid detection and the en-
forcement agencys e¤ort to detect crime are strategic complements, then the maximum feasible
ne can be optimal. In particular, it is optimal to set the ne at its maxumum feasible level
when criminals avoidance e¤ort is more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of the ne.
231Interestingly, Innes [2001] shows that Beckers rule for setting the ne at its maximum feasible
level is restored.
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with high nes, but at a lower cost, in terms of rmsproductive ine¢ ciencies.
In a recent paper, Jensen et al. [2012] investigate the relationship between
punishment and the severity of the crime in the context of antitrust enforcement.
Contrary to Nussim and Tabbach [2009], the severity of the crime is endogenous.
The authors show that if colluding rms can engage in detection avoidance activi-
ties, then a tougher punishment may lead to higher cartel overcharges. Intuitively,
when the overcharge and the ne are positively related, there is a trade-o¤between
the benet from a higher overcharge and the cost from a higher expected ne.
Thus, if a higher ne leads to more avoidance activity, and, thereby, a lower prob-
ability of detection, then it may also lead the cartel to attain a higher overcharge
in equilibrium. This result also holds when the portfolio of policy instruments
includes a leniency programme. Similar to Aubert et al. [2006], Buccirossi and
Spagnolo [2006b] and Motchenkova and Leliefeld [2010], the leniency programme
provides a credible device to thwart defections from the illegal cartel.232
The economic literature on leniency programmes has proliferated over the last
decade after the pioneer contributions by Motta and Polo [2003] and Spagnolo
[2004]. A general nding of the relevant literature is that by eroding a cartels in-
ternal trust, leniency programmes may evoke substantial desistance and deterrence
e¤ects (e.g. Motta and Polo [2003], Spagnolo [2004], Ellis and Wislon [2003] and
Harrington [2008]). The direction and magnitude of these e¤ects depend on the
level of market concentration (Ellis and Wislon [2003]), the degree of evidence het-
erogeneity (Feess and Walzl [2004] and Silbye [2010]), the heterogeneity in rms
market shares (Motchenkova and Leliefeld [2010]), whether nes are xed or pro-
portional to the accumulated collusive prots (Motchenkova [2004]), whether the
probability of cartel detection deterministically or stochastically changes over time
(Hinloopen [2003] and Harrington [2008]) and whether the antitrust policy instru-
ments (probability of detection and penalties) are endogenous to rmspricing
behaviour (Chen and Harrington [2007]). Nevertheless, leniency programmes are
not unambiguously optimal. Wrongly designed leniency programmes may exacer-
bate collusive behaviour or provoke cartel formation (e.g. Motta and Polo [2003],
Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006a], Aubert et al. [2006], Motchenkova and Leliefeld
[2010] and Jensen et al. [2012]). More recently, Chen and Rey [2012] explore the
trade-o¤ between greater deterrence and lower desistance. On the one hand, a
more generous ne discount sharpens colluding rmsincentives to defect and self-
report to the antitrust authority (desistance e¤ect). On the other hand, rms can
strategically exploit the generosity of the leniency programme and form a cartel
that in the absence of the leniency programme would be unprotable (deterrence
e¤ect).
232The authors demonstrate that this counterintuitive result holds as long as rms cannot retain
illegal prots after detection.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the
game and its main assumptions; Section 4.3 presents the equilibrium analysis and
derives the optimal leniency programme; Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
Consider two symmetric rms which play an innitely repeated game. In partic-
ular, the two rms, which maximize their expected payo¤ in each period, decide
whether to collude or compete in the presence of antitrust enforcement. To sim-
plify the analysis we consider a stationary antitrust policy which treats all markets
alike.233 The net payo¤ from collusion equals  for each rm. A rm that devi-
ates in the market obtains 2. We assume that rms use the same discount factor
 2 (0; 1). To sustain collusion rms adopt grim-trigger strategies. That is, once a
deviation occurs, rms revert to cut-throat competition forever. For simplicity, the
competitive prots are normalized to zero. In a context without antitrust enforce-
ment, collusion can be sustained if   1
2
. Thus, in order to have an interesting
game we assume that   1
2
, implying that collusion is a real concern.
The starting point for the analysis with antitrust enforcement is that the cartel
leaves incriminating evidence which can be exposed by the antitrust authority. To
keep things simple we assume that the evidence lasts only for one period, thus the
cartel cannot be prosecuted for its past actions.234 Due to budget constraints the
antitrust authority cannot monitor all markets. The probability of inspecting a
particular market is p 2 (0; 1). This probability reects the antitrust authoritys
budget or the e¤ectiveness of its investigations. Furthermore, each colluding rm
can invest resources ai  0, i = 1; 2, in avoidance activities to reduce the prob-
ability of cartel detection. Thus, the e¤ective probability of detection of a cartel
depends on the exogenous probability of rms inspection and on the endoge-
nous probability of exposing incriminating evidence after an inspection at rms
premises. In particular, the e¤ective probability of detection is given by:
~p(a1; a2; p) =
p
ea1+a2
(5)
233The assumption of stationarity implies that the probability of investigating a market in every
period is the same. Moreover, the level of the ne for convicted cartels is also the same regardless
of the number of previous convictions. Essentially, we abstract from the possibility of tighter
monitoring of detected cartels and increased nes for repeated o¤enders.
234Existing literature reveals that relaxing this assumption gives rise to an additional e¤ect
of leniency programmes. A rm that deviates in the market can simultaneously self-report in
order to preempt other rms from self-reporting in the future. Spagnolo [2004] calls this e¤ect
the protection form punishment e¤ectwhile Harrington [2008] calls it the deviator e¤ect. In
principle, this e¤ect mitigates the costs associated with a deviation from the collusive agreement
and, thereby, make collusion easier to sustain. See also Chen and Harrington [2007].
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It depends negatively on the intensity of rmsavoidance e¤orts (a1 and a2)
and positively on the exogenous probability of market investigation (p). More-
over, the probability of detection has the following properties: (1) lim
ai;aj!0
~p = p, (2)
lim
ai;aj!1
~p = 0, (3) lim
ai!0
~p = p
eaj
< p, (4) @~p
@ai
< 0, (5) @
2~p
@a2i
> 0, (6) @
2~p
@ai@aj
> 0 and (7)
@2~p
@ai@p
< 0. In words, property (1) implies that when rms do not invest at all in
avoidance activities the probability of detection equals the exogenous probability
of inspection. Property (2) implies that when rms invest an innite amount of
resources in avoidance, the probability of detection tends to zero. Property (3)
implies that rms i avoidance e¤ort is productive, in the sense that it decreases
the e¤ective probability of detection, even if rm j exerts no e¤ort to avoid detec-
tion. The fact that one rm does not invest resources to avoid detection does not
imply that the other rms avoidance activity will be futile in reducing the risk
of detection. Property (4) implies that the probability of detection decreases with
the amount of resources a rm invests in avoidance e¤ort. Property (5) implies
that the marginal productivity of a rms avoidance e¤ort diminishes as it invests
more resources in detection avoidance activities. In particular, the e¤ectiveness of
each unit of additional e¤ort to avoidance activities for rm i decreases with the
amount of e¤ort already made by rm i. Property (6) implies that the productiv-
ity of rms i avoidance e¤ort increases in rms j e¤ort to avoid detection.235 In
e¤ect, this assumption implies that rmsdecisions with regard to the intensity of
their avoidance e¤orts are strategic substitutes.236 Properties (5) and (6) imply
that the rmsdetection avoidance technology exhibits diminishing returns. Prop-
erty (7) implies that the e¤ectiveness of antitrust enforcement and rmsavoidance
235One way to think about this property is the following. Suppose that both rms retain
duplicate copies of hard incriminating evidence. The antitrust authority can detect incriminating
evidence from both rms. Thus, rms must destroy the same pieces of evidence; otherwise the
antitrust authority can discover the evidence destroyed by one rm from the other rm, even
though with a lower probability. In this situation, rms e¤orts to avoid detection are more
fruitful when both rms destroy the same pieces of evidence. The more e¤ort rm j exerts to
destroy the incriminating evidence it retains, the more likely it is for rm i to destroy the same
pieces of evidence as rm j does. Put it di¤erently, the productivity of rms i e¤ort to destroy
the incriminating evidence increases as rm j destroys more evidence.
236This contrasts with Avramovich [2010] who assumes that rms i e¤ort to avoid detection
becomes less productive as rm j invests more resources in detection avoidance. The latter implies
that rmsavoidance e¤orts are strategic complements. One justication for this assumption is
that rms retain distinct pieces of incriminating evidence. Thus, the pieces of evidence destroyed
by rm i cannot be discover by the antitrust authoritys investigations in the rms j premises.
Moreover, the more pieces of evidence rm i destroys, the less evidence remains available to be
discovered by the antitrust authority. Therefore, the productivity of a rms e¤ort to destroy
evidence (avoid detection) is decreasing in both, its own e¤ort and the other rms e¤ort.
It is worth noting that the di¤erence between the two papers lies in the adopted functional
form of the e¤ective probability of detection.
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activities are related. The level of one factor inuences the marginal e¤ectiveness
of the other factor. In particular, rmsavoidance e¤orts become less productive in
reducing the probability of detection when the frequency of inspection increases,
and vice versa.237 In e¤ect, this implies that rmsavoidance e¤orts and pub-
lic e¤ort in monitoring and detecting illegal cartels are strategic complements in
the e¤ective probability of detection. A consequence of this property is that the
elasticity of the e¤ective probability of detection with respect to the exogenous
probability of detection is one, i.e., @~p
@p
p
~p
= 1.238
The cost of avoidance e¤ort is:
Ci(ai) = ke
ai
where k = 0 if ai = 0 and k > 0 if ai > 0. Parameter k reects the e¢ ciency of
rmsavoidance technology. A higher k implies a higher unit cost of e¤ort. Note
that the technology of avoidance exhibits decreasing returns to scale; the cost of
avoidance e¤ort is increasing at an increasing rate as rms invest more resources
in detection avoidance activities, i.e., @Ci(ai)
@ai
> 0 and @
2Ci(ai)
@a2i
> 0, 8ai > 0.239
When the cartel is detected, either because of the antitrust authoritys own
investigations or because of a leniency application, rms must pay a ne. The
leniency programme provides a ne discount  only to the rst self-reporting rm.
Thus, the rst informant pays only (1 )F , while the other rm pays the full ne
F . If both rms simultaneously lodge a leniency application, then each rm pays
an expected ne (1   
2
)F . The antitrust policy parameters are p, F and . To
simplify the analysis and focus on the ne discount rate that achieves the optimal
level of deterrence, p and F are exogenously xed.
In each period, the game unfolds as follows:
237As we will see later, a consequence of this property of the e¤ective probability of detection is
that rmsavoidance e¤orts are inuenced by both, the antitrust authoritys enforcement e¤orts
(reected in p) and the level of the ne (F ).
238Langlais [2008] show that when the private expenditures in avoidance and the public ex-
penditures in the detection of criminals are complements, then setting the ne at its maximum
feasible level is optimal contrary to Malik [1990]. Intuitively, although a higher ne increases
wasteful avoidance, a proportionate decrease in enforcement e¤orts reduces avoidance even more.
A requirement for this result is that criminals must be more sensitive to the risk of detection
than to the severity of the ne, i.e., the elasticity of the criminals e¤ort to avoid detection with
respect to public monitoring is at least a high as the elasticity of the criminals e¤ort with respect
to the ne. The latter requirement is also satised in the model of this paper. This may o¤er a
justication for letting F denote the maximum feasible ne in this paper.
239The adopted functional forms of the e¤ective probability of detection and the cost function
associated with detection avoidance e¤ort ensure a well-dened optimization problem.
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 Stage 0 (Cartel formation) - Firms decide whether to collude or not. If at
least one rm chooses not to collude, rms compete and the game ends for
that period; otherwise:
 Stage 1 (Avoidance) - Each rm decides how many resources to invest in
avoidance activities.
 Stage 2 (Defection)- Each rm decides whether to comply or not to the illegal
agreement. These decisions become known to rival rms at the end of the
period.
 Stage 3 (Leniency application and Policy implementation) - Firms decide
whether to self-report their illegal act to the antitrust authority. If at least
one rm self-reports, the cartel is detected with probability 1. Otherwise,
the cartel is detected with probability ~p.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
4.3.1 Normal collusion
When a leniency programme is not available, rms cannot benet from self-
reporting to the antitrust authority. Thus, in every period each rm receives
collusive prots  and pay a ne F if the cartel is detected by the antitrust
authority. Moreover, rms pay the cost related to their avoidance e¤ort. The
expected discounted value of collusion is:
VN =
 

p
eai+aj

F   keai
1   , for i = 1; 2 and i 6= j
where the subscript N stands for normal collusion. Similar to Chen and Rey
[2012], we dene normal collusionas the degree of collusion that can be sustained
when a leniency programme is not included in the set of policy instruments.
Denition (Normal collusion). Normal collusion is dened as the level of collusion
that could be sustained in an environment with antitrust enforcement without a
leniency programme.
Firms choose their avoidance e¤ort in order to maximize the value of collusion:
ai = argmax
ai
VN , for i = 1; 2 and i 6= j
From the above optimization problem we derive the best response function of
rm i:
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ai (aj) =
1
2

ln

pF
k

  aj

Note that @a

i (aj)
@aj
=  1
2
< 0, i.e., rms detection avoidance activities are
strategic substitutes. The higher rms j avoidance e¤ort, the lower the marginal
contribution to rms i prots of each unit of owns avoidance e¤ort.
Given the symmetry of the game, the equilibrium avoidance e¤ort of each rm
is:
a = a1 = a2 =
1
3
ln

pF
k

(6)
This optimal level of avoidance e¤ort balances the marginal contribution of each
unit of avoidance e¤ort to rms prots, through a reduction in the probability of
detection, and the marginal cost of an additional of e¤ort.240
Note that if the ne is su¢ ciently low, then rms do not invest resources in
avoidance activities at all. Moreover, observe that the intensity of rmsavoid-
ance activity increases, at a diminishing rate, with the antitrust policy parameters
p and F .241 This is intuitive, as the higher the (exogenous) frequency of an inves-
tigation (or the magnitude of the ne), the more resources colluding rms invest
in avoidance activities in order to decrease the expected ne. Furthermore, rms
investment in avoidance activities decrease (at a increasing rate) with the cost of
avoidance e¤ort.
Lemma 1. Firmsoptimal avoidance e¤ort is a =

1
3
ln
 
pF
k

0
if F > k
p
otherwise
. It
decreases with k and increases with p and F .
Taking the above into consideration, the present value of the expected payo¤
with normal collusion is:
VN =
  2p 13F 13k 23
1   (7)
When a leniency programme is not available a rm can only deviate in the
market. Thus, the value of deviation is:
240The second order su¢ cient conditions for a maximum are satised: @
2VN
@a2i
=
 pF
e
ai+aj
 keai
1  < 0,
8ai  0. Moreover, uniqueness is guaranteed: @2VN@a2i +
@2VN
@aiaj
=
 pF
e
ai+aj
 keai
1  +
 pF
eai+aj (1 ) < 0;
8a  0. Finally, stability is guaranteed: @a1(a2)@a2
@a2(a1)
@a1
= (  12 )(  12 ) < 1. For the conditions that
ensure uniqueness and stability see [Vives, 2001, p. 47 and p. 51].
241All comparative statics and calculations can be found in Appendix E.
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V d = 2 

p
ea

i+a

j

F   keai , for i = 1; 2 and i 6= j
Deviation from normal collusion is not protable if the collusive prots are
su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  > N  2p
1
3 F
1
3 k
2
3
2 1 . When the per-rm collusive prots are
lower than N , the temptation to renegade from the collusive agreement under-
mines the trust between rms and, thus, the cartel cannot be sustained. Notice
that N increases (at a diminishing rate) with p, F and k. In words, it is harder
to sustain collusion with a higher frequency of market investigations, magnitude
of the ne and cost of avoidance e¤ort.
Lemma 2. Normal collusion is sustained if  > N , where N = 2p
1
3 F
1
3 k
2
3
2 1 . It is
harder to sustain normal collusion with higher p, F and k.
4.3.2 A Leniency Programme is available
When a leniency programme is available, then a rm that deviates from the col-
lusive agreement can run to the antitrust authority and self-report in exchange of
a lower ne. The value for a deviant rm that self-reports is:
V dr = 2  (1  )F
Thus, with a leniency programme, the optimal deviation depends on the level
of the ne discount. In particular, a deviating rm would not only deviate in
the market but also self-report if V dr > V d. This inequality holds when the ne
discount rate is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  > 1  2p
1
3 k
1
3
F 2=3
 . Note that  increases (at a
diminishing rate) with F while it decreases (at an increasing rate) with p and k. In
words, the higher the frequency of market investigations or the cost of avoidance
e¤ort and the lower the ne, the more attractive a leniency application after a
deviation in the market would be. Intuitively, an increase in the ne intensies
rmsengagement in avoidance activities that reduce the probability of detection.
Given that avoidance e¤ort is costly, a more generous ne discount should be
o¤ered by the antitrust authority in order to elicit self-reporting by colluding rms.
With a higher rate of market investigations, the option to self-report becomes more
tempting for rms. This is because with self-reporting rms pay a lower certain
ne (rather than a higher expected ne) and, at the same time, save on avoidance
activities. Similarly, an increase in the cost of avoidance e¤ort makes rms to invest
less resources in avoidance activities, implying a higher probability of detection.
Thus, again, the option to self-report becomes more appealing for rms.
Lemma 3 (Desistance). If  > , where  = 1   2p
1
3 k
1
3
F 2=3
, then a deviating rm
129
is better-o¤ to self-report to the antitrust authority after deviating in the market.
Self-reporting is more appealing to rms when p and k are low and F is high.
To proceed with the analysis, suppose that  > . This implies that after a
rm deviates in the market, it self-reports to the antitrust authority. In this case,
normal collusion is sustained if VN  V dr. This inequality holds if collusion is
su¢ ciently lucrative, i.e.,   2p
1
3 k
2
3 F
1
3 (1 )(1 )F
2 1  LPN (). It is straightforward
to see that a more generous leniency programme (i.e., higher ) makes it more
challenging to sustain normal collusion.242
@LPN ()
@
=
(1  )F
2   1 > 0
Lemma 4. When a leniency programme is available and provided that the ne
discount rate is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  > , where  = 1   2p
1
3 k
1
3
F 2=3
, collusion is
sustained if   LPN (), where LPN () = 2p
1
3 k
2
3 F
1
3 (1 )(1 )F
2 1 . Normal collusion
is harder to sustain with a more generous ne discount.
It is straightforward to see that LPN () > N . This implies that the e¤ective-
ness of antitrust policy is enhanced with the introduction of a leniency programme.
4.3.3 Alternative collusive strategies
The set of collusive strategies expands when a leniency programme is available.
For instance, rms can adopt an alternative strategy, namely, to collude and sys-
tematically self-report to the antitrust authority. To simplify the exposition, we
consider a strategy where rms collude and report in every period. We label this
strategy as Collude and Report. When rms adopt this strategy, then each of
them appropriates the collusive prots  and pays a discounted ne with proba-
bility 1
2
, since only the rst self-reporting rm is eligible to a lenient treatment.
Thus, the present value of the expected payo¤ if rms collude and self-report in
every period is:
VR =
  (1  
2
)F
1  
If a rm deviates from this strategy, it obtains a payo¤ equal to:
V dR = 2  (1 

2
)F
242The impact of leniency programmes on a cartels sustainability has been identied, among
others, by Spagnolo [2004], Harrington [2008] and Houba et al. [2011].
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Considering the above, a deviation from Collude and Reportis not protable
if collusive prots are su¢ ciently high. In particular Collude and Report can
be sustained if VR  V dR . This inequality holds if   (2 )F2(2 1)  R(). It is
straightforward to see that a more generous leniency programme makes it easier
to sustain this alternative collusive strategy.
@R()
@
=   F
2(2   1) < 0
Note that if the ne discount is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  > 2

1  2p
1
3 k
2
3
F
2
3

 ,
then this alternative collusive strategy is more robust than normal collusion with-
out a leniency programme, i.e., R() < N . The argument is that a su¢ ciently
generous leniency programme can be exploited by rms and establish a cartel which
in the absence of a leniency programme would be unprotable. Thus, a leniency
programme can enhance cartel formation contrary to its objective.243Observe that
Collude and Reportis easier to sustain with a higher probability of investigation
(p) and cost of avoidance e¤ort (k) and lower ne (F ).
Lemma 5 (Deterrence). Collude and Reportis more robust than normal collusion
without a leniency programme if  > , where  = 2

1  2p
1
3 k
2
3
F
2
3

.
4.4 The Optimal ne discount rate
The above analysis highlights the trade-o¤ between cartel desistance and cartel
deterrence.244 On the one hand, a more generous leniency programmes makes
cartels more fragile, and, thus, more di¢ cult to sustain (see Lemma 4). On the
other hand, a su¢ ciently generous leniency programme may enable some rms to
establish a cartel that would be unprotable without a leniency programme (see
Lemma 5).
From the analysis of Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, normal collusion can be
sustained regardless of whether a leniency programme is available if:
  N() = maxfN ;LPN ()g
while Collude and Reportcan be sustained if:
243The pro-collusive e¤ect of leniency programmes was initially pointed out by Motta and Polo
[2003].
244See, Motta and Polo [2003], Chen and Harrington [2007], Harrington [2008] and Chen and
Rey [2012].
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  R()
Thus, the deterrence threshold is:
()  minfN();R()g
In words, those cartels with prots less than () are deterred. Notice that, by
denition, the leniency programme does not facilitate normal collusion nor does
it provokes new cartels to form. Given that the antitrust authoritys objective is
to deter cartels in as many industries as possible, the optimal ne discount rate
should maximize the deterrence threshold:
^ = argmax

()
As remarked above, the introduction of a leniency programme makes collusion
more fragile if  >  and does not foster alternative forms of collusion if  < .
Since  < , it is optimal to o¤er a ne discount rate  2 (; ), so that to deter
collusion in industries where, absent a leniency programme, normal collusion could
be sustained. Moreover, given that LPN () increases in  (i.e., destabilizes normal
collusion) but, at the same time, decreases R (i.e., facilitate Collude and Report
strategies), the optimal leniency programme is such that LPN () = R(). This
implies that the optimal discount rate is:
^ =
2

F   2p 13F 13k 23

(2  )F (8)
To visualize the analysis above consider Figure 11 below. The horizontal axis
of the graph represents the ne discount rate, while the vertical axis represents
the per-rm collusive prots. The green line depicts N , the purple line LPN and
the red line R.
Notice that LPN has a positive slope as an increase in the ne discount rate
(more generous leniency programme) reinforce rmsincentives to deviate in the
market and simultaneously self-report to the antitrust authority, i.e., it makes it
harder to sustain the cartel. Moreover, R has a negative slope as an increase
in the ne discount rate makes it more protable for rms to collude and report
in every period. Observe that N is independent of the ne discount rate, since
it reects the threshold for normal collusion in absence of a leniency programme.
Without a leniency programme all cartels with per-rm collusive prots lower than
N are deterred.
When  > , then a deviant rm prefer to self-report to the antitrust authority
and therefore the threshold for cartel deterrence is given by LPN . Moreover, when
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 >  rms can exploit the generosity of the leniency programme by adopting
collude and report strategies. For  > , this strategy adversely a¤ects deterrence
since for N > R.
The optimal ne discount rate ^ is determined by the intersection of LPN and
R. Note that the threshold of deterrence with an optimally designed leniency
programme which takes into account rmsdecisions to engage in detection avoid-
ance activities ^R(^) is greater than the threshold for normal collusion N . Thus,
an optimally designed leniency policy is e¤ective in deterring cartels.
Figure 11: Optimal ne discount rate when rms can engage in detection avoidance
activities.
Note that the optimal ne discount rate is increasing (at a diminishing rate)
with the severity of the ne. Intuitively, when the ne increases, rms profoundly
invest in costly avoidance activities. Thus, a more generous ne discount must
be o¤ered by the antitrust authority in order to elicit self-reporting by rms.
Moreover, notice that the optimal ne discount rate is decreasing (at an increasing
rate) with the frequency of market investigations and the cost of avoidance e¤ort.
If the antitrust authority conducts fewer market investigations (i.e., the audit rate
decreases), then rms would invest less in costly avoidance activities. In this case,
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the antitrust authority can attain the optimal level of deterrence with a lower ne
discount rate. Similarly, when the cost of avoidance activities increases, rms
e¤orts to avoid detection becomes less intense. Thus, the antitrust authority can
attain the optimal level deterrence with a less generous leniency programme.
Moreover, observe that it is desirable to o¤er a positive reward to a self-
reporting rm, i.e., ^ > 1, if a) p < 
3F 2
64k2
or b) F > 8k
p
p

3
2
or c) k < 
3
2 F
8
p
p
. In
words, if a) the frequency of market investigations is low so that the probability
of detection is relatively low or b) the cost of avoidance e¤ort is relatively low so
that rmsinvest heavily in avoidance activities or c) the magnitude of the ne is
su¢ ciently high so that the expected ne is relatively high, then the leniency pro-
gramme should be more generous. In contrast to Chen and Rey [2012], it may be
optimal not to o¤er a lenient treatment if the frequency of inspection is relatively
high (p > 1
2
) and the ne is relatively low (F  2kp2p).
Taking into consideration that: i) k
p
7 2kp2p if p ? 1
2
and ii) 2k
p
2p <
8k
p
p

3
2
,we
derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The optimal leniency programme when rms can invest resources
to avoid detection is characterized by ^ =
2

F 2p 13 F 13 k 23

(2 )F . The optimal leniency
programme is such that:
1. ^ = 0 (no leniency) if p > 1
2
and F 2 (k
p
; 2k
p
2p]
2. ^ 2 (0; 1] if:
(a) p = 1
2
and F 2 (k
p
;
8k
p
p

3
2
] or
(b) p > 1
2
and F 2 (2kp2p; 8k
p
p

3
2
)
3. ^ > 1 (positive reward) if:
(a) p < 1
2
and F > k
p
or
(b) p  1
2
and F > 8k
p
p

3
2
The threshold for collusive prots that characterizes the e¤ectiveness of the
leniency programme is:
^(^) =

h
F (1  ) + 2p 13F 13k 23
i
5   2(1 + 2)
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This threshold determines the e¤ectiveness of the antitrust policy when the port-
folio of policy instruments includes a leniency programme. It implies that cartels
with prots less than ^(^) are deterred.
Corollary 1. The level of optimal deterrence when colluding rms can engage in
avoidance activities is determined by ^(^), where ^(^) =

h
F (1 )+2p 13 F 13 k 23
i
5 2(1+2) .
It is straightforward to see that ^(^) > N . This implies that the optimal
leniency programme enhances the e¢ cacy of the antitrust policy, as more cartels
are deterred when a leniency programme is available.
Moreover, notice that VN > VR(^). This implies that when the ne discount
rate is set at the optimal level, then rms would not adopt Collude and Report
strategies. Although this type of strategies could be sustained, rms would prefer
to collude without reporting to the antitrust authority.
4.4.1 Comparison with Chen and Rey (2012)
If the antitrust authority does not take into account rmsdecisions to engage
in costly e¤orts to avoid detection, then, as shown by Chen and Rey [2012], the
optimal ne discount rate is:
 =
2(1  p)
2  
It is straightforward to see that  ? ^ if F 7 2
p
2k
p
. In words, if the antitrust
authority fails to take into consideration rmse¤ort to avoid detection, then the
leniency programme would be suboptimal. In particular, if the leniency programme
provides excessive leniency (i.e.,  > ^) then it would be: a) easier to sustain Col-
lude and Report, since the gains from defecting in the market are reduced (R()
decreases with ) and, b) harder to sustain normal collusion, since the gains from
a deviation in the market along with a leniency application increase (LPN () in-
creases with ). Therefore, cartels with prots  2

R(); ^R(^)

which would
otherwise not have been sustained, can establish a viable cartel by adopting Col-
lude and Reportstrategies. Thus, a wrongly designed leniency programme that
provides a ne discount rate greater than the optimal level (i.e.,  > ^) results in
under-deterrence. This is illustrated in Figure 12 below.
On the other hand, if the leniency programme provides insu¢ cient leniency
(i.e.,  < ^), then it would be: a) easier to sustain normal collusion, since the
gains from deviating in the market with a simultaneous self-report to the antitrust
authority diminish (LPN () increases with ) and, b) harder to Collude and Re-
portsince the gains from defecting in the market increase (R() decreases with
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Figure 12: When  > ^, the leniency programme results in under-deterrence. With
a ne discount rate that disregards rmse¤orts to avoid detection , cartels with
prots  2

R(); ^R(^)

can be sustained by resorting to collude and report
strategies.
). Therefore, cartels with prots  2

LPN (
); ^(^)

which otherwise would
have been deterred can now be sustained. This is illustrated in Figure 13 below.
The above discussion is condensed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal ne discount rate is suboptimal when the antitrust
authority does not take into consideration rmsdecisions to engage in avoidance
activities. The leniency programme results in under-deterrence. Normal collusion
is facilitated when the ne is relatively low, i.e., F < 2
p
2k
p
. Firms exploit the
generosity of the leniency programme and establish cartels that otherwise would
have been unprotable when the ne is relatively high, i.e., F > 2
p
2k
p
.
4.5 Conclusions
This paper derives the optimal leniency programme when colluding rms have the
opportunity to engage in activities to avoid detection by an antitrust authority.
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Figure 13: When  < ^, the leniency programme results in under-deterrence. With
a ne discount rate that disregards rmse¤orts to avoid detection , cartels with
prots  2

LPN (
); ^(^)

can be sustained since a deviation in the market with
a simultaneous self-report to the antitrust authority becomes less protable.
We have modied the basic model by Chen and Rey [2012] in order to incorpo-
rate an endogenous probability of detection which depends on the frequency of
inspection and the intensity of rmsdetection avoidance activities. This model
provides a very simple theoretical framework to analyze the optimal leniency pro-
gramme. Importantly, it helps to illuminate the trade-o¤ between deterrence and
desistance. By extending the basic model developed by Chen and Rey [2012], we
show that rmsavoidance e¤orts have a profound impact on the design of opti-
mal leniency policies. In particular, we show that the optimal ne discount rate
depends positively on the severity of the ne and negatively on the probability of
investigation and the cost of avoidance activities. Moreover, we demonstrate that
when the ne is relatively low and the cost of avoidance e¤ort relatively high no
leniency should be o¤ered. This di¤ers from the results previously obtained by
Chen and Rey [2012] who show that it is always optimal to o¤er some leniency to
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self-reporting rms. Furthermore, the paper derives the conditions under which
the antitrust authority must o¤er a positive reward in order to attain the optimal
level of deterrence. Finally, we show that a leniency programme that fails to take
into account rmsdecisions to undertake e¤ort to avoid detection may result in
under-deterrence. Depending on the severity of the ne, either normal collusion
is facilitated or cartel formation is fostered.
This paper contributes to the literature on leniency programmes in antitrust
and, more generally, to the literature on generic law enforcement for crimes com-
mitted by groups of violators. By characterizing the leniency programme when
avoidance is taken into consideration, the paper derives interesting policy impli-
cations about the interplay between the policy instruments (ne, frequency of in-
spections and leniency programme). Furthermore, it highlights the potential risks
that emanate from a wrongly designed leniency programme when policymakers
fail to take into consideration rmse¤orts to avoid detection. Thus, a policy rec-
ommendation that derives from the analysis of this paper is that policy designers
should not underrate rmse¤orts to avoid detection.
Some remarks are in order before we conclude. The repeated structure of the
game essentially means that the antitrust authority does not distinguish between
rst time o¤enders and repeated o¤enders. In their paper, Chen and Rey [2012]
extend the basic setting in order to examine the e¤ects of a discriminatory leniency
programme. Nonetheless, they do not nd support for prohibiting access to the
leniency for repeated o¤enders. Thus, we do not expect our results to change, at
least qualitatively, by allowing a discriminatory leniency policy. A further remark
is that in this paper we consider avoidance e¤ort which inuences the probability of
cartel detection. However, the model could be easily adapted in order to consider
e¤ort or activities that inuence the level of the ne rather than the probability
of detection. Such e¤ort may include defense expenditures or litigation e¤ort
(lawyers, consultants, advisors, experts etc.).
Several assumptions of this paper were made to simplify the exposition. For
instance, we assume that colluding rms (or cartels) are assumed to be homoge-
neous with respect to the cost of avoidance e¤ort, the cost of rmsavoidance
activities is independent of the cartelsprots (or overcharges), and, the antitrust
authority has complete information with regard to the rmsdetection avoidance
technologies. The implications of relaxing these assumptions remain open to future
research.
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Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 6. 1. p1  0 i¤   1, where 1  F 2(+ )(+ +1)
2. 1 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ )
3. p1 +  1 i¤   2, where 2  2(+ )(1 )(1 )( F   1)
4. 2 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ )
5. 1  2 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ].
Proof of Lemma 6
(1) To show: p1 > 0 i¤ < 1, where 1  F 2(+ )(+ +1) :
p1  0,

F
  ( +     + 1)
2( +    )  0,
  
F
2( +    )
( +     + 1)  1
) QED:
(2) To show: 1 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ ) :
1 > 1 ,

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) > 1,

F
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
) QED:
(3) To show: p1 +  1 i¤ > 2, where 2  2(+ )(1 )(1 )( F   1):
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  ( +     + 1)
2( +    ) +   1,
(

F
  1)  ( +     + 1
2( +    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  2( +    )
(1  )(1  )(

F
  1)  2
) QED:
(4) To show: 2 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ ) :
2 > 1,
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 +    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(1  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
F
  1) > 1,

F
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)(1  )
2( +    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
F
>
(1  )(1  )
2( +    ) + 1,

F
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
) QED:
(5) To show: 1 > 2 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ]:
1 > 2 ,

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) >
2( +    )
(1  )(1  )(

F
  1),

F
<
1 +  +    
2( +    )
true given that

F
2 [1;  +     + 1
2( +    ) ]
) QED:
If 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then both 1  1 (from Lemma 6(2)) and 2  1 (from
Lemma 6(4)). Moreover, 1 > 2 (from Lemma 6(5)). Hence, if  < 2 then
p1 > 1   so that for all p 2 [0; 1  ] (Keep, Keep) is a NE. If  2 [2;1]
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then p 2 [0; 1   ] and thus for all p < p1 (Keep, Keep) is a NE. Moreover, if
 > 1 then p1 < 0 so that (Keep, Keep) is not a NE. The intuition for the
latter result is the following. If the additional probability with which the collusive
rms are detected in the presence of hard evidence is su¢ ciently high then each
rm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the agreement and destroy the
hard evidence. By destroying the hard evidence the probability of detection and
therefore of paying the ne decreases by 
2
. This decrease is higher when  is
high. If on the other hand 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) then both 1 > 1 (from Lemma 6(2))
and 2 > 1 (from Lemma 6(4)), implying that p1 > 0 and p1 > 1   . In this
case (Keep, Keep) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for all p 2 [0; 1  ] .
Hence, if the ratio of collusive prots to ne is relatively high then no rm has an
incentive to deviate from (Keep, Keep). Any deviation in that case will result in
deprivation of future prots which is very costly given that the level of the ne is
relatively low compared to the collusive prots.
Lemma 7. (Keep, Keep) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy game if:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and either a)  < 2 and p 2 [0; 1 ] or b)  2 [2;1]
and p 2 [0; p1] or
2. 
F
> + +1
2(+ )
Lemma 8. 1. p3  0 i¤  < 3; where 3 =  F
2. 3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. p3  1  i¤   4; where 4 = 1  ( F   1)
4. 4 > 1 i¤ F >
1

5. 2 > 4
6. 3 > 2
7. 1 > 3
8. 1 > 3 > 2 > 4
9. p1 > p3
10. + +1
2(+ ) <
1

11. 3 > 4 i¤ F <
1

:
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Proof of Lemma 8
(1) To show: p3  0 i¤  3; where 3   F :
p3  0

F
  

 0,


F
 ,
   
F
 3
) QED:
(2) To show: 3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

.


F
> 1,

F
>
1

) QED:
(4) To show: p3  1  i¤  4; where 4 = 1  ( F   1):
p3  1 ,

F
  

 1 ,

F
  1  (1

  1),
  
1   (

F
  1)  4
) QED:
(5) To show: 2 > 4:
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) QED:
(6) To show: 3 > 2 i¤ F [1;
+ +1
2(+ ) ]:
By contradiction. Suppose that:
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Notice that 2(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)(1  ) > 0
always true given that ;  < 1
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But given that 
F
[1; + +1
2(+ ) ] this leads to a contradiction since:
2( +    )
2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2 >
 +     + 1
2( +    )
4( +    )( +    ) > (2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2)( +     + 1)
contradiction
) QED:
(7)
To show: 1 > 3:
1 > 3

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) > 

F
2( +    ) >  + ( +    )
2 + 2(1  )        (1  ) > 0
2(1  ) > 0
(1  ) + (1  )[(2  )] > 0
true
) QED:
(8) To show: 1 >3 > 2 > 4 i¤ F [1;
+ +1
2(+ ) ]:
From Lemmata 5, 6 and 7.
) QED:
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(9) To show: p1 > p3:
p1 > p3

F
  ( +     + 1)
2( +    ) >

F
  



>
( +     + 1)
2( +    )
(2  )( +    )   > 0
 + 2(1  )  2   (1  ) > 0
(1  ) + (2  )(1  ) > 0
 >   
2   < 0
which is always true given that  2 [0; 1]
) QED:
(10) To show: + +1
2(+ ) <
1

:
 +     + 1
2( +    ) <
1

( +    ) +  < 2( +    )
2 + (1  ) +  < 2 + 2(1  )
(1  ) + 2(1  )  (1  ) > 0
 + (2  ) > 0
true
) QED:
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(11) To show: 3 > 4 i¤ F <
1

:
3 > 4 ,


F
>

1   (

F
  1),

F
>
1
1   (

F
  1),
(1  ) 
F
>

F
  1,

F
(1     1) <  1,
1 > 

F
,

F
<
1

) QED:
From Lemmata 7 and 8 we get the following result.
Lemma 9. The Keep-Destroy subgame has two NE if:
1. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]
(a)  < 2 and p 2 [0; 1 ]
(b)  2 [2;1] and p 2 [0; p1]
2. For 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) ; 8 and 8p.
Corollary 2. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] the unique NE is (Destroy, Destroy) if:
1.  2 [2;1] and p 2 [p1; 1 ] or
2.  > 1:
From Lemma 9 we distinguish three cases:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and  < 2
2. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p < p1 and  2 [2;1]
3. 
F
> + +1
2(+ )
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We will analyze each of the three cases below.
Case 1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and  < 2
Given that 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], then from Lemma 8(8) 3 > 2 > 4. Given
that 3 > 2, from Lemma 8(1) p3  0. Moreover, if  < 4 then p3 > 1  so
that for all p (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy). If on the
other hand  2 [4;2] then from 8(3) p3  1   and thus for p < p3 (Keep,
Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p  p3 (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep). These results are summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 10. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and  < 2 the Pareto dominant NE of the
Keep-Destroy subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if:
(a)  < 4(< 2) and 8p 2 [0; 1 ]
(b)  2 [4;2] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if  2 [4;2] and p  p3.
Case 2. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p  p1 and  2 [2;1]
From Lemma 8(8) we know that 1 > 3 > 2 > 4: Hence, 3 2 [2;1].
Given that 4 < 2 for all  2 [2;1], p3  1   . Then, for  2 [2;3],
p3 2 [0; p1], while for  2 (3;1], p3 < 0. Hence, for  2 [2;3] if p < p3
(Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; p1]
(Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep). On the other hand, if
 2 (3;1] then for all p  p1 (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep,
Keep).
From the above analysis and from Corollary 2 we get the following result.
Lemma 11. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p < p1 and  2 [2;1] the Pareto dominant
NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if  2 [2;3] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if:
(a)  2 [2;3] and p 2 [p3; p1]
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(b)  2 [2;1] and p > p1
(c)  2 (3;1] and p  p1
(d)  > 1
Conjoining Lemmata 10 and 11, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] the Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy
subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if:
(a)  < 4 and 8p 2 [0; 1 ]
(b)  2 [2;3] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if:
(a)  2 [4;3] and p  p3
(b)  > 3 and 8p 2 [0; 1 ]
Case 3. 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) .
In that case we know from Lemma 9 that there are two NE for all p 2 [0; 1 
] and for all  2 [0; 1). From Lemmata 8(2), 8(4), 8(9) and 8(10) for 
F
2
[ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

], 4 < 3 < 1. Hence, if  < 4, then p3 > 1    and thus
(Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy). If  2 [4;3] then
for p < p3 (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for
p  p3 (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep). Moreover, for
all  > 3, p3 < 0 so that (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep,
Keep). If on the other hand 
F
> 1

then both we know from Lemma 8(2)and 8(4)
that both 3  1 and 4 > 1, implying that p3  0 and p3 > 1 . In that case
for all p and for all  (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
We can summarize the above results into the following lemma.
Lemma 13. For 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) the Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy
subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep)
(a) For 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

]
i.  < 4 and 8p 2 [0; 1 ]
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ii.  2 [4;3] and p < p3
(b) For 
F
> 1

2. (Destroy, Destroy)
(a) For 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

]
i.  2 [4;3] and p  p3
ii.  > 3 and 8p 2 [0; 1 ]
From Lemmata 12 and 13 we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For given policy and other parameters (p, , F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the baseline model without LP is:
1. (Keep, Keep) i¤:
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
i.  2 [0;4] and p 2 [0; 1 ] or
ii.  2 [4;3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
(b) 
F
> 1

,  2 [0; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 ]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
(a)  2 [4;3] and p 2 [p3; 1 ] or
(b)  2 (3; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 ]
where p3  F    , 3   F and 4  1  ( F   1).
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Appendix B - Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 14. 1. For  
F
> 1 the revelation subgame has two NE.
2. For  
F
 1 and p+   
F
the revelation subgame has also two NE.
Corollary 3. For  
F
2 [1
2
; 1] and p+ >  
F
the revelation subgame has one NE
(Keep and Report, Keep and Report).
As discussed before in the case where we have two NE we apply the Pareto
dominance criterion. It is easy to show that VKR > VKNR i¤ p+ > 12 .
Lemma 15. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) in the revelation subgame if
p+ > 1
2
.
Therefore, from Lemmata 14 and 15 we obtain the following result:
Lemma 16. 1. For  
F
2 [1
2
; 1]
(a) (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ 1
2
< p+   
F
(b) (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+  1
2
2. For  
F
> 1
(a) (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+ > 1
2
(b) (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+  1
2
Conation of Corollary 3 and Lemma 16 above boils down to the following
lemma.
Lemma 17. The Pareto dominant NE of the Revelation subgame is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+  1
2
;
2. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+ > 1
2
:
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Proof of Lemma 14
Lemma 18. 1. p4 <  F
2. p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
3. p4 < 12   i¤  < 5, where 5 = 1  F   2(1 )
4. 5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
Proof of Lemma 18
(1) To show: p4 <  F :
p4 < 

F
F   2M
2(1  )F < 

F
 >
1  2 
F
2(1  ) 
F
 1
Notice that:
1 > 0
1  2 
F
2(1  ) 
F
> 0

F
<
1
2
contradiction since

F
 1
) Given that 1 < 0 it is always true that p4 <  F .
(2) To show: p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
:
p4 < 0()
F   2M
2(1  )F < 0()

F
>
1
2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) QED:
(3) To show: p4 < 12   i¤ < 5, where 5 = 1  F   2(1 ) :
p4 <
1
2
 ()
 <

1  

F
  
2(1  )  5
) QED:
(4) To show: 5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
:
5 > 1()

1  

F
  
2(1  ) > 1()

F
>
2  
2
) QED:
Consider rst Lemma 9(1), that is,  
F
< 1    so that the Keep-Destroy
subgame has two NE for p 2 [1
2
 ;  
F
]: Then, given Lemmata 10 and 18 above
we can now proceed to the analysis to nd the NE at the Keep-Destroy subgame.
To begin with suppose that  < 1
2
. Then, 1 < 1
2
< 2 
2
. From Lemma 18(2) if

F
> 1
2
; p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
  g;  
F
]. If however

F
< 1
2
then from Lemma 18(3) p4 2 [0; 12 ] if  < 5. Therefore, if F 2 [1; 12 ]
and  < 5 then (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [1
2
 ;  
F
]. If on the other hand  > 5 then
for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
  g; p4] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Report, Keep and Report), whereas for all p 2 (p4;  F ] (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
Suppose now that  2 [1
2
; 2
3
]. Then 2 
2
> 1 > 1
2
. From Lemma 18(2) if

F
2 [1; 2 
2
] then p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [1
2
  ;  
F
]. Moreover, if

F
> 2 
2
then again p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g;  
F
].
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Finally, suppose that  > 2
3
. Then 1 > 2 
2
> 1
2
. From Lemma 18(2) for all

F
 1; p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g;  
F
].
Consider now Lemma 9(2), that is  
F
> 1 so that for all p 2 [1
2
  ; 1   ]
there are two NE. In that case we have to check whether p4 is greater or lower
than 1 .
Lemma 19. 1. p4 < 1  i¤  < 6; where 6 = 1 22(1 ) + 1  F
2. 6 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. 6 > 5
Proof of Lemma 19
(1) To show: p4 < 1  i¤ < 6 where 6 = 1 22(1 ) + 1  F :
p4 < 1 ,
F   2M
2(1  )F < 1 ,
 <
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
 6
) QED:
(2) To show: 6 > 1 i¤ F >
1

:
6 > 1,
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
> 1,

F
>
1

) 6 > 1 if F >
1

:
(3) To show: 6 > 5:
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6 > 5
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
>

1  

F
  
2(1  )
1  2
2(1  ) >  

2(1  )
1  2 + 
2(1  )
1
2
> 0
) QED:
Taking into consideration Lemma 19 above we can nd the Pareto dominant
NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for di¤erent combinations of parametersvalues.
To begin with suppose that  < 1
2
. Then, 1 < 1
2
< 2 
2
< 1

: In that case, if

F
> 1
2
then p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]. If on
the other hand, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] then we can distinguish the following three cases:
1. From Lemma 18(3) if < 5 then p4 < 12  so that for all p 2 [12 ; 1 ]
(Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy).
2. From Lemmata 18(3), 19(1) and 19(3) if  2 [5;6] then p4 > 12    so
that for p 2 [0; p4] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report), while for p 2 (p4; 1   ] (Keep and Re-
port, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
3. From Lemma 19(1) if  > 6 then p4 > 1  so that for all p 2 [0; 1 ]
(Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and Report, Keep and
Report).
Suppose now that  2 [1
2
; 2
3
]. Then, 1
2
< 1 < 2 
2
< 1

: From Lemma 18(2) for
all 
F
 1 then p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]:
Finally, if  > 2
3
then 1
2
< 2 
2
< 1 < 1

: From 18(2) then for all 
F
 1, p4 <
0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 (maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]:
We can now summarize the above results in the lemma below.
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Lemma 20. The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for
p+ > 1
2
and  
F
 1 is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
, 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ];
(b)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  < 5 and p 2 [12  ; 1 ];
(c)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  > 5 and p 2 [p4; 1 ];
(d)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  > 5 and p 2 [maxf0; 12  
g; p4].
Lemma 21. The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for
p > 1
2
  and  
F
> 1 is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
, 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ];
(b)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 (12  ; 1 ];
(c)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;6] and p 2 (p4; 1 ];
(d)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and  2 [5;6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  g; p4];
(b)  < 1
2
and 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]  > 6 and p 2 [0; 1 ]:
From Lemmata 20 and 21 we get the following Lemma.
Lemma 22. The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+ > 1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) if:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 [12  ; 1 ]
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;6] and p 2 (p4; 1 ]
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iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a)  2 [5;6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  g; p4]
(b)  > 6 and p 2 [0; 1 ].
Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 23. 1. p5  0 i¤   7, where 7 = F 2(+ )+ +1
2. 7  1 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ]
3. + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
4. p5 + < 12 i¤  > 8, where 8 =
(2 
F
 1)(+ )
1 (+ )
5. 8 > 1
6. 8 > 7
Proof of Lemma 23
(1) To show: p5 > 0 i¤ < 7, where 7 = F
2(+ )
+ +1 :
p5 > 0,

F
  ( +     + 1)
2( +    ) > 0,
 <

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1  7
) QED:
(2) To show: 7 < 1 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ].
7 < 1,

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1 < 1,

F
<
 +     + 1
2( +    )
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) QED:
(3) To show: + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
:
 +     + 1
2( +    ) >
1
2
 <
2
(1  )2
Given that  2 [1
2
; 1]; lim
! 1
2
2
(1 )2 = 1 and lim!1
2
(1 )2 = 1. Thus, given that
 2 [0; 1],  < 2
(1 )2 : Another way to see this is the following. Observe that
+ +1
+  > 1 and that max
2[ 1
2
;1]
1
2
= 1.
) QED:
(4) To show: p5 + < 12 i¤ > 8, where 8 =
(2 
F
 1)(+ )
81 (+ ) :
p5 + <
1
2
,

F
  ( +     + 1)
2( +    ) +  <
1
2
,
 >
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    )  8
) QED:
(5) To show: 8 > 1:
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    ) > 1
(2

F
  1)( +    ) > 1  ( +    )

F
>
1  ( +    ) + ( +    )
2( +    )

F
>
1
2( +    )
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12( +    ) < 1
1 < 2( +    )
 +     > 1
2
true given that   1
2
) 8 > 1:
(6) To show: 7 > 8:
7 > 8

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1 >
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    )

F
<
1 +  +    
4( +    )
Notice however that given that we are in the area where 
F
> 1
2
for this to hold
it must be the case that:
1 +  +    
4( +    ) >
1
2
(1  ) + (1  )(2  ) < 0
This, however, implies that 
F
< 1++ 
4(+ ) <
1
2
which is a contradiction.
) QED:
Notice that Lemma 23(5) imply that p5 > 12  .
Corollary 4. p5 > 12  .
From Lemma 23(1) p5 > 0 8 i¤ F > + +12(+ ) , while p5 > 0 for all   7
i¤ 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]. Therefore, for

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and  < 7 and for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
  ] (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE
of the Keep-Destroy subgame. If however 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then from Lemmata
23(1) and 23(2) and  > 7 then p5 < 0. In the latter case (Keep Not Report,
Keep Not Report) is not a NE. On the other hand, from Lemmata 23(1), 23(2),
23(4) and 23(5) if 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) then both 8 > 1 and 7 > 1, so that for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ] (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) form a NE
of the Keep-Destroy subgame.
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Lemma 24. The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for p < 1
2
 
is:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and   7 and p 2 [0; 12  ]
2. 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
Corollary 5. If 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and  > 7 the unique NE of the Keep-Destroy
subgame for p  1
2
  is (Destroy, Destroy).
Lemma 25. 1. p3  0 i¤   3, where 3   F :
2. 3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. p3  12   i¤   5, where 5  1  ( F   12)
4. 5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
(from Lemma 18(4))
5. 5 > 3 i¤ F >
1
2
6. 1

> + +1
2(+ )
7. 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ )
8. 2 
2
< 1

9. 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) if  < 0:414 or if  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  > 
2
(1 )2
Proof of Lemma 25
(1) To show: p3 > 0 if  < 3, where 3 =  F :
p3 > 0,

F
  

> 0,
 < 

F
 3
) QED:
(2) To show: 1

> + +1
2(+ ) :
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Let x   +    : Notice that x < 1. Then,
1

>
x+ 1
2x
2x > x+ x
x(2  ) > 
1

>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
(2 + (1  ))(1  ) > 0
Given that x >  it is the case also that x(2  ) > :
) QED:
(3) To show: p3 < 12   if  > 5, where 5 = 1  ( F   12):
p3 <
1
2
 ,
 >

1   (

F
  1
2
)  5
) QED:
(4) To show: 5 > 1 if F >
2 
2
:
5 > 1,

1   (

F
  1
2
) > 1,

F
>
2  
2
) QED:
(5) To show: 3 > 1 if F >
1

:
3 > 1,


F
> 1,

F
>
1
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) QED:
(6) To show: 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) :
By contradiction. Suppose that 2 
2
< + +1
2(+ ) . Then:
2  
2
<
 +     + 1
2( +    )
 <
(2   1)
22   4 + 2
Now, observe that (2 1)
22 4+2 <
1
2
:
(2   1)
22   4 + 2 <
1
2
2 +  < 2
always true
This implies that  < (2 1)
22 4+2 <
1
2
which is a contradiction, given
assumption 2.
) QED:
(7) To show: 2 
2
< 1

:
2  
2
<
1

 > 0
) QED:
(8) To show: 5 > 3 i¤ F >
1
2
:
5 > 3 ,

1   (

F
  1
2
) > 

F
,

F
>
1
2
) QED:
(9) To show: 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) if  < 0; 414 or if  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and  > 
2
(1 )2 :
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Let x   +    : Then:
1
2
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
x > x+ 
x >

1  
Now notice that 
1  > 1 if  >
1
2
: However, this leads to a contradiction since
x < 1: Therefore. if  > 1
2
then 1
2
< + +1
2(+ ) .
Now suppose that  < 1
2
: In this case,
1
2
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
 >
2
(1  )2
Notice that 
2
(1 )2 <
1
2
if  < 0; 414: Therefore, for  < 0; 414 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) .
Moreover, for  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and  > 2
(1 )2 : Conversely, if  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and
 < 
2
(1 )2 then
1
2
< + +1
2(+ ) :
) QED:
Case 1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] so that 7 < 1
1. From Lemmata 25(8) and 25(9) if  < 0:414 or  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  > 2
(1 )2
then 1

> 2 
2
> 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) > 1. Therefore, given that

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]
and taking into account Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3), 25(4) and 25(5) we
may distinguish three subcases:
(a) if  < 5 then p3  0 and p3 > 12  . Hence (Keep and not Re-
port, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, De-
stroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(b) if  2 [5;3] then p3  0 and p3  12   . Hence for p 2 [0; p3)
(Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dom-
inates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12   ] (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report).
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(c) if  2 [3,12 ] then p3 < 0 and p3  12   . Hence (Destroy, De-
stroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and not
Report) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]. Notice that we restrict  < 1
2
so that
the set [0; 1
2
 ] is non-empty.
2. From Lemmata 25(7), 25(8) and 25(9) if  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  < 2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
> 1.
(a) If 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] then from Lemma 25(5) 3 > 5. Taking into consid-
eration Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3) and 25(4) we may distinguish the
following three cases:
i. if  < 5 then p3  0 and p3 > 12   . Hence (Keep and not
Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
ii. if  2 [5;3] then p3  0 and p3  12  . Hence for p 2 [0; p3)
(Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dom-
inates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12 ] (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report).
iii. if  2 [3; 12 ] then p3 < 0 and p3  12   . Hence (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(b) If 
F
2 [ 1
2
; + +1
2(+ ) ] then from Lemma 25(5) 5 > 3 >
1
2
. Taking
into consideration Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3) and 25(4) if  < 1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  . Hence, (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
3. From Lemmata 25(7), 25(8) if  2 [1
2
; 2
3
] then 1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1 > 1
2
. By taking into consideration Lemmata 25(2), 25(4) and 25(5) if

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then 5 > 3 >
1
2
. By Lemmata 25(1) and 25(3) if  < 1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12  . Hence for  < 12 (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
4. From Lemmata 25(7), 25(8) if  > 2
3
then 1

> + +1
2(+ ) > 1 >
2 
2
> 1
2
.
By taking into account Lemmata 25(2), 25(4) and 25(5) 1 > 5 > 3 > 12 .
Hence, from Lemmata 25(1) and 25(3) if  < 1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12  .
Therefore, for  < 1
2
(Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
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Case 2. 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) so that 7 > 1
Consider the second case now where 7 > 1 so that for all  and p  12  
we have two NE.
1. From Lemmata 25(7), 25(8) and 25(9) if  < 0:414 or  2 [0:414; 0:5] and
 > 
2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) > 1. Therefore, given that

F
> + +1
2(+ ) and taking into account Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3), 25(4)
and 25(5) we may then distinguish four cases:
(a) if 
F
> 1

then both 5 > 3 > 1 implying that p3  0 and p3 >
1
2
  . Therefore for  < 1
2
(Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2
[0; 1
2
 ].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then 5 > 1 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(c) if 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 2 
2
] then 1 > 5 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(d) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
] then 1
2
> 3 > 5. Therefore:
i. if  < 5, then p3 > 0 and p3 > 12  and hence (Keep and not
Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy).
ii. if  2 [5;3] then p3  0 and p3  12   and hence for p < p3
(Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dom-
inates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12 ] (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report).
iii. if > (3; 12 ] then p3 < 0 and hence (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto
dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
2. From Lemmata 25(7), 25(8) and 25(9) if  2 [0; 414; 0; 5] and  < 2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
> 1. By taking into account Lemmata 25(1),
25(2), 25(3), 25(4) and 25(5) we may then distinguish the following three
cases:
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(a) if 
F
> 1

then both 5 > 3 > 12 implying that for all  <
1
2
p3 > 0
and p3 > 12   . Therefore (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2
[0; 1
2
 ].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then 5 > 1 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(c) if 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
2 
2
] then 1 > 5 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
3. From Lemmata 25(7) and 25(8) if  2 [1
2
; 2
3
] then 1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1 > 1
2
. By taking into consideration Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3), 25(4)
and 25(5) we may then distinguish the following three cases:
(a) if 
F
> 1

then both 5 > 3 > 1 implying that for all  < 12 , p3 > 0
and p3 > 12  . Therefore, for all  < 12 (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then 5 > 1 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
(c) if 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
2 
2
] then 1 > 5 > 3 > 12 . Therefore, for  <
1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
4. From Lemmata 25(7) and 25(8) if  > 2
3
then 1

> + +1
2(+ ) > 1 >
2 
2
> 1
2
.
By taking into consideration Lemmata 25(1), 25(2), 25(3), 25(4) and 25(5)
we may then distinguish the following two cases:
(a) 
F
> 1

then both 5 > 3 > 12 implying that for all  <
1
2
, p3  0
and p3 > 12   . Therefore (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2
[0; 1
2
 ].
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(b) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then 5 > 1 > 3 >
1
2
. Therefore, for  < 1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12    and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
We can now summarize the results of the above analysis to the following lemma.
Lemma 26. The SPE of the game is (Keep and Not Report, Keep and
Not Report) if :
1.  < 0:414
(a) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
] and 7 > 1 OR F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ] and 7 < 1
i.  < 5 and p 2 [0; 12  ]
ii.  2 [5;3] and p 2 [0; p3)
(b) 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

];  < 1
2
(< 3 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
(c) 
F
> 1

;  < 1
2
< 1 < 7 and p 2 [0; 12  ]
2.  2 [0:414; 0:5]
(a)  < 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5(< 12 < 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;3](< 12 < 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; p3)
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; + +1
2(+ ) ],  <
1
2
(< 3 < 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
iv. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

],  < 1
2
(< 3 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
v. 
F
> 1

,  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]
(b)  > 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  < 5(< 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
ii. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  2 [5;3](< 12 < 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; p3)
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

],  < 1
2
(< 3 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
iv. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
],  < 5(< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
v. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
];  2 [5;3](< 12 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; p3)
vi. 
F
> 1

;  < 1
2
(< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
3.  > 0:5
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(a) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ];  <
1
2
(< 3 < 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
(b) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

];  < 1
2
(< 3 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
(c) 
F
> 1

; 8 < 1
2
(< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
Lemma 26(2(a)iii) and 26(2(a)iv) imply the following result.
Corollary 6. (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  < 2
(1 )2 ,

F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

],  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]:
From Lemma 26(2(b)i) and 26(2(b)iv) we can get the corollary below.
Corollary 7. (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  > 2
(1 )2 ;

F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 [0; 12  ]:
Lemma 26(2(b)ii) and 26(2(b)v) imply the following.
Corollary 8. (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  > 2
(1 )2 ;

F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;3] and p 2 [0; p3):
Lemma 26(3a) and 26(3b) imply the following.
Corollary 9. (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if 
F
2 [1; 1

],  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]:
From Lemma 26 and Corollaries 6, 7, 8 and 9 we get the following result, which
identies the parametersvalues for which (Keep and Not Report, Keep and
Not Report) is the Pareto dominant SPE for p  1
2
 .
Similarly, by summarizing the results of our previous analysis we nd the re-
gions for the parametersvalues for which (Destroy, Destroy) form a Pareto
dominant SPE for p  1
2
 .
Lemma 27. For p 2 [0; 1
2
  ] (Destroy, Destroy) is the Pareto dominant
SPE if:
1.  < 0:414
(a) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  2 [5;3](< 7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12  ]
(b) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  2 [3; 12 ](< 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
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(c) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
];  2 [3; 12 ](< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
(d) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
], [5;3](< 12 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [p3; 12  ]
2.  2 [0:414; 0:5]
(a)  < 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;3](< 7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12  ]
ii. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
];  2 [3; 12 ](< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
(b)  > 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  2 [5;3](< 7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12  ]
ii. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ],  2 [3; 12 ](< 7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
iii. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
];  2 [3; 12 ](< 1 < 7) and p 2 [0; 12  ]
iv. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
], [5;3](< 12 < 1 < 7) and p 2 [p3; 12  ]
Taking into consideration Corollary 5 we get the following result, which iden-
ties the parametersvalues for which (Destroy, Destroy) is the Pareto dom-
inant SPE for p 2 [0; 1
2
 ].
From Lemmata 26, 27 and 22 we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For given policy and other parameters (p, , F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the extended game with LP is:
1. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a)  2 [5;3] and p 2 [p3; 12  ] or
(b) [3; 12) and p 2 [0; 12  ] or
(c)  2 [5;6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  g; p4] or
(d)  > 6 and p 2 [0; 1 ]
2. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  < 5 and p 2 [0; 12  ] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
];  2 [5;3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ] or
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(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1;  < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 ]
3. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  < 5 and p 2 [12  ; 1 ] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
],  2 [5;6] and p 2 (p4; 1 ] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 g; 1 ]
where p3 = F    , p4 = F 2M2(1 )F , 3 =  F , 5 = 1  F   2(1 ) and 6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
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Appendix C
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Appendix D
Figure 14: Optmal e¤ort levels
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Appendix E
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VN > VR(^)
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